From: Ming Liu <[email protected]> The original CVE-2023-29406.patch is not complete, causing docker failures at runtime, backport a complementary fix from golang upstream.
Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <[email protected]> --- meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc | 3 +- ...023-29406.patch => CVE-2023-29406-1.patch} | 0 .../go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-29406-2.patch | 114 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) rename meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/{CVE-2023-29406.patch => CVE-2023-29406-1.patch} (100%) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-29406-2.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc index 6fc07bb910..c02da60f68 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.17.13.inc @@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ SRC_URI += "\ file://CVE-2023-29405.patch \ file://CVE-2023-29402.patch \ file://CVE-2023-29400.patch \ - file://CVE-2023-29406.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-29406-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-29406-2.patch \ file://CVE-2023-24536_1.patch \ file://CVE-2023-24536_2.patch \ file://CVE-2023-24536_3.patch \ diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-29406.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-29406-1.patch similarity index 100% rename from meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-29406.patch rename to meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-29406-1.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-29406-2.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-29406-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..637f46a537 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.18/CVE-2023-29406-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +From c08a5fa413a34111c9a37fd9e545de27ab0978b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Damien Neil <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 10:30:46 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] [release-branch.go1.19] net/http: permit requests with + invalid Host headers + +Historically, the Transport has silently truncated invalid +Host headers at the first '/' or ' ' character. CL 506996 changed +this behavior to reject invalid Host headers entirely. +Unfortunately, Docker appears to rely on the previous behavior. + +When sending a HTTP/1 request with an invalid Host, send an empty +Host header. This is safer than truncation: If you care about the +Host, then you should get the one you set; if you don't care, +then an empty Host should be fine. + +Continue to fully validate Host headers sent to a proxy, +since proxies generally can't productively forward requests +without a Host. + +For #60374 +Fixes #61431 +Fixes #61825 + +Change-Id: If170c7dd860aa20eb58fe32990fc93af832742b6 +Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/511155 +TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <[email protected]> +Run-TryBot: Damien Neil <[email protected]> +(cherry picked from commit b9153f6ef338baee5fe02a867c8fbc83a8b29dd1) +Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/518855 +Auto-Submit: Dmitri Shuralyov <[email protected]> +Run-TryBot: Roland Shoemaker <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/c08a5fa413a34111c9a37fd9e545de27ab0978b1] +CVE: CVE-2023-29406 +Signed-off-by: Ming Liu <[email protected]> +--- + src/net/http/request.go | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- + src/net/http/request_test.go | 17 ++++++++++++----- + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/net/http/request.go b/src/net/http/request.go +index 3100037386..91cb8a66b9 100644 +--- a/src/net/http/request.go ++++ b/src/net/http/request.go +@@ -582,8 +582,29 @@ func (r *Request) write(w io.Writer, usingProxy bool, extraHeaders Header, waitF + if err != nil { + return err + } ++ // Validate that the Host header is a valid header in general, ++ // but don't validate the host itself. This is sufficient to avoid ++ // header or request smuggling via the Host field. ++ // The server can (and will, if it's a net/http server) reject ++ // the request if it doesn't consider the host valid. + if !httpguts.ValidHostHeader(host) { +- return errors.New("http: invalid Host header") ++ // Historically, we would truncate the Host header after '/' or ' '. ++ // Some users have relied on this truncation to convert a network ++ // address such as Unix domain socket path into a valid, ignored ++ // Host header (see https://go.dev/issue/61431). ++ // ++ // We don't preserve the truncation, because sending an altered ++ // header field opens a smuggling vector. Instead, zero out the ++ // Host header entirely if it isn't valid. (An empty Host is valid; ++ // see RFC 9112 Section 3.2.) ++ // ++ // Return an error if we're sending to a proxy, since the proxy ++ // probably can't do anything useful with an empty Host header. ++ if !usingProxy { ++ host = "" ++ } else { ++ return errors.New("http: invalid Host header") ++ } + } + + // According to RFC 6874, an HTTP client, proxy, or other +diff --git a/src/net/http/request_test.go b/src/net/http/request_test.go +index fddc85d6a9..dd1e2dc2a1 100644 +--- a/src/net/http/request_test.go ++++ b/src/net/http/request_test.go +@@ -770,16 +770,23 @@ func TestRequestWriteBufferedWriter(t *testing.T) { + } + } + +-func TestRequestBadHost(t *testing.T) { ++func TestRequestBadHostHeader(t *testing.T) { + got := []string{} + req, err := NewRequest("GET", "http://foo/after";, nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } +- req.Host = "foo.com with spaces" +- req.URL.Host = "foo.com with spaces" +- if err := req.Write(logWrites{t, &got}); err == nil { +- t.Errorf("Writing request with invalid Host: succeded, want error") ++ req.Host = "foo.com\nnewline" ++ req.URL.Host = "foo.com\nnewline" ++ req.Write(logWrites{t, &got}) ++ want := []string{ ++ "GET /after HTTP/1.1\r\n", ++ "Host: \r\n", ++ "User-Agent: " + DefaultUserAgent + "\r\n", ++ "\r\n", ++ } ++ if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) { ++ t.Errorf("Writes = %q\n Want = %q", got, want) + } + } + +-- +2.34.1 + -- 2.34.1
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