there is a new timing attack against OpenSSL. We strongly recommend everybody to update it's openssl. You can find the scientific description here:
http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/ssl-timing.html
Best regards
Michael
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: [ADVISORY] Timing Attack on OpenSSL
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2003 08:47:01 +0000
From: Ben Laurie <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Bugtraq <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED], OpenSSL Announce <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, openssl-users <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, OpenSSL Dev <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
I expect a release to follow shortly.
-- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.thebunker.net/
"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------- Michael Bell Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ZE Computer- und Medienservice Tel.: +49 (0)30-2093 2482 (Computing Centre) Fax: +49 (0)30-2093 2704 Humboldt-University of Berlin Unter den Linden 6 10099 Berlin Email (private): [EMAIL PROTECTED] Germany http://www.openca.org
OpenSSL v0.9.7a and 0.9.6i vulnerability ----------------------------------------
Researchers have discovered a timing attack on RSA keys, to which OpenSSL is generally vulnerable, unless RSA blinding has been turned on. Typically, it will not have been, because it is not easily possible to do so when using OpenSSL to provide SSL or TLS. The enclosed patch switches blinding on by default. Applications that wish to can remove the blinding with RSA_blinding_off(), but this is not generally advised. It is also possible to disable it completely by defining OPENSSL_NO_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING at compile-time. The performance impact of blinding appears to be small (a few percent). This problem affects many applications using OpenSSL, in particular, almost all SSL-enabled Apaches. You should rebuild and reinstall OpenSSL, and all affected applications. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2003-0147 to this issue. We strongly advise upgrading OpenSSL in all cases, as a precaution.
Index: crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /e/openssl/cvs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c,v
retrieving revision 1.28.2.3
diff -u -r1.28.2.3 rsa_eay.c
--- crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c 30 Jan 2003 17:37:46 -0000 1.28.2.3
+++ crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c 16 Mar 2003 10:34:13 -0000
@@ -195,6 +195,25 @@
return(r);
}
+static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ int ret = 1;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ /* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */
+ if(rsa->blinding == NULL)
+ ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
+ do { \
+ if(((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && \
+ ((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
+ !rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
+ err_instr \
+ } while(0)
+
/* signing */
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
@@ -239,8 +258,8 @@
goto err;
}
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
- RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
+ BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
+
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
@@ -318,8 +337,8 @@
goto err;
}
- if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL))
- RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx);
+ BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
+
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING)
if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err;
Index: crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /e/openssl/cvs/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c,v
retrieving revision 1.30.2.2
diff -u -r1.30.2.2 rsa_lib.c
--- crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c 30 Jan 2003 17:37:46 -0000 1.30.2.2
+++ crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c 16 Mar 2003 10:34:13 -0000
@@ -72,7 +72,13 @@
RSA *RSA_new(void)
{
- return(RSA_new_method(NULL));
+ RSA *r=RSA_new_method(NULL);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FORCE_RSA_BLINDING
+ r->flags|=RSA_FLAG_BLINDING;
+#endif
+
+ return r;
}
void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
