Hello there,
Coverity scan on latest version reveled some possible problems in the code, namely:

 * NULL_RETURNS - variable is not checked against
* MISSING_BREAK - this is not a bug, but would be nice to explicitly mention that the fall-through is intentional * OVERRUN - there is buffer overflow in trace code, which assigns unknown errors ERR_MAX, which is over ock_err_msg boundaries
 * DEADCODE - there is bad identification of readonly icsf tokens

See attached patches, which should cleanly apply on the master from sourceforge.

There are other issues that I will address in the another emails.

Regards,

--
Jakub Jelen
Associate Software Engineer
Security Technologies
Red Hat

>From c9387f9755515016dc07120b584e6437489a6521 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2016 15:39:32 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] Coverity: NULL_RETURNS sanity check

---
 usr/lib/pkcs11/icsf_stdll/icsf_specific.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/usr/lib/pkcs11/icsf_stdll/icsf_specific.c b/usr/lib/pkcs11/icsf_stdll/icsf_specific.c
index 2c12e91..31c8e24 100644
--- a/usr/lib/pkcs11/icsf_stdll/icsf_specific.c
+++ b/usr/lib/pkcs11/icsf_stdll/icsf_specific.c
@@ -934,6 +934,12 @@ CK_RV icsftok_open_session(SESSION *sess)
 	LDAP *ld;
 	struct session_state *session_state;
 
+	/* Sanity */
+	if (session == NULL) {
+		TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID));
+		return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+	}
+
 	/* Add session to list */
 	session_state = malloc(sizeof(struct session_state));
 	if (!session_state) {
@@ -1065,7 +1071,7 @@ CK_RV icsftok_close_session(SESSION *session)
 	struct session_state *session_state;
 
 	/* Get the related session_state */
-	if (!(session_state = get_session_state(session->handle))) {
+	if (session == NULL || !(session_state = get_session_state(session->handle))) {
 		TRACE_ERROR("%s\n", ock_err(ERR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID));
 		return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
 	}
-- 
2.5.0


>From 584b9841a4e898e5cbe531345b23c7f74518d735 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2016 15:51:21 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] Coverity: MISSING_BREAK: explicitly note the fallback is
 intentional

---
 usr/lib/pkcs11/soft_stdll/soft_specific.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/usr/lib/pkcs11/soft_stdll/soft_specific.c b/usr/lib/pkcs11/soft_stdll/soft_specific.c
index 0b9b891..ce53439 100644
--- a/usr/lib/pkcs11/soft_stdll/soft_specific.c
+++ b/usr/lib/pkcs11/soft_stdll/soft_specific.c
@@ -2470,21 +2470,25 @@ static CK_RV softtok_hmac(SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx, CK_BYTE *in_data,
 	switch(ctx->mech.mechanism) {
 	case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
 		general = TRUE;
+		/* fallthrough */
 	case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
 		mac_len = SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
 		break;
 	case CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL:
 		general = TRUE;
+		/* fallthrough */
 	case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
 		mac_len = SHA2_HASH_SIZE;
 		break;
 	case CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL:
 		general = TRUE;
+		/* fallthrough */
 	case CKM_SHA384_HMAC:
 		mac_len = SHA3_HASH_SIZE;
 		break;
 	case CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL:
 		general = TRUE;
+		/* fallthrough */
 	case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
 		mac_len = SHA5_HASH_SIZE;
 		break;
@@ -2610,11 +2614,13 @@ static CK_RV softtok_hmac_final(SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx, CK_BYTE *signature,
 	switch(ctx->mech.mechanism) {
 	case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
 		general = TRUE;
+		/* fallthrough */
 	case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
 		mac_len = SHA1_HASH_SIZE;
 		break;
 	case CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL:
 		general = TRUE;
+		/* fallthrough */
 	case CKM_SHA256_HMAC:
 		mac_len = SHA2_HASH_SIZE;
 		break;
@@ -2625,6 +2631,7 @@ static CK_RV softtok_hmac_final(SIGN_VERIFY_CONTEXT *ctx, CK_BYTE *signature,
 		break;
 	case CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL:
 		general = TRUE;
+		/* fallthrough */
 	case CKM_SHA512_HMAC:
 		mac_len = SHA5_HASH_SIZE;
 		break;
-- 
2.5.0


>From 7a0562297d9903f8e30ff6195509b39d58f6e72e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2016 15:59:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] Coverity: OVERRUN: ERR_MAX fallback for unknown errors

---
 usr/lib/pkcs11/common/trace.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/usr/lib/pkcs11/common/trace.c b/usr/lib/pkcs11/common/trace.c
index 4ba2c2d..da294f8 100644
--- a/usr/lib/pkcs11/common/trace.c
+++ b/usr/lib/pkcs11/common/trace.c
@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ static const char *ock_err_msg[] = {
 "API already Initialized",		/*ERR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED*/
 "Mutex Invalid",			/*ERR_MUTEX_BAD*/
 "Mutex was not locked",			/*ERR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED*/
+"Unknown error",			/*ERR_MAX*/
 };
 
 void set_trace(struct trace_handle_t t_handle)
-- 
2.5.0


>From 9c2a22e2cb9b50a2655ea67a8819ad3f69df7f2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2016 16:06:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Coverity: Readonly token identification

---
 usr/sbin/pkcsicsf/pkcsicsf.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/usr/sbin/pkcsicsf/pkcsicsf.c b/usr/sbin/pkcsicsf/pkcsicsf.c
index 81662fd..0a3100f 100644
--- a/usr/sbin/pkcsicsf/pkcsicsf.c
+++ b/usr/sbin/pkcsicsf/pkcsicsf.c
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ list_tokens(void)
 				num_seen, tokens[i].name,
 				tokens[i].manufacturer,
 				tokens[i].model, tokens[i].serial,
-				tokens[i].flags ? "yes" : "no");
+				ICSF_IS_TOKEN_READ_ONLY(tokens[i].flags) ? "yes" : "no");
 			num_seen++;
 		}
 
-- 
2.5.0

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