From: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> Upstream-Status: Backport from https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/289f29b0fe38baf2d7cb5854f4bb573cc34a6a15
Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yoann Congal <[email protected]> --- .../python/python3/CVE-2025-13836.patch | 163 ++++++++++++++++++ .../python/python3_3.10.19.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 164 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2025-13836.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2025-13836.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2025-13836.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c4387b6019 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3/CVE-2025-13836.patch @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +From 289f29b0fe38baf2d7cb5854f4bb573cc34a6a15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Miss Islington (bot)" + <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2025 16:21:57 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] [3.13] gh-119451: Fix a potential denial of service in + http.client (GH-119454) (#142139) + +gh-119451: Fix a potential denial of service in http.client (GH-119454) + +Reading the whole body of the HTTP response could cause OOM if +the Content-Length value is too large even if the server does not send +a large amount of data. Now the HTTP client reads large data by chunks, +therefore the amount of consumed memory is proportional to the amount +of sent data. +(cherry picked from commit 5a4c4a033a4a54481be6870aa1896fad732555b5) + +CVE: CVE-2025-13836 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/python/cpython/commit/289f29b0fe38baf2d7cb5854f4bb573cc34a6a15] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + Lib/http/client.py | 28 ++++++-- + Lib/test/test_httplib.py | 66 +++++++++++++++++++ + ...-05-23-11-47-48.gh-issue-119451.qkJe9-.rst | 5 ++ + 3 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-05-23-11-47-48.gh-issue-119451.qkJe9-.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py +index d1b7b10..c8ab5b7 100644 +--- a/Lib/http/client.py ++++ b/Lib/http/client.py +@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ responses = {v: v.phrase for v in http.HTTPStatus.__members__.values()} + _MAXLINE = 65536 + _MAXHEADERS = 100 + ++# Data larger than this will be read in chunks, to prevent extreme ++# overallocation. ++_MIN_READ_BUF_SIZE = 1 << 20 ++ ++ + # Header name/value ABNF (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.2) + # + # VCHAR = %x21-7E +@@ -628,10 +633,25 @@ class HTTPResponse(io.BufferedIOBase): + reading. If the bytes are truly not available (due to EOF), then the + IncompleteRead exception can be used to detect the problem. + """ +- data = self.fp.read(amt) +- if len(data) < amt: +- raise IncompleteRead(data, amt-len(data)) +- return data ++ cursize = min(amt, _MIN_READ_BUF_SIZE) ++ data = self.fp.read(cursize) ++ if len(data) >= amt: ++ return data ++ if len(data) < cursize: ++ raise IncompleteRead(data, amt - len(data)) ++ ++ data = io.BytesIO(data) ++ data.seek(0, 2) ++ while True: ++ # This is a geometric increase in read size (never more than ++ # doubling out the current length of data per loop iteration). ++ delta = min(cursize, amt - cursize) ++ data.write(self.fp.read(delta)) ++ if data.tell() >= amt: ++ return data.getvalue() ++ cursize += delta ++ if data.tell() < cursize: ++ raise IncompleteRead(data.getvalue(), amt - data.tell()) + + def _safe_readinto(self, b): + """Same as _safe_read, but for reading into a buffer.""" +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py +index 77152cf..89ec5f6 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py +@@ -1226,6 +1226,72 @@ class BasicTest(TestCase): + thread.join() + self.assertEqual(result, b"proxied data\n") + ++ def test_large_content_length(self): ++ serv = socket.create_server((HOST, 0)) ++ self.addCleanup(serv.close) ++ ++ def run_server(): ++ [conn, address] = serv.accept() ++ with conn: ++ while conn.recv(1024): ++ conn.sendall( ++ b"HTTP/1.1 200 Ok\r\n" ++ b"Content-Length: %d\r\n" ++ b"\r\n" % size) ++ conn.sendall(b'A' * (size//3)) ++ conn.sendall(b'B' * (size - size//3)) ++ ++ thread = threading.Thread(target=run_server) ++ thread.start() ++ self.addCleanup(thread.join, 1.0) ++ ++ conn = client.HTTPConnection(*serv.getsockname()) ++ try: ++ for w in range(15, 27): ++ size = 1 << w ++ conn.request("GET", "/") ++ with conn.getresponse() as response: ++ self.assertEqual(len(response.read()), size) ++ finally: ++ conn.close() ++ thread.join(1.0) ++ ++ def test_large_content_length_truncated(self): ++ serv = socket.create_server((HOST, 0)) ++ self.addCleanup(serv.close) ++ ++ def run_server(): ++ while True: ++ [conn, address] = serv.accept() ++ with conn: ++ conn.recv(1024) ++ if not size: ++ break ++ conn.sendall( ++ b"HTTP/1.1 200 Ok\r\n" ++ b"Content-Length: %d\r\n" ++ b"\r\n" ++ b"Text" % size) ++ ++ thread = threading.Thread(target=run_server) ++ thread.start() ++ self.addCleanup(thread.join, 1.0) ++ ++ conn = client.HTTPConnection(*serv.getsockname()) ++ try: ++ for w in range(18, 65): ++ size = 1 << w ++ conn.request("GET", "/") ++ with conn.getresponse() as response: ++ self.assertRaises(client.IncompleteRead, response.read) ++ conn.close() ++ finally: ++ conn.close() ++ size = 0 ++ conn.request("GET", "/") ++ conn.close() ++ thread.join(1.0) ++ + def test_putrequest_override_domain_validation(self): + """ + It should be possible to override the default validation +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-05-23-11-47-48.gh-issue-119451.qkJe9-.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-05-23-11-47-48.gh-issue-119451.qkJe9-.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..6d6f25c +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-05-23-11-47-48.gh-issue-119451.qkJe9-.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ ++Fix a potential memory denial of service in the :mod:`http.client` module. ++When connecting to a malicious server, it could cause ++an arbitrary amount of memory to be allocated. ++This could have led to symptoms including a :exc:`MemoryError`, swapping, out ++of memory (OOM) killed processes or containers, or even system crashes. +-- +2.50.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.10.19.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.10.19.bb index 6f23d258c1..5140445ad8 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.10.19.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/python/python3_3.10.19.bb @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.python.org/ftp/python/${PV}/Python-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://0001-test_storlines-skip-due-to-load-variability.patch \ file://0001-gh-107811-tarfile-treat-overflow-in-UID-GID-as-failu.patch \ file://CVE-2025-6075.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-13836.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-native = " \
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