On 8/13/19 4:25 PM, Kevin Weng via Openembedded-core wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Kevin Weng <t-kew...@microsoft.com>
> ---
> .../curl/curl/CVE-2018-16890.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++++
> .../curl/curl/CVE-2019-3822.patch | 47 ++++++++++++++++
> .../curl/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch | 55 +++++++++++++++++++
> meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.61.0.bb | 3 +
> 4 files changed, 155 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2018-16890.patch
> create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-3822.patch
> create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch
I master and Warrior not affected?
- armin
>
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2018-16890.patch
> b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2018-16890.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..3776f362bc
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2018-16890.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
> +From 53d3c2f92b4a7561b1006494badf8cf2ef9110c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Daniel Stenberg <dan...@haxx.se>
> +Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2019 20:33:08 +0100
> +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] NTLM: fix size check condition for type2 received data
> +
> +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16890.html
> +Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian
> +CVE-2018-16890
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +[https://github.com/curl/curl/commit
> +/b780b30d1377adb10bbe774835f49e9b237fb9bb]
> +
> +CVE: CVE-2018-16890
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Kevin Weng <t-kew...@microsoft.com>
> +---
> + lib/vauth/ntlm.c | 7 ++++---
> + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
> +index cdb8d8f0d..0212756ab 100644
> +--- a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
> ++++ b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
> +@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
> + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
> + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
> + *
> +- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2017, Daniel Stenberg, <dan...@haxx.se>, et al.
> ++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2019, Daniel Stenberg, <dan...@haxx.se>, et al.
> + *
> + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
> + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
> +@@ -182,10 +182,11 @@ static CURLcode ntlm_decode_type2_target(struct
> Curl_easy *data,
> + target_info_len = Curl_read16_le(&buffer[40]);
> + target_info_offset = Curl_read32_le(&buffer[44]);
> + if(target_info_len > 0) {
> +- if(((target_info_offset + target_info_len) > size) ||
> ++ if((target_info_offset >= size) ||
> ++ ((target_info_offset + target_info_len) > size) ||
> + (target_info_offset < 48)) {
> + infof(data, "NTLM handshake failure (bad type-2 message). "
> +- "Target Info Offset Len is set incorrect by the
> peer\n");
> ++ "Target Info Offset Len is set incorrect by the peer\n");
> + return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING;
> + }
> +
> +--
> +2.22.0
> +
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-3822.patch
> b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-3822.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..4f612ddd5e
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-3822.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
> +From 761b51f66c7b1cd2cd6c71b807bfdb6a27c49b30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Daniel Stenberg <dan...@haxx.se>
> +Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 12:59:28 +0100
> +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] ntlm: fix *_type3_message size check to avoid buffer
> + overflow
> +
> +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-3822.html
> +Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian
> +CVE-2019-3822
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +[https://github.com/curl/curl/commit
> +/50c9484278c63b958655a717844f0721263939cc]
> +
> +CVE: CVE-2019-3822
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Kevin Weng <t-kew...@microsoft.com>
> +---
> + lib/vauth/ntlm.c | 11 +++++++----
> + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
> +index 0212756ab..3be0403d9 100644
> +--- a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
> ++++ b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
> +@@ -777,11 +777,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_ntlm_type3_message(struct
> Curl_easy *data,
> + });
> +
> + #ifdef USE_NTRESPONSES
> +- if(size < (NTLM_BUFSIZE - ntresplen)) {
> +- DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff);
> +- memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen);
> +- size += ntresplen;
> ++ /* ntresplen + size should not be risking an integer overflow here */
> ++ if(ntresplen + size > sizeof(ntlmbuf)) {
> ++ failf(data, "incoming NTLM message too big");
> ++ return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
> + }
> ++ DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff);
> ++ memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen);
> ++ size += ntresplen;
> +
> + DEBUG_OUT({
> + fprintf(stderr, "\n ntresp=");
> +--
> +2.22.0
> +
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch
> b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..194e6e6430
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
> +From 40f6c913f63cdbfa81daa7ac7f1c7415bb99edeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Daniel Gustafsson <dan...@yesql.se>
> +Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 00:42:47 +0100
> +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] smtp: avoid risk of buffer overflow in strtol
> +
> +If the incoming len 5, but the buffer does not have a termination
> +after 5 bytes, the strtol() call may keep reading through the line
> +buffer until is exceeds its boundary. Fix by ensuring that we are
> +using a bounded read with a temporary buffer on the stack.
> +
> +Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-3823.html
> +Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
> +CVE-2019-3823
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +[https://github.com/curl/curl/commit
> +/39df4073e5413fcdbb5a38da0c1ce6f1c0ceb484]
> +
> +CVE: CVE-2019-3823
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Kevin Weng <t-kew...@microsoft.com>
> +---
> + lib/smtp.c | 8 ++++++--
> + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/lib/smtp.c b/lib/smtp.c
> +index ecf10a41a..1b9f92d30 100644
> +--- a/lib/smtp.c
> ++++ b/lib/smtp.c
> +@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
> + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
> + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
> + *
> +- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2018, Daniel Stenberg, <dan...@haxx.se>, et al.
> ++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2019, Daniel Stenberg, <dan...@haxx.se>, et al.
> + *
> + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
> + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
> +@@ -207,8 +207,12 @@ static bool smtp_endofresp(struct connectdata *conn,
> char *line, size_t len,
> + Section 4. Examples of RFC-4954 but some e-mail servers ignore this and
> + only send the response code instead as per Section 4.2. */
> + if(line[3] == ' ' || len == 5) {
> ++ char tmpline[6];
> ++
> + result = TRUE;
> +- *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(line, NULL, 10));
> ++ memset(tmpline, '\0', sizeof(tmpline));
> ++ memcpy(tmpline, line, (len == 5 ? 5 : 3));
> ++ *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(tmpline, NULL, 10));
> +
> + /* Make sure real server never sends internal value */
> + if(*resp == 1)
> +--
> +2.22.0
> +
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.61.0.bb
> b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.61.0.bb
> index 1027f75e9e..c1e4342df5 100644
> --- a/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.61.0.bb
> +++ b/meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.61.0.bb
> @@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ SRC_URI = "http://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
> file://CVE-2018-16842.patch \
> file://CVE-2019-5435.patch \
> file://CVE-2019-5436.patch \
> + file://CVE-2018-16890.patch \
> + file://CVE-2019-3822.patch \
> + file://CVE-2019-3823.patch \
> "
>
> SRC_URI[md5sum] = "31d0a9f48dc796a7db351898a1e5058a"
--
_______________________________________________
Openembedded-core mailing list
Openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org
http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core
