Ping, is there any plan to include this patch in a short term? Regards.
On 11/03/2017 01:46 PM, Isaac Hermida wrote: > WPA2 is vulnerable to replay attacks which result in unauthenticated users > having access to the network. > > * CVE-2017-13077: reinstallation of the pairwise key in the Four-way handshake > > * CVE-2017-13078: reinstallation of the group key in the Four-way handshake > > * CVE-2017-13079: reinstallation of the integrity group key in the Four-way > handshake > > * CVE-2017-13080: reinstallation of the group key in the Group Key handshake > > * CVE-2017-13081: reinstallation of the integrity group key in the Group Key > handshake > > * CVE-2017-13082: accepting a retransmitted Fast BSS Transition Reassociation > Request and reinstalling the pairwise key while processing it > > * CVE-2017-13086: reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) > PeerKey (TPK) key in the TDLS handshake > > * CVE-2017-13087: reinstallation of the group key (GTK) when processing a > Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame > > * CVE-2017-13088: reinstallation of the integrity group key (IGTK) when > processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame > > This is the backport to wpa_supplicant 2.1. > > Signed-off-by: Isaac Hermida <[email protected]> > --- > .../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc | 1 + > .../wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch | 944 > +++++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 945 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 > meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch > > diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc > b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc > index 2229b8f5e960..de3f926515e6 100644 > --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc > +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant.inc > @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ SRC_URI = > "http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ > file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \ > file://99_wpa_supplicant \ > file://fix-libnl3-host-contamination.patch \ > + file://key-replay-cve-multiple.patch \ > " > SRC_URI[md5sum] = "e96b8db5a8171cd17a5b2012d6ad7cc7" > SRC_URI[sha256sum] = > "91632e7e3b49a340ce408e2f978a93546a697383abf2e5a60f146faae9e1b277" > diff --git > a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch > > b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..0bc6a8b9a5e9 > --- /dev/null > +++ > b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,944 @@ > +The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which > can > +result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network. > + > +CVE: CVE-2017-13077 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13078 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13079 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13080 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13081 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13082 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13086 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13087 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13088 > + > +From 7e11b9d657d869ec0736021fd873484c806fa903 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Mathy Vanhoef <[email protected]> > +Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200 > +Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake > + > +Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame > +processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids > +issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing > +same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and > +also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed > +frames on RX side. > + > +This issue was introduced by the commit > +0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in > +authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple > +times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is > +needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt > +failed. > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport > + > +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef > <[email protected]> > +--- > + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++ > + src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++- > + src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++ > + src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 + > + 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > + > +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > +index 707a63f0cf63..950d14ea1ca6 100644 > +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > +@@ -1555,6 +1555,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, > wpa_event event) > + #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ > + break; > + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ > ++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED: > ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; > ++ return 0; > + } > + > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R > +@@ -2986,6 +2989,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine > *sm) > + } > + > + > ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) > ++{ > ++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) > ++ return 0; > ++ return sm->tk_already_set; > ++} > ++ > ++ > + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, > + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry) > + { > +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h > +index bc3dec45a032..d6fbbdd4aaa5 100644 > +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h > ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h > +@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, > + u8 *data, size_t data_len); > + typedef enum { > + WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH, > +- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT > ++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED > + } wpa_event; > + void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > + int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, wpa_event event); > +@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > + int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > + int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > + int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, > + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry); > + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry * > +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c > +index c22c4ccae3e6..6b7892a79116 100644 > +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c > ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c > +@@ -762,6 +762,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) > + return; > + } > + > ++ if (sm->tk_already_set) { > ++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX > ++ * PN in the driver */ > ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, > ++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); > ++ return; > ++ } > ++ > + /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail > + * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only > + * after association has been completed. This function will be called > +@@ -774,6 +782,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) > + > + /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */ > + sm->pairwise_set = TRUE; > ++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE; > + } > + > + > +@@ -887,6 +896,7 @@ static u16 wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct > wpa_state_machine *sm, > + wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PTKName", ptk_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); > + > + sm->pairwise = pairwise; > ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; > + wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm); > + > + buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + > +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h > +index fcd5878e7494..e7e092a33850 100644 > +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h > ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h > +@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine { > + struct wpa_ptk PTK; > + Boolean PTK_valid; > + Boolean pairwise_set; > ++ Boolean tk_already_set; > + int keycount; > + Boolean Pair; > + struct wpa_key_replay_counter { > + > +From 1cfe215c2ed3ce487dc3e61a64a9704174afd04e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Mathy Vanhoef <[email protected]> > +Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200 > +Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key > + > +Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a > +(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do > +not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an > +attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the > +sequence counter associated to the group key. > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport > + > +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef > <[email protected]> > +--- > + src/common/wpa_common.h | 12 ++++++ > + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 107 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- > + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++ > + 3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h > +index dcc035c7d874..78217175acdc 100644 > +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h > ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h > +@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ RSN_SELECTOR(0x00, 0x0f, 0xac, 13) > + > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > + #define WPA_IGTK_LEN 16 > ++#define WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN 32 > + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + > + > +@@ -207,6 +208,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk { > + } u; > + } STRUCT_PACKED; > + > ++struct wpa_gtk { > ++ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN]; > ++ size_t gtk_len; > ++}; > ++ > ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > ++struct wpa_igtk { > ++ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN]; > ++ size_t igtk_len; > ++}; > ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + > + /* WPA IE version 1 > + * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type) > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +index 4474c3b11737..26fdb7913270 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +@@ -630,6 +630,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; > + u8 gtk_buf[32]; > + > ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ > ++ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && > ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { > ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver > (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", > ++ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); > ++ return 0; > ++ } > ++ > + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len); > + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > + "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", > +@@ -661,6 +670,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + return -1; > + } > + > ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; > ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); > ++ > + return 0; > + } > + > +@@ -730,6 +742,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm > *sm, > + } > + > + > ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > ++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) > ++{ > ++ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); > ++ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); > ++ > ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ > ++ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && > ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { > ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the > driver (keyidx=%d)", > ++ keyidx); > ++ return 0; > ++ } > ++ > ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > ++ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", > ++ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); > ++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len); > ++ if (keyidx > 4095) { > ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, > ++ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); > ++ return -1; > ++ } > ++ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), > ++ broadcast_ether_addr, > ++ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), > ++ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { > ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, > ++ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); > ++ return -1; > ++ } > ++ > ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; > ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); > ++ > ++ return 0; > ++} > ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > ++ > ++ > + static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) > + { > +@@ -739,28 +793,13 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + > + if (ie->igtk) { > + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; > +- u16 keyidx; > ++ > + if (ie->igtk_len != sizeof(*igtk)) > + return -1; > ++ > + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; > +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); > +- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d " > +- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", > +- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); > +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", > +- igtk->igtk, WPA_IGTK_LEN); > +- if (keyidx > 4095) { > +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, > +- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); > +- return -1; > +- } > +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, WPA_ALG_IGTK, broadcast_ether_addr, > +- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), > +- igtk->igtk, WPA_IGTK_LEN) < 0) { > +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, > +- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); > ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) > + return -1; > +- } > + } > + > + return 0; > +@@ -2077,7 +2116,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm) > + */ > + void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) > + { > +- int clear_ptk = 1; > ++ int clear_keys = 1; > + > + if (sm == NULL) > + return; > +@@ -2103,11 +2142,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 > *bssid) > + /* Prepare for the next transition */ > + wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL); > + > +- clear_ptk = 0; > ++ clear_keys = 0; > + } > + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ > + > +- if (clear_ptk) { > ++ if (clear_keys) { > + /* > + * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if > + * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition. > +@@ -2115,6 +2154,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 > *bssid) > + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Clear old PTK"); > + sm->ptk_set = 0; > + sm->tptk_set = 0; > ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); > ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); > ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + } > + > + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS > +@@ -2654,6 +2697,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) > + os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk)); > + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); > + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); > ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); > ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); > ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + } > + > + > +@@ -2726,21 +2773,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 > subelem_id, u8 *buf) > + } > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > + } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) { > +- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2); > +- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6); > +- > +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid); > +- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, WPA_IGTK_LEN); > +- > +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)", > +- igd.igtk, WPA_IGTK_LEN); > +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, WPA_ALG_IGTK, broadcast_ether_addr, > +- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn), > +- igd.igtk, WPA_IGTK_LEN) < 0) { > +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in " > +- "WNM mode"); > ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; > ++ > ++ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); > ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) > + return -1; > +- } > + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + } else { > + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id"); > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > +index 75cfb479e032..73287c1612cb 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > +@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { > + u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; > + int rx_replay_counter_set; > + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; > ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk; > ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk; > ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + > + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ > + > + > +From 7ce8d2cd05f370bc94d821e9cef401d8de9e75ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300 > +Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of > WNM-Sleep > + Mode cases > + > +This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value > +separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a > +corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the > +GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to > +detect a possible key reconfiguration. > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport > + > +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > +--- > + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- > + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++ > + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +index 26fdb7913270..4aa1ccb87684 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +@@ -625,14 +625,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data { > + > + static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd, > +- const u8 *key_rsc) > ++ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep) > + { > + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; > + u8 gtk_buf[32]; > + > + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ > +- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && > +- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { > ++ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && > ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) || > ++ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && > ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, > ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) { > + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver > (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", > + gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); > +@@ -670,8 +673,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + return -1; > + } > + > +- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; > +- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); > ++ if (wnm_sleep) { > ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; > ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, > ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len); > ++ } else { > ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; > ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); > ++ } > + > + return 0; > + } > +@@ -730,7 +739,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher, > + gtk_len, gtk_len, > + &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) || > +- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc))) { > ++ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0))) { > + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > + "RSN: Failed to install GTK"); > + return -1; > +@@ -744,14 +753,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm > *sm, > + > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > + static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > +- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) > ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk, > ++ int wnm_sleep) > + { > + size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); > + u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); > + > + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ > +- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && > +- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { > ++ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && > ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) || > ++ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len && > ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, > ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) { > + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the > driver (keyidx=%d)", > + keyidx); > +@@ -776,8 +789,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm > *sm, > + return -1; > + } > + > +- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; > +- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); > ++ if (wnm_sleep) { > ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len; > ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, > ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len); > ++ } else { > ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; > ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); > ++ } > + > + return 0; > + } > +@@ -798,7 +817,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + return -1; > + > + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; > +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) > ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0) > + return -1; > + } > + > +@@ -1415,7 +1434,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct > wpa_sm *sm, > + if (ret) > + goto failed; > + > +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc) || > ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0) || > + wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info)) > + goto failed; > + > +@@ -2155,8 +2174,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 > *bssid) > + sm->ptk_set = 0; > + sm->tptk_set = 0; > + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); > ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); > ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); > + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + } > + > +@@ -2698,8 +2719,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) > + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); > + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); > + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); > ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); > ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); > + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + } > + > +@@ -2766,7 +2789,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 > subelem_id, u8 *buf) > + > + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)", > + gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len); > +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) { > ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) { > + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in " > + "WNM mode"); > + return -1; > +@@ -2776,7 +2799,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 > subelem_id, u8 *buf) > + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; > + > + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); > +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) > ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0) > + return -1; > + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + } else { > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > +index 73287c1612cb..004915aba236 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > +@@ -30,8 +30,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { > + int rx_replay_counter_set; > + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; > + struct wpa_gtk gtk; > ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep; > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > + struct wpa_igtk igtk; > ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep; > + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + > + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ > + > +From 19cde15c1685266e41e3f08c5f58e4dc3d8b1246 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Mathy Vanhoef <[email protected]> > +Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200 > +Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK > + > +Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver > +and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from > +trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK. > + > +This fixes the earlier fix in commit > +ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the > +driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account > +possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of > +message 3/4. > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport > + > +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef > <[email protected]> > +--- > + src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 + > + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 7 +++++++ > + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) > + > +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h > +index 78217175acdc..f0e4e9bcce3d 100644 > +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h > ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h > +@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk { > + u8 rx_mic_key[8]; > + } auth; > + } u; > ++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */ > + } STRUCT_PACKED; > + > + struct wpa_gtk { > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +index 4aa1ccb87684..fe27cecf14be 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +@@ -541,6 +541,12 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + const u8 *key_rsc; > + u8 null_rsc[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; > + > ++ if (sm->ptk.installed) { > ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > ++ "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); > ++ return 0; > ++ } > ++ > + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > + "WPA: Installing PTK to the driver"); > + > +@@ -577,6 +583,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + return -1; > + } > + > ++ sm->ptk.installed = 1; > + if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) { > + eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL); > + eloop_register_timeout(sm->wpa_ptk_rekey, 0, wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, > + > +From 91837b1b958081a3df7fb1ecea49934961e8e442 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300 > +Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce > + > +The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing > +the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going > +directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to > +determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the > +new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant. > + > +Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state > +for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK. > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport > + > +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > +--- > + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- > + 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > +index 950d14ea1ca6..229b50290a70 100644 > +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > +@@ -1699,6 +1699,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2) > + } > + > + > ++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) > ++{ > ++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) { > ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, > ++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce"); > ++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE; > ++ return -1; > ++ } > ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce, > ++ WPA_NONCE_LEN); > ++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0; > ++ return 0; > ++} > ++ > ++ > + SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK) > + { > + u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN]; > +@@ -2205,9 +2220,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK) > + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION); > + else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest) > + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2); > +- else if (sm->PTKRequest) > +- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); > +- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { > ++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) { > ++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0) > ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED); > ++ else > ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); > ++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { > + case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE: > + break; > + case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT: > + > +From 5741bf62d3b5e9060f88a52d7d2836f423fd6cc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300 > +Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration > + > +Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has > +been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues > +related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check > +for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so > +that behavior does not get modified. > + > +For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was > +followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating > +the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e., > +ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path > +and simple replay attacks are not feasible. > + > +As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if > +the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros. > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport > + > +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > +--- > + src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > + 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c > +index 8a978f7475ec..2802f8aeb406 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c > +@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer { > + u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */ > + } tpk; > + int tpk_set; > ++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */ > + int tpk_success; > + int tpk_in_progress; > + > +@@ -182,6 +183,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct > wpa_tdls_peer *peer) > + u8 rsc[6]; > + enum wpa_alg alg; > + > ++ if (peer->tk_set) { > ++ /* > ++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver > ++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an > ++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing > ++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must > ++ * not allow that to happen. > ++ */ > ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR > ++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not > reconfigure", > ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); > ++ return -1; > ++ } > ++ > + os_memset(rsc, 0, 6); > + > + switch (peer->cipher) { > +@@ -199,12 +214,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct > wpa_tdls_peer *peer) > + return -1; > + } > + > ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR, > ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); > + if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1, > + rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) { > + wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the " > + "driver"); > + return -1; > + } > ++ peer->tk_set = 1; > + return 0; > + } > + > +@@ -645,7 +663,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_free(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct > wpa_tdls_peer *peer) > + peer->supp_oper_classes = NULL; > + peer->rsnie_i_len = peer->rsnie_p_len = 0; > + peer->cipher = 0; > +- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; > ++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; > + os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk)); > + os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN); > + os_memset(peer->rnonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN); > +@@ -1068,6 +1086,7 @@ skip_rsnie: > + wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer); > + return -1; > + } > ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ > + wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake", > + peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); > + os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); > +@@ -1518,6 +1537,19 @@ static int copy_peer_supp_oper_classes(const struct > wpa_eapol_ie_parse *kde, > + } > + > + > ++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce) > ++{ > ++ int i; > ++ > ++ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) { > ++ if (nonce[i]) > ++ return 1; > ++ } > ++ > ++ return 0; > ++} > ++ > ++ > + static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, > + const u8 *buf, size_t len) > + { > +@@ -1758,7 +1790,8 @@ skip_rsn: > + peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len; > + peer->cipher = cipher; > + > +- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) { > ++ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 || > ++ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) { > + /* > + * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained > + * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the > +@@ -1775,6 +1808,7 @@ skip_rsn: > + wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer); > + goto error; > + } > ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ > + } > + > + #if 0 > + > +From b6bdcc39aaf1a51c90c46a884e08acb3ffe33c47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:25:02 +0300 > +Subject: [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending > + request > + > +Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep > +Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the > +response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the > +association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when > +successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of > +protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame. > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport > + > +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > +--- > + wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 2 ++ > + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) > + > +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c > +index 65b2783839ee..294d73d4f6a2 100644 > +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c > ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c > +@@ -274,6 +274,8 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp(struct > wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, > + return; > + } > + > ++ wpa_s->wnmsleep_used = 0; > ++ > + if (wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_ACCEPT || > + wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_EXIT_ACCEPT_GTK_UPDATE) { > + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Successfully recv WNM-Sleep Response " > + > +From a812fb8140288ed89399720ae1f6e09795655402 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300 > +Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames > + > +The driver is expected to not report a second association event without > +the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this > +case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same > +pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues, > +be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this > +even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected > +Reassociation Response frame. > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport > + > +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > +--- > + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++ > + src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++ > + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 + > + 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+) > + > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +index fe27cecf14be..ff9f26f94016 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +@@ -2215,6 +2215,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm) > + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS > + wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm); > + #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */ > ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R > ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; > ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ > + } > + > + > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c > +index c8d8cfc8b6c4..172f5fcfc1a6 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c > +@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t > *len, > + u16 capab; > + > + sm->ft_completed = 0; > ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; > + > + buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + > + 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100; > +@@ -684,6 +685,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, > const u8 *ies, > + return -1; > + } > + > ++ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) { > ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been > completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission"); > ++ return 0; > ++ } > ++ > + if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) { > + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs"); > + return -1; > +@@ -782,6 +788,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, > const u8 *ies, > + return -1; > + } > + > ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1; > ++ > + if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0) > + return -1; > + > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > +index 004915aba236..63c7f90ed34b 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > +@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ struct wpa_sm { > + size_t r0kh_id_len; > + u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN]; > + int ft_completed; > ++ int ft_reassoc_completed; > + int over_the_ds_in_progress; > + u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */ > + int set_ptk_after_assoc; > -- _______________________________________________ Openembedded-core mailing list [email protected] http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core
