Simon Wilkinson wrote:

Who do you trust?

It would be trivial to arrange that the RPMs are automatically signed by a GPG key that lives on the build machine, with an unprotected private key.

I think that regardless of whether or not you protect the signing key, you're trusting that the build host hasn't been compromised. If it has, an adversary could do anything to your rpm _before_ it gets signed by a protected key (or 100 other ways someone who has compromised the host can defeat the signing process).

It's harder to arrange that they're signed by a key which requires manual intervention - but it would be possible for them to be signed, for example, by my GPG key.

I think the question here is, who is taking responsibility for the RPMs? If these are Simon Wilkinson RPMs, then I think it's fine for them to be signed by Simon. If openafs.org is asserting that the RPMs are somehow blessed by the organization (which I think is implied by the current structure, but may not be intended), they should carry an openafs.org signature. Choosing who signs the RPMs could make these relationships clearer.

As for an OpenAFS key, who do you let sign packages with that key. What happens if someone with access to that key then leaves the project, etc, etc?

openafs is hardly alone in this regard. Lots of organizations/projects deal with this issue. There are a number of ways through this.

And, ultimately, if the packages are getting signed without any form of checks, do either of the latter two actually offer any more security than the first?

The checks consist largely in the established relationships between the builders and the organization. Somewhere you have to trust someone. The holder(s) of the signing key(s) ultimately are trusted. Deciding who should sign the RPMs and who should have access to the signing keys makes that trust explicit. Unless you (whoever openafs.org is) is going to audit diffs of source RPMs and rebuild/sign them, you're trusting the RPM builders. The act of giving someone an openafs.org signing key codifies the trust. Signing an RPM with a personal RPM key likewise codifies that an individual is operating on their own behalf.

Dave Thompson
UW-Madison
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