From: Li Wang <[email protected]> the patch come from: http://cups.org/strfiles/3867/str3867.patch
The LZW decompressor in the LWZReadByte function in giftoppm.c in the David Koblas GIF decoder in PBMPLUS, as used in the gif_read_lzw function in filter/image-gif.c in CUPS before 1.4.7, the LZWReadByte function in plug-ins/common/file-gif-load.c in GIMP 2.6.11 and earlier, the LZWReadByte function in img/gifread.c in XPCE in SWI-Prolog 5.10.4 and earlier, and other products, does not properly handle code words that are absent from the decompression table when encountered, which allows remote attackers to trigger an infinite loop or a heap-based buffer overflow, and possibly execute arbitrary code, via a crafted compressed stream, a related issue to CVE-2006-1168 and CVE-2011-2895. http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2011-2896 [YOCTO #3582] [ CQID: WIND00299595 ] Upstream-Status: Backport (From OE-Core rev: 0742b7aecaada435f90f39f26914906a5eb1fd4f) Signed-off-by: Li Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Saul Wold <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <[email protected]> --- .../cups/cups-1.4.6/cups-CVE-2011-2896.patch | 140 ++++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups_1.4.6.bb | 3 +- 2 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups-1.4.6/cups-CVE-2011-2896.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups-1.4.6/cups-CVE-2011-2896.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups-1.4.6/cups-CVE-2011-2896.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c6f75b --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups-1.4.6/cups-CVE-2011-2896.patch @@ -0,0 +1,140 @@ +cups - CVE-2011-2896 + +the patch come from: +http://cups.org/strfiles/3867/str3867.patch + +The LZW decompressor in the LWZReadByte function in giftoppm.c +in the David Koblas GIF decoder in PBMPLUS, as used in the +gif_read_lzw function in filter/image-gif.c in CUPS before 1.4.7, +the LZWReadByte function in plug-ins/common/file-gif-load.c +in GIMP 2.6.11 and earlier, the LZWReadByte function in img/gifread.c +in XPCE in SWI-Prolog 5.10.4 and earlier, and other products, +does not properly handle code words that are absent from the +decompression table when encountered, which allows remote attackers to +trigger an infinite loop or a heap-based buffer overflow, and possibly +execute arbitrary code, via a crafted compressed stream, a related +issue to CVE-2006-1168 and CVE-2011-2895. +http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2011-2896 + +Integrated-by: Li Wang <[email protected]> +--- + filter/image-gif.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- + 1 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/filter/image-gif.c b/filter/image-gif.c +index 3857c21..fa9691e 100644 +--- a/filter/image-gif.