I'm getting a failure on the autobuilder for the qemumips64 machine:
DEBUG: Executing shell function do_compile
NOTE: make -j 16 -l 52
perl "-I." -Mconfigdata "../openssl-1.1.1v/util/dofile.pl" \
"-oMakefile" ../openssl-1.1.1v/include/crypto/bn_conf.h.in >
include/crypto/bn_conf.h
perl "-I." -Mconfigdata "../openssl-1.1.1v/util/dofile.pl" \
"-oMakefile" ../openssl-1.1.1v/include/openssl/opensslconf.h.in >
include/openssl/opensslconf.h
perl "-I." -Mconfigdata "../openssl-1.1.1v/util/dofile.pl" \
"-oMakefile" ../openssl-1.1.1v/include/crypto/dso_conf.h.in >
include/crypto/dso_conf.h
make depend && make _all
make[1]: Entering directory
'TOPDIR/tmp/work/mips64r2-poky-linux/openssl/1.1.1v-r0/build'
make[1]: Leaving directory
'TOPDIR/tmp/work/mips64r2-poky-linux/openssl/1.1.1v-r0/build'
make[1]: Entering directory
'TOPDIR/tmp/work/mips64r2-poky-linux/openssl/1.1.1v-r0/build'
mips64-poky-linux-gcc -meb -mabi=64 -mhard-float -march=mips64r2
-fstack-protector-strong -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -Wformat
-Wformat-security -Werror=format-security
--sysroot=TOPDIR/tmp/work/mips64r2-poky-linux/openssl/1.1.1v-r0/recipe-sysroot
-I. -Iinclude -I../openssl-1.1.1v -I../openssl-1.1.1v/include -fPIC
-pthread -mabi=64 -mips3 -Wa,--noexecstack -O2 -pipe -g
-feliminate-unused-debug-types
-fmacro-prefix-map=TOPDIR/tmp/work/mips64r2-poky-linux/openssl/1.1.1v-r0=/usr/src/debug/openssl/1.1.1v-r0
-fdebug-prefix-map=TOPDIR/tmp/work/mips64r2-poky-linux/openssl/1.1.1v-r0=/usr/src/debug/openssl/1.1.1v-r0
-fdebug-prefix-map=TOPDIR/tmp/work/mips64r2-poky-linux/openssl/1.1.1v-r0/recipe-sysroot=
-fdebug-prefix-map=TOPDIR/tmp/work/mips64r2-poky-linux/openssl/1.1.1v-r0/recipe-sysroot-native=
-DOPENSSL_USE_NODELETE -DOPENSSL_PIC -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT -DSHA1_ASM
-DSHA256_ASM -DSHA512_ASM -DAES_ASM -DPOLY1305_ASM
-DOPENSSLDIR="\"/usr/lib/ssl-1.1\""
-DENGINESDIR="\"/usr/lib/engines-1.1\"" -DNDEBUG -MMD -MF
apps/app_rand.d.tmp -MT apps/app_rand.o -c -o apps/app_rand.o
../openssl-1.1.1v/apps/app_rand.c
Assembler messages:
Error: -mips3 conflicts with the other architecture options, which
imply -mips64r2
cc1: error: '-mips3' conflicts with the other architecture options,
which specify a mips64r2 processor
make[1]: *** [Makefile:711: apps/app_rand.o] Error 1
make[1]: Leaving directory
'TOPDIR/tmp/work/mips64r2-poky-linux/openssl/1.1.1v-r0/build'
make: *** [Makefile:178: all] Error 2
ERROR: oe_runmake failed
WARNING: exit code 1 from a shell command.
ERROR: Execution of
'TOPDIR/tmp/work/mips64r2-poky-linux/openssl/1.1.1v-r0/temp/run.do_compile.3017457'
failed with exit code 1
On Tue, Aug 1, 2023 at 12:30 PM Peter Marko via lists.openembedded.org
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
>
> https://www.openssl.org/news/openssl-1.1.1-notes.html
> Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1u and OpenSSL 1.1.1v [1 Aug 2023]
> * Fix excessive time spent checking DH q parameter value (CVE-2023-3817)
> * Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus (CVE-2023-3446)
> Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1t and OpenSSL 1.1.1u [30 May 2023]
> * Mitigate for very slow `OBJ_obj2txt()` performance with gigantic OBJECT
> IDENTIFIER sub-identities. (CVE-2023-2650)
> * Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466)
> * Fixed handling of invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates
> (CVE-2023-0465)
> * Limited the number of nodes created in a policy tree ([CVE-2023-0464])
>
> All CVEs for upgrade to 1.1.1u were already patched, so effectively
> this will apply patches for CVE-2023-3446 and CVE-2023-3817 plus
> several non-CVE fixes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
> ---
> .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch | 226 ------------------
> .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch | 60 -----
> .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch | 82 -------
> .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-2650.patch | 122 ----------
> .../{openssl_1.1.1t.bb => openssl_1.1.1v.bb} | 6 +-
> 5 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 495 deletions(-)
> delete mode 100644
> meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch
> delete mode 100644
> meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch
> delete mode 100644
> meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch
> delete mode 100644
> meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-2650.patch
> rename meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/{openssl_1.1.1t.bb =>
> openssl_1.1.1v.bb} (96%)
>
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch
> b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index cce5bad9f0..0000000000
> --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
> -From 879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Pauli <[email protected]>
> -Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 15:28:20 +1100
> -Subject: [PATCH] x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints
> -
> -A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions
> -of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains
> -that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit this
> -vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers
> -exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service
> -(DoS) attack on affected systems.
