-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 02/02/2012 02:01 PM, Bernhard Reutner-Fischer wrote: > On 2 February 2012 13:40, Matthijs Mekking <[email protected]> > wrote: >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 >> >> Using mkstemp will not solve this attack, since you can do the >> same trick for /the/zone-name (without .tmp), or any other file >> location > > If the target filename of the rename is a symlink, the symlink will > be overwritten. > > But anyway, that spot caught my attention and prompted me to think > aloud, that's all :)
And it is greatly appreciated! But rather than blindly accepting proposals, I want to have better understandings of the threat. So the signed zone file is safe against this, but OpenDNSSEC uses more file locations where the trick still can be applied. I think the chances that such an attack is successful is rather low, as you are required to have access on the OpenDNSSEC box. Nevertheless, I have created a story for this, so that we will think over this twice. Thanks for your input. Best regards, Matthijs -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJPKo0CAAoJEA8yVCPsQCW5Rw8H+wY3p+F2kzzm9w/Vfj6D1tRy H03wZwGtgVRP2ANaWou+HVprKpNiEyD7Bfodj6XG+N8pipzQzfpH6xP/dInKOsS7 0nWYuxNsg4h4axFiZh9fHjzXMHH1zLu9Rx8n2vTa/BTC2Ub3tjxMz+uum5XWJ1lr 060atEhGCnUKOEQSvKihFLOsLjzlV0j9NQVY9HB6msUOkuBhoyfjLXAVRLUQtLww h7CFtqz3OMJ68nIIM/JKq7jwnLQ0dv5sabAVoECnuTBEIE3NmG6YoNaAHBNl6yVg 8Jrcy8WiBSnBbeFYBWBBZXqKL1BB6ToTSn4bgYH6Q/YfZBuladS7sHAWcG0EcNY= =SIHU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Opendnssec-user mailing list [email protected] https://lists.opendnssec.org/mailman/listinfo/opendnssec-user
