Jake,

It’s not only the signing time that is of consequence. After full resign of 
your zone, you also enforce a full AXFR of your zone to your nameservers. We 
fully trust on the operation of OpenDNSSEC btw. After a few checks and such, 
before publishing the zone… ;-)

Marc

From: Opendnssec-user <[email protected]> on behalf 
of Jake Zack <[email protected]>
Date: Tuesday, 27 September 2016 at 17:37
To: "[email protected] List" 
<[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [Opendnssec-user] Zone signed by key in retire state

Confirmed it does work (nuking signature cache and restarting Ods)…

CIRA’s signing system signs separately with both BIND and ODS, then compares at 
the end, and only after validity checks and comparison is it published to the 
world…so we’ve occasionally seen ODS have signatures that haven’t expired yet 
for outgoing keys cause issues where BIND doesn’t have the same signatures 
on-hand.

It’s not ideal, as stated below…because it causes a full re-sign of the 
zone…versus using the perfectly valid signatures under the old key.  If you 
have a small zone, though, I guess the extra few seconds of signing time 
probably isn’t a major concern.

We tend to do:

/sbin/service ods-signerd stop
rm –rf /var/opendnssec/tmp/* /var/opendnssec/signed/*
/sbin/service ods-signerd start

We stop and restart ods-signerd because we’re set to “keep” serial rather than 
increment…and ods-signerd doesn’t like signing the same serial twice.

We’re moving away from the dual-signer setup, now, however, as we believe both 
software’s have matured in their DNSSEC handling, and after years of comparing 
zone output, the value in combing over minute differences in outputs is no 
longer as substantial as it once was.

-jake


From: Opendnssec-user [mailto:[email protected]] On 
Behalf Of Arun Natarajan
Sent: Tuesday, September 27, 2016 11:14 AM
To: Yuri Schaeffer
Cc: [email protected] List
Subject: Re: [Opendnssec-user] Zone signed by key in retire state

Thanks Yuri,


OpenDNSSEC tries to keep signatures in the zone as long as they are
valid. Only when a signature expires and thus needs a resign, the
signature is generated with the new ZSK.

You'll notice that some signatures are generated with the new ZSK and
some with the old ZSK. The signature validity is configurable in the
KASP. During that time both ZSKs have their DNSKEY record published in
the zone.

My understanding was, it create new signatures with the new key once the keys 
is rolled.

> I guess if we clear the ods and run signer again it will work, but
> wondering why it does not happen automatically?

It would work, but it is probably not what you want.

Yeah, probably not a good idea. Might be useful in emergency roll over though.

--
arun


Regards,
Yuri


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