> -
> -Fixes CVE-2023-0464
> -
> -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
> -Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <[email protected]>
> -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20569)
> -
> -CVE: CVE-2023-0464
> -Upstream-Status: Backport
> [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=patch;h=879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b]
> -Signed-off-by: Nikhil R <[email protected]>
> -
> ----
> - crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h | 8 +++++++-
> - crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c | 12 +++++++++---
> - crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
> - 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
> -index 5daf78de45..344aa06765 100644
> ---- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
> -+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h
> -@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st {
> - };
> -
> - struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st {
> -+ /* The number of nodes in the tree */
> -+ size_t node_count;
> -+ /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */
> -+ size_t node_maximum;
> -+
> - /* This is the tree 'level' data */
> - X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels;
> - int nlevel;
> -@@ -159,7 +164,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE
> *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk,
> - X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
> - X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
> - X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
> -- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree);
> -+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
> -+ int extra_data);
> - void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node);
> - int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl,
> - const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid);
> -diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
> -index e2d7b15322..d574fb9d66 100644
> ---- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
> -+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c
> -@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const
> X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
> - X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
> - X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
> - X509_POLICY_NODE *parent,
> -- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
> -+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
> -+ int extra_data)
> - {
> - X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
> -
> -+ /* Verify that the tree isn't too large. This mitigates CVE-2023-0464
> */
> -+ if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum)
> -+ return NULL;
> -+
> - node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node));
> - if (node == NULL) {
> - X509V3err(X509V3_F_LEVEL_ADD_NODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
> -@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
> - }
> - node->data = data;
> - node->parent = parent;
> -- if (level) {
> -+ if (level != NULL) {
> - if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) {
> - if (level->anyPolicy)
> - goto node_error;
> -@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level,
> - }
> - }
> -
> -- if (tree) {
> -+ if (extra_data) {
> - if (tree->extra_data == NULL)
> - tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null();
> - if (tree->extra_data == NULL){
> -@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL
> *level,
> - }
> - }
> -
> -+ tree->node_count++;
> - if (parent)
> - parent->nchild++;
> -
> -diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
> -index 6e8322cbc5..6c7fd35405 100644
> ---- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
> -+++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
> -@@ -13,6 +13,18 @@
> -
> - #include "pcy_local.h"
> -
> -+/*
> -+ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it
> to
> -+ * a generous default of 1000 nodes.
> -+ *
> -+ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens
> the
> -+ * door on CVE-2023-0464.
> -+ */
> -+
> -+#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX
> -+# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000
> -+#endif
> -+
> - /*
> - * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during
> - * evaluation.
> -@@ -168,6 +180,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree,
> STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
> - return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
> - }
> -
> -+ /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */
> -+ tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX;
> -+
> - /*
> - * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
> - *
> -@@ -184,7 +199,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree,
> STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
> - level = tree->levels;
> - if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) ==
> NULL)
> - goto bad_tree;
> -- if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
> -+ if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) {
> - policy_data_free(data);
> - goto bad_tree;
> - }
> -@@ -243,7 +258,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree,
> STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
> - * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
> - */
> - static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
> -- X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
> -+ X509_POLICY_DATA *data,
> -+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
> - {
> - X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
> - int i, matched = 0;
> -@@ -253,13 +269,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL
> *curr,
> - X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
> -
> - if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
> -- if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
> -+ if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL)
> - return 0;
> - matched = 1;
> - }
> - }
> - if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
> -- if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
> -+ if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL)
> - return 0;
> - }
> - return 1;
> -@@ -272,7 +288,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL
> *curr,
> - * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
> - */
> - static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
> -- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
> -+ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
> -+ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
> - {
> - int i;
> -
> -@@ -280,7 +297,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
> - X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
> -
> - /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
> -- if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
> -+ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree))
> - return 0;
> - }
> - return 1;
> -@@ -311,7 +328,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
> - /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
> - data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
> - data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
> -- if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
> -+ if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) {
> - policy_data_free(data);
> - return 0;
> - }
> -@@ -373,7 +390,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
> - }
> - /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
> - if (last->anyPolicy &&
> -- level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) ==
> NULL)
> -+ level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) ==
> NULL)
> - return 0;
> - return 1;
> - }
> -@@ -555,7 +572,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE
> *tree,
> - extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
> - extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
> - | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE;
> -- node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree);
> -+ node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree, 1);
> - }
> - if (!tree->user_policies) {
> - tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null();
> -@@ -582,7 +599,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
> -
> - for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
> - cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
> -- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
> -+ if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree))
> - return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
> -
> - if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
> ---
> -2.34.1
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch
> b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index be5068074e..0000000000
> --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
> -From b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
> -Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 16:52:55 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf
> - certs
> -
> -Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we
> -later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf
> -cert was bad.
