On 15.01.21 06:26, Paul Gortmaker wrote:
Recent systemd started using ascii args to "hidepid=" mount options
for proc fs - unconditionally -- even though kernels older than v5.8
emit an error message on each attempt:
root@qemux86-64:~# cat /proc/version
Linux version 5.4.87-yocto-standard (oe-user@oe-host) (gcc version 10.2.0
(GCC)) #1 SMP PREEMPT Fri Jan 8 01:47:13 UTC 2021
root@qemux86-64:~# dmesg|grep proc:
[ 29.487995] proc: Bad value for 'hidepid'
[ 43.170571] proc: Bad value for 'hidepid'
[ 44.175615] proc: Bad value for 'hidepid'
[ 46.213300] proc: Bad value for 'hidepid'
root@qemux86-64:~#
Simply ignoring them as the systemd maintainer unconditionally says
is the resolution is clearly not acceptable, given the above.
Add a kernel version check to avoid calling mount with invalid args.
Further details are within the enclosed systemd commit.
Cc: Luca Boccassi <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Purdie <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <[email protected]>
diff --git
a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-proc-dont-trigger-mount-error-with-invalid-options-o.patch
b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-proc-dont-trigger-mount-error-with-invalid-options-o.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..65e7eca32d05
--- /dev/null
+++
b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd/0027-proc-dont-trigger-mount-error-with-invalid-options-o.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+From 297aba739cd689e4dc9f43bb1422ec88d481099a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Gortmaker <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2021 21:09:33 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] proc: dont trigger mount error with invalid options on old
+ kernels
+
+As of commit 4e39995371738b04d98d27b0d34ea8fe09ec9fab ("core: introduce
+ProtectProc= and ProcSubset= to expose hidepid= and subset= procfs
+mount options") kernels older than v5.8 generate multple warnings at
+boot, as seen in this Yocto build from today:
+
+ qemux86-64 login: root
+ [ 65.829009] proc: Bad value for 'hidepid'
+ root@qemux86-64:~# dmesg|grep proc:
+ [ 16.990706] proc: Bad value for 'hidepid'
+ [ 28.060178] proc: Bad value for 'hidepid'
+ [ 28.874229] proc: Bad value for 'hidepid'
+ [ 32.685107] proc: Bad value for 'hidepid'
+ [ 65.829009] proc: Bad value for 'hidepid'
+ root@qemux86-64:~#
+
+The systemd maintainer has dismissed this as something people should
+simply ignore[1] and has no interest in trying to avoid it by
+proactively checking the kernel version, so people can safely assume
+that they will never see this version check commit upstream.
+
+However, as can be seen above, telling people to just ignore it is not
+an option, as we'll end up answering the same question and dealing with
+the same bug over and over again.
+
+The commit that triggers this is systemd v247-rc1~378^2~3 -- so any
+systemd 247 and above plus kernel v5.7 or older will need this.
+
+[1] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/16896
+
+Upstream-Status: Actively hostile
Just a tiny bit of nitpick, although I really like this new
classification (as it pretty much sums up many things when it comes to
systemd), it should be `Denied`
Nonetheless I think that this is a very useful patch
+Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <[email protected]>
+
+diff --git a/src/core/namespace.c b/src/core/namespace.c
+index cdf427a6ea93..f8fc33a89fc2 100644
+--- a/src/core/namespace.c
++++ b/src/core/namespace.c
+@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
+ #include <linux/loop.h>
+ #include <sched.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <sys/mount.h>
++#include <sys/utsname.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ #include <linux/fs.h>
+
+@@ -859,14 +861,34 @@ static int mount_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
+ }
+
+ static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
++ _cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL;
+ const char *entry_path;
+- int r;
++ int r, major, minor;
++ struct utsname uts;
++ bool old = false;
+
+ assert(m);
+ assert(ns_info);
+
+ entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
+
++ /* If uname says that the system is older than v5.8, then the textual
hidepid= stuff is not
++ * supported by the kernel, and thus the per-instance hidepid=
neither, which means we
++ * really don't want to use it, since it would affect our host's
/proc * mount. Hence let's
++ * gracefully fallback to a classic, unrestricted version. */
++
++ r = uname(&uts);
++ if (r < 0)
++ return errno;
++
++ major = atoi(uts.release);
++ minor = atoi(strchr(uts.release, '.') + 1);
++
++ if (major < 5 || (major == 5 && minor < 8)) {
++ log_debug("Pre v5.8 kernel detected [v%d.%d] - skipping
hidepid=", major, minor);
++ old = true;
++ }
++
+ /* Mount a new instance, so that we get the one that matches our user
namespace, if we are running in
+ * one. i.e we don't reuse existing mounts here under any condition,
we want a new instance owned by
+ * our user namespace and with our hidepid= settings applied. Hence,
let's get rid of everything
+@@ -875,9 +897,8 @@ static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const
NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
+ (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
+ (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
+
+- if (ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
+- ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) {
+- _cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL;
++ if (!old && (ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
++ ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL)) {
+
+ /* Starting with kernel 5.8 procfs' hidepid= logic is truly
per-instance (previously it
+ * pretended to be per-instance but actually was
per-namespace), hence let's make use of it
+@@ -891,21 +912,9 @@ static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const
NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
+ ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID ? ",subset=pid"
: "");
+ if (!opts)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+-
+- r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path,
"proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, opts);
+- if (r < 0) {
+- if (r != -EINVAL)
+- return r;
+-
+- /* If this failed with EINVAL then this likely means
the textual hidepid= stuff is
+- * not supported by the kernel, and thus the
per-instance hidepid= neither, which
+- * means we really don't want to use it, since it
would affect our host's /proc
+- * mount. Hence let's gracefully fallback to a
classic, unrestricted version. */
+- } else
+- return 1;
+ }
+
+- r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc",
MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL);
++ r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc",
MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, opts);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+--
+2.29.2
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_247.2.bb
b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_247.2.bb
index 5eea78eff353..84d997196cb6 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_247.2.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-core/systemd/systemd_247.2.bb
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://touchscreen.rules \
file://0003-implment-systemd-sysv-install-for-OE.patch \
file://0001-systemd.pc.in-use-ROOTPREFIX-without-suffixed-slash.patch \
file://0001-logind-Restore-chvt-as-non-root-user-without-polkit.patch \
+
file://0027-proc-dont-trigger-mount-error-with-invalid-options-o.patch \
"
# patches needed by musl
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