Pick patch from [1] & [2] also mentioned at NVD report in [3] & [4]
[1] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/c78194e41d5a0b05b0ddf383b6679b1503f977fb [2] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/190cb3c2b9c769a3972bcfd991a7b5b6cb771ef0 [3] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41411 [4] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44656 More info : CVE-2026-41411 - Disallow backticks before attempting to expand filenames. CVE-2026-44656 - Prevent shell execution from 'path' backticks via modelines. Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> --- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-41411.patch | 75 +++++++++++ .../vim/files/CVE-2026-44656.patch | 124 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 2 + 3 files changed, 201 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-41411.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-44656.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-41411.patch b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-41411.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..13d613c204 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-41411.patch @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +From c78194e41d5a0b05b0ddf383b6679b1503f977fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2026 20:17:17 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0357: [security]: command injection via backticks + in tag files + +Problem: [security]: command injection via backticks in tag files + (Srinivas Piskala Ganesh Babu, Andy Ngo) +Solution: Disallow backticks before attempting to expand filenames. + +Github Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-cwgx-gcj7-6qh8 + +Supported by AI + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2026-41411 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/c78194e41d5a0b05b0ddf383b6679b1503f977fb] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + src/tag.c | 4 +++- + src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/src/tag.c b/src/tag.c +index d3e27e6023..0f12e384b5 100644 +--- a/src/tag.c ++++ b/src/tag.c +@@ -4137,8 +4137,10 @@ expand_tag_fname(char_u *fname, char_u *tag_fname, int expand) + + /* + * Expand file name (for environment variables) when needed. ++ * Disallow backticks, they could execute arbitrary shell ++ * commands. This is not needed for tag filenames. + */ +- if (expand && mch_has_wildcard(fname)) ++ if (expand && mch_has_wildcard(fname) && vim_strchr(fname, '`') == NULL) + { + ExpandInit(&xpc); + xpc.xp_context = EXPAND_FILES; +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim b/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim +index bbab3c70e8..c0fa7b02e6 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_tagjump.vim +@@ -1693,4 +1693,26 @@ func Test_tag_excmd_with_number_vim9script() + bwipe! + endfunc + ++" Test that backtick expressions in tag filenames are not expanded. ++" This prevents command injection via malicious tags files. ++func Test_tag_backtick_filename_not_expanded() ++ let pwned_file = 'Xtags_pwnd' ++ call assert_false(filereadable(pwned_file)) ++ ++ let tagline = "main\t`touch " .. pwned_file .. "`\t/^int main/;\"\tf" ++ call writefile([tagline], 'Xbt_tags', 'D') ++ call writefile(['int main(int argc, char **argv) {', '}'], 'Xbt_main.c', 'D') ++ ++ set tags=Xbt_tags ++ sp Xbt_main.c ++ ++ " The :tag command should fail to find the file, but must NOT execute ++ " the backtick shell command. ++ call assert_fails('tag main', 'E429:') ++ call assert_false(filereadable(pwned_file)) ++ ++ set tags& ++ bwipe! ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-44656.patch b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-44656.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..971e4c145b --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-44656.patch @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +From 190cb3c2b9c769a3972bcfd991a7b5b6cb771ef0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 3 May 2026 16:10:03 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0435: [security]: backticks in 'path' may cause + shell execution on completion + +Problem: [security]: Backticks enclosed shell commands in the 'path' + option value are executed during completion (q1uf3ng). +Solution: Skip path entries containing backticks, add P_SECURE to 'path' + option, so that it cannot be set from a modeline (for symmetry with + the 'cdpath' option) + +Github Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-hwg5-3cxw-wvvg + +Supported by AI. + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2026-44656 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/190cb3c2b9c769a3972bcfd991a7b5b6cb771ef0] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/doc/options.txt | 3 +++ + src/findfile.c | 4 ++++ + src/optiondefs.h | 2 +- + src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim | 17 +++++++++++++++++ + src/testdir/test_modeline.vim | 14 ++++++++++++++ + 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/doc/options.txt b/runtime/doc/options.txt +index f083d6ff10..8a4d782262 100644 +--- a/runtime/doc/options.txt ++++ b/runtime/doc/options.txt +@@ -6750,6 +6750,9 @@ A jump table for the options with a short description can be found at |Q_op|. + < Replace the ';' with a ':' or whatever separator is used. Note that + this doesn't work when $INCL contains a comma or white space. + ++ This option cannot be set from a |modeline| or in the |sandbox|, for ++ security reasons. ++ + *'perldll'* + 'perldll' string (default depends on the build) + global +diff --git a/src/findfile.c b/src/findfile.c +index 0c5d1cf252..fccbc05a76 100644 +--- a/src/findfile.c ++++ b/src/findfile.c +@@ -2412,6 +2412,10 @@ expand_path_option( + { + buflen = copy_option_part(&path_option, buf, MAXPATHL, " ,"); + ++ // do not expand backticks, could have been set via a modeline ++ if (vim_strchr(buf, '`') != NULL) ++ continue; ++ + if (buf[0] == '.' && (buf[1] == NUL || vim_ispathsep(buf[1]))) + { + size_t plen; +diff --git a/src/optiondefs.h b/src/optiondefs.h +index a5e1fe99df..dac06119fc 100644 +--- a/src/optiondefs.h ++++ b/src/optiondefs.h +@@ -1954,7 +1954,7 @@ static struct vimoption options[] = + (char_u *)&p_pm, PV_NONE, + did_set_backupext_or_patchmode, NULL, + {(char_u *)"", (char_u *)0L} SCTX_INIT}, +- {"path", "pa", P_STRING|P_EXPAND|P_VI_DEF|P_COMMA|P_NODUP, ++ {"path", "pa", P_STRING|P_EXPAND|P_VI_DEF|P_SECURE|P_COMMA|P_NODUP, + (char_u *)&p_path, PV_PATH, NULL, NULL, + { + #if defined(AMIGA) || defined(MSWIN) +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim b/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim +index 079fb78043..8b8b71c303 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_find_complete.vim +@@ -161,4 +161,21 @@ func Test_find_complete() + set path& + endfunc + ++" Verify that backticks in 'path' are not executed ++func Test_find_completion_backtick_in_path() ++ CheckUnix ++ CheckExecutable id ++ ++ new Xpoc.c ++ setl path+=`id>Xrce_marker` ++ " Triggering completion must not execute the backtick command. ++ call getcompletion('', 'file_in_path') ++ call assert_false(filereadable('Xrce_marker')) ++ call feedkeys(":find \t\n", "xt") ++ call assert_false(filereadable('Xrce_marker')) ++ ++ bwipe! ++ call delete('Xrce_marker') ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim b/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim +index 79fc7d14d5..20fb7e0677 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_modeline.vim +@@ -493,4 +493,18 @@ func Test_modeline_nowrap_lcs_extends() + set equalalways& + endfunc + ++" Verify that backticks in 'path' set from a modeline are not executed ++func Test_path_modeline() ++ let lines =<< trim END ++ // vim: set path+=foobar : ++ END ++ call writefile(lines, 'Xpoc.c', 'D') ++ ++ set nomodelinestrict modeline ++ call assert_fails('split Xpoc.c', 'E520:') ++ ++ bwipe! ++ set modelinestrict& modeline& ++endfunc ++ + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc index d6fdf45706..efd24650f4 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +++ b/meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https;tag=v${PV} file://disable_acl_header_check.patch \ file://0001-src-Makefile-improve-reproducibility.patch \ file://no-path-adjust.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-44656.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-41411.patch \ " PV .= ".0340" -- 2.50.1
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