> -
> -Fixes: CVE-2023-0465
> -
> -Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <[email protected]>
> -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
> -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20588)
> -
> -CVE: CVE-2023-0465
> -Upstream-Status: Backport
> [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95]
> -Comment: Refreshed first hunk
> -Signed-off-by: Omkar Patil <[email protected]>
> -
> ----
> - crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 11 +++++++++--
> - 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
> -index 925fbb5412..1dfe4f9f31 100644
> ---- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
> -+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
> -@@ -1649,18 +1649,25 @@
> - }
> - /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
> - if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
> -- int i;
> -+ int i, cbcalled = 0;
> -
> - /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
> -- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
> -+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
> - X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
> -
> - if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
> - continue;
> -+ cbcalled = 1;
> - if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
> - X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
> - return 0;
> - }
> -+ if (!cbcalled) {
> -+ /* Should not be able to get here */
> -+ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
> -+ return 0;
> -+ }
> -+ /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */
> - return 1;
> - }
> - if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
> ---
> -2.34.1
> -
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch
> b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index f042aa5da1..0000000000
> --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
> -From 0d16b7e99aafc0b4a6d729eec65a411a7e025f0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
> -Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2023 16:15:47 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Fix documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()
> -
> -The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking.
> -
> -Fixes: CVE-2023-0466
> -
> -Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
> -Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]>
> -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20564)
> -
> -CVE: CVE-2023-0466
> -Upstream-Status: Backport
> [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=0d16b7e99aafc0b4a6d729eec65a411a7e025f0a]
> -Comment: Refreshed first hunk from CHANGE and NEWS
> -Signed-off-by: Omkar Patil <[email protected]>
> -
> ----
> - CHANGES | 5 +++++
> - NEWS | 1 +
> - doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod | 9 +++++++--
> - 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
> -index efccf7838e..b19f1429bb 100644
> ---- a/CHANGES
> -+++ b/CHANGES
> -@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@
> -
> - Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
> -
> -+ *) Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention
> -+ that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to
> -+ David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0466)
> -+ [Tomas Mraz]
> -+
> - *) Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName.
> -
> - There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address
> processing
> -diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
> -index 36a9bb6890..62615693fa 100644
> ---- a/NEWS
> -+++ b/NEWS
> -@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
> -
> - Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1s and OpenSSL 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
> -
> -+ o Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()
> (CVE-2023-0466)
> - o Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName
> (CVE-2023-0286)
> - o Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF (CVE-2023-0215)
> - o Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex (CVE-2022-4450)
> -diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
> b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
> -index f6f304bf7b..aa292f9336 100644
> ---- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
> -+++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod
> -@@ -92,8 +92,9 @@ B<trust>.
> - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to
> - B<t>. Normally the current time is used.
> -
> --X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled
> --by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
> -+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set.
> -+Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable
> -+policy checking.
> -
> - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled
> - by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing
> -@@ -377,6 +378,10 @@ and has no effect.
> -
> - The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i.
> -
> -+The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as
> -+enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this.
> -+The documentation was changed to align with the implementation.
> -+
> - =head1 COPYRIGHT
> -
> - Copyright 2009-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
> ---
> -2.34.1
> -
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-2650.patch
> b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-2650.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index ef344dda7f..0000000000
> --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-2650.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
> -From 9e209944b35cf82368071f160a744b6178f9b098 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> -From: Richard Levitte <[email protected]>
> -Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 10:00:13 +0200
> -Subject: [PATCH] Restrict the size of OBJECT IDENTIFIERs that OBJ_obj2txt
> will
> - translate
> -
> -OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical
> -numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very
> -long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that
> -sub-identifier.
