From: Meenali Gupta <[email protected]> There is a stack overflow vulnerability in ash.c:6030 in busybox vbefore 1.35. In the environment of Internet of Vehicles, this vulnerability can be executed from command to arbitrary code execution.
Signed-off-by: Meenali Gupta <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <[email protected]> --- .../busybox/busybox/CVE-2022-48174.patch | 80 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.35.0.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2022-48174.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2022-48174.patch b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2022-48174.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dd0ea19f02 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox/CVE-2022-48174.patch @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +From cf5d0889262e1b04ec2aa4caff2f5da2d602c665 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2023 17:48:47 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] busybox: shell: avoid segfault on ${0::0/0~09J}. Closes 15216 +function old new delta evaluate_string 1011 1053 +42 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=d417193cf37ca1005830d7e16f5fa7e1d8a44209] +CVE: CVE-2022-48174 + +Signed-off-by: Meenali Gupta <[email protected]> +--- + shell/math.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/shell/math.c b/shell/math.c +index 76d22c9..727c294 100644 +--- a/shell/math.c ++++ b/shell/math.c +@@ -577,6 +577,28 @@ static arith_t strto_arith_t(const char *nptr, char **endptr) + # endif + #endif + ++//TODO: much better estimation than expr_len/2? Such as: ++//static unsigned estimate_nums_and_names(const char *expr) ++//{ ++// unsigned count = 0; ++// while (*(expr = skip_whitespace(expr)) != '\0') { ++// const char *p; ++// if (isdigit(*expr)) { ++// while (isdigit(*++expr)) ++// continue; ++// count++; ++// continue; ++// } ++// p = endofname(expr); ++// if (p != expr) { ++// expr = p; ++// count++; ++// continue; ++// } ++// } ++// return count; ++//} ++ + static arith_t + evaluate_string(arith_state_t *math_state, const char *expr) + { +@@ -584,10 +606,12 @@ evaluate_string(arith_state_t *math_state, const char *expr) + const char *errmsg; + const char *start_expr = expr = skip_whitespace(expr); + unsigned expr_len = strlen(expr) + 2; +- /* Stack of integers */ +- /* The proof that there can be no more than strlen(startbuf)/2+1 +- * integers in any given correct or incorrect expression +- * is left as an exercise to the reader. */ ++ /* Stack of integers/names */ ++ /* There can be no more than strlen(startbuf)/2+1 ++ * integers/names in any given correct or incorrect expression. ++ * (modulo "09v09v09v09v09v" case, ++ * but we have code to detect that early) ++ */ + var_or_num_t *const numstack = alloca((expr_len / 2) * sizeof(numstack[0])); + var_or_num_t *numstackptr = numstack; + /* Stack of operator tokens */ +@@ -652,6 +676,13 @@ evaluate_string(arith_state_t *math_state, const char *expr) + numstackptr->var = NULL; + errno = 0; + numstackptr->val = strto_arith_t(expr, (char**) &expr); ++ /* A number can't be followed by another number, or a variable name. ++ * We'd catch this later anyway, but this would require numstack[] ++ * to be twice as deep to handle strings where _every_ char is ++ * a new number or name. Example: 09v09v09v09v09v09v09v09v09v ++ */ ++ if (isalnum(*expr) || *expr == '_') ++ goto err; + //bb_error_msg("val:%lld", numstackptr->val); + if (errno) + numstackptr->val = 0; /* bash compat */ +-- +2.40.0 diff --git a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.35.0.bb b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.35.0.bb index e9ca6fdb1a..07a5137d2a 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.35.0.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-core/busybox/busybox_1.35.0.bb @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://busybox.net/downloads/busybox-${PV}.tar.bz2;name=tarball \ file://0002-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch \ file://CVE-2022-30065.patch \ file://0001-devmem-add-128-bit-width.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-48174.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:libc-musl = " file://musl.cfg " -- 2.34.1
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