From: Sana Kazi <[email protected]> Applied patch for CVE-2020-14145 Link: https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/patch/?id=b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d
Also, whitelisted below CVEs: 1.CVE-2020-15778: As per upstream, because of the way scp is based on a historical protocol called rcp which relies on that style of argument passing and therefore encounters expansion problems. Making changes to how the scp command line works breaks the pattern used by scp consumers. Upstream therefore recommends the use of rsync in the place of scp for better security. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1860487 2.CVE-2008-3844: It was reported in OpenSSH on Red Hat Enterprise Linux and certain packages may have been compromised. This CVE is not applicable as our source is OpenBSD. Links: https://securitytracker.com/id?1020730 https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30794 Also, for CVE-2007-2768 no fix is available yet as it's unavoidable drawback of using one time passwords as per https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2007-2768 Also it is marked as unimportant on debian https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2007-2768 Mailed to CPE to update database for CVE-2020-15778, CVE-2008-3844 and CVE-2007-2768. We can upstream CVE-2020-14145 till we recieve response from CPE. Signed-off-by: Sana Kazi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Nisha Parrakat <[email protected]> --- .../openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch | 97 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb | 13 ++- 2 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3adb981fb4 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2020-14145.patch @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +From b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "[email protected]" <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 05:23:03 +0000 +Subject: upstream: tweak the client hostkey preference ordering algorithm to + +prefer the default ordering if the user has a key that matches the +best-preference default algorithm. + +feedback and ok markus@ + +OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a92dd7d7520ddd95c0a16786a7519e6d0167d35f + +Signed-off-by: Sana Kazi <[email protected]> +--- + sshconnect2.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +CVE: CVE-2020-14145 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/patch/?id=b3855ff053f5078ec3d3c653cdaedefaa5fc362d] +Comment: Refreshed first hunk + +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index 347e348c..f64aae66 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.320 2020/02/06 22:48:23 djm Exp $ */ ++/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.326 2020/09/18 05:23:03 djm Exp $ */ + /* + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. +@@ -102,12 +102,25 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) + return 0; + } + ++/* Returns the first item from a comma-separated algorithm list */ ++static char * ++first_alg(const char *algs) ++{ ++ char *ret, *cp; ++ ++ ret = xstrdup(algs); ++ if ((cp = strchr(ret, ',')) != NULL) ++ *cp = '\0'; ++ return ret; ++} ++ + static char * + order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + { +- char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret; ++ char *oavail = NULL, *avail = NULL, *first = NULL, *last = NULL; ++ char *alg = NULL, *hostname = NULL, *ret = NULL, *best = NULL; + size_t maxlen; +- struct hostkeys *hostkeys; ++ struct hostkeys *hostkeys = NULL; + int ktype; + u_int i; + +@@ -119,6 +132,26 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++) + load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]); + ++ /* ++ * If a plain public key exists that matches the type of the best ++ * preference HostkeyAlgorithms, then use the whole list as is. ++ * Note that we ignore whether the best preference algorithm is a ++ * certificate type, as sshconnect.c will downgrade certs to ++ * plain keys if necessary. ++ */ ++ best = first_alg(options.hostkeyalgorithms); ++ if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, ++ sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(best)), NULL)) { ++ debug3("%s: have matching best-preference key type %s, " ++ "using HostkeyAlgorithms verbatim", __func__, best); ++ ret = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys ++ * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible. ++ */ + oavail = avail = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms); + maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1; + first = xmalloc(maxlen); +@@ -159,6 +192,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) + if (*first != '\0') + debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first); + ++ out: ++ free(best); + free(first); + free(last); + free(hostname); +-- +cgit v1.2.3 diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb index 6ed54a8139..64a0a72a8f 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_8.2p1.bb @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar file://fix-potential-signed-overflow-in-pointer-arithmatic.patch \ file://sshd_check_keys \ file://add-test-support-for-busybox.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-14145.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "3076e6413e8dbe56d33848c1054ac091" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "43925151e6cf6cee1450190c0e9af4dc36b41c12737619edff8bcebdff64e671" @@ -35,7 +36,17 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2007-2768" # and when running in a Kerberos environment. As such it is not relevant to OpenEmbedded CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2014-9278" -# CVE only applies to some distributed RHEL binaries +# As per upstream, because of the way scp is based on a historical protocol called rcp +# which relies on that style of argument passing and therefore encounters expansion +# problems. Making changes to how the scp command line works breaks the pattern used +# by scp consumers. Upstream therefore recommends the use of rsync in the place of +# scp for better security. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1860487 +CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-15778" + +# CVE-2008-3844 was reported in OpenSSH on Red Hat Enterprise Linux and +# certain packages may have been compromised. This CVE is not applicable +# as our source is OpenBSD. https://securitytracker.com/id?1020730 +# https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30794 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2008-3844" PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sshd" -- 2.17.1
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#152396): https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/152396 Mute This Topic: https://lists.openembedded.org/mt/83155599/21656 Group Owner: [email protected] Unsubscribe: https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/unsub [[email protected]] -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