> -
> -To mitigate this, a restriction on the size that OBJ_obj2txt() will
> -translate to canonical numeric text form is added, based on RFC 2578
> -(STD 58), which says this:
> -
> -> 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
> ->
> -> An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative numbers.
> -> For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a sub-identifier,
> -> there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, and each sub-identifier
> -> has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).
> -
> -Fixes otc/security#96
> -Fixes CVE-2023-2650
> -
> -Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
> -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
> -
> -Upstream-Status: Backport
> [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9e209944b35cf82368071f160a744b6178f9b098]
> -CVE: CVE-2023-2650
> -Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
> ----
> - CHANGES | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> - NEWS | 2 ++
> - crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> - 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
> -index 1eaaf4e..f2cf38f 100644
> ---- a/CHANGES
> -+++ b/CHANGES
> -@@ -7,7 +7,33 @@
> - https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
> - release branch.
> -
> -- Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
> -+ Changes between 1.1.1t and 1.1.1u [xx XXX xxxx]
> -+
> -+ *) Mitigate for the time it takes for `OBJ_obj2txt` to translate gigantic
> -+ OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identifiers to canonical numeric text form.
> -+
> -+ OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical
> -+ numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a
> very
> -+ long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that
> -+ sub-identifier. (CVE-2023-2650)
> -+
> -+ To mitigitate this, `OBJ_obj2txt()` will only translate an OBJECT
> -+ IDENTIFIER to canonical numeric text form if the size of that OBJECT
> -+ IDENTIFIER is 586 bytes or less, and fail otherwise.
> -+
> -+ The basis for this restriction is RFC 2578 (STD 58), section 3.5.
> OBJECT
> -+ IDENTIFIER values, which stipulates that OBJECT IDENTIFIERS may have at
> -+ most 128 sub-identifiers, and that the maximum value that each sub-
> -+ identifier may have is 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).
> -+
> -+ For each byte of every sub-identifier, only the 7 lower bits are part
> of
> -+ the value, so the maximum amount of bytes that an OBJECT IDENTIFIER
> with
> -+ these restrictions may occupy is 32 * 128 / 7, which is approximately
> 586
> -+ bytes.
> -+
> -+ Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
> -+
> -+Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
> -
> - *) Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention
> - that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to
> -diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
> -index a86220a..41922c4 100644
> ---- a/NEWS
> -+++ b/NEWS
> -@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
> -
> - Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1s and OpenSSL 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
> -
> -+ o Mitigate for very slow `OBJ_obj2txt()` performance with gigantic
> -+ OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identities. (CVE-2023-2650)
> - o Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy()
> (CVE-2023-0466)
> - o Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName
> (CVE-2023-0286)
> - o Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF (CVE-2023-0215)
> -diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
> -index 7e8de72..d699915 100644
> ---- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
> -+++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
> -@@ -428,6 +428,25 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const
> ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
> - first = 1;
> - bl = NULL;
> -
> -+ /*
> -+ * RFC 2578 (STD 58) says this about OBJECT IDENTIFIERs:
> -+ *
> -+ * > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values
> -+ * >
> -+ * > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative
> -+ * > numbers. For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a
> -+ * > sub-identifier, there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value,
> -+ * > and each sub-identifier has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295
> -+ * > decimal).
> -+ *
> -+ * So a legitimate OID according to this RFC is at most (32 * 128 / 7),
> -+ * i.e. 586 bytes long.
> -+ *
> -+ * Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
> -+ */
> -+ if (len > 586)
> -+ goto err;
> -+
> - while (len > 0) {
> - l = 0;
> - use_bn = 0;
> ---
> -2.25.1
> -
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb
> b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1v.bb
> similarity index 96%
> rename from meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb
> rename to meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1v.bb
> index eea8ef64af..d3bf76863a 100644
> --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb
> +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1v.bb
> @@ -19,17 +19,13 @@ SRC_URI =
> "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \
> file://reproducible.patch \
> file://reproducibility.patch \
> file://0001-Configure-add-2-missing-key-sorts.patch \
> - file://CVE-2023-0464.patch \
> - file://CVE-2023-0465.patch \
> - file://CVE-2023-0466.patch \
> - file://CVE-2023-2650.patch \
> "
>
> SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \
> file://environment.d-openssl.sh \
> "
>
> -SRC_URI[sha256sum] =
> "8dee9b24bdb1dcbf0c3d1e9b02fb8f6bf22165e807f45adeb7c9677536859d3b"
> +SRC_URI[sha256sum] =
> "d6697e2871e77238460402e9362d47d18382b15ef9f246aba6c7bd780d38a6b0"
>
> inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest
> MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"
> --
> 2.30.2
>
>
>
>
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