GOD DAMN IT BEN Stop writing these ninny emails, and start thinking about what the hell is going on. I've explained this six ways from Sunday, and I get the impression that you are just skimming everything I write, and not bothering to read it, much less think about it.
I know you are really really smart, and I know you can understand this stuff, (cause its really not that hard) but you are simply not making the effort to do so. You are probably overwhelmed with other work -- OK -- great -- so we can maybe follow up on this later on. But reading your responses is just plain highly unproductive, and just doesn't lead anywhere. Its not interesting, its not constructive, it doesn't solve any of the current problems in front of us. --linas On Fri, Sep 2, 2016 at 10:50 PM, Ben Goertzel <[email protected]> wrote: > On Sat, Sep 3, 2016 at 9:59 AM, Linas Vepstas <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Hi Nil, > > > >> > >>> > >>> These same ideas should generalize to PLN: although PLN is itself a > >>> probabilistic logic, and I do not advocate changing that, the actual > >>> chaining process, the proof process of arriving at conclusions in PLN, > >>> cannot be, must not be. > >>> > >>> I hope the above pins down the source of confusion, when we talk about > >>> these things. The logic happening at the proof level, the ludics > level, > >>> is very different from the structures representing real-world > knowledge. > >> > >> > >> Oh, it's a lot clearer then! But in the case of PLN inference control we > >> want to use meta-learning anyway, not "hacks" (sorry if I upset certain) > >> like linear logic or intuitionistic logic. > > > > > > Well, hey, that is like saying that 2+2=4 is a hack -- > > > > The ideas that I am trying to describe are significantly older than PLN, > and > > PLN is not some magical potion that somehow is not bound by the rules of > > reality, that can in some supernatural way violate the laws of > mathematics. > > Hmm, no, but forms of logic with a Possibly operator are kinda crude > -- they basically lump all non-crisp truth values into a single > category, which is not really the most useful thing to do in most > cases... > > Intuitionistic is indeed much older than probabilistic logic; but my > feeling is it is largely superseded by probabilistic logic in terms of > practical utility and relevance... > > It's a fair theoretical point, though, that a lot of the nice theory > associated with intuitionistic logic could be generalized and ported > to probabilistic logic -- and much of this mathematical/philosophical > work has not been done... > > As for linear logic, I'm still less clear on the relevance. It is > clear to me that integrating resource-awareness into the inference > process is important, but unclear to me that linear logic or affine > logic are good ways to do this in a probabilistic context. It may be > that deep integration of probabilistic truth values provides better > and different ways to incorporate resource-awareness... > > As for "reasoning about reasoning", it's unclear to me that this > requires special treatment in terms of practicalities of inference > software.... Depending on one's semantic formalism, it may or may > not require special treatment in terms of the formal semantics of > reasoning.... It seems to me that part of the elegance of dependent > types is that one can suck meta-reasoning cleanly into the same > formalism as reasoning. This can also be done using type-free > domains (Dana Scott's old work, etc.).... But then there are other > formalisms where meta-reasoning and base-level reasoning are > formalized quite differently... > > -- Ben > > -- Ben > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "link-grammar" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/link-grammar. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "opencog" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/opencog. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/opencog/CAHrUA36KRnFJkF9ELaOeDjmm%3DYWfY%2BSY42kaitevYJkS_H2nfg%40mail.gmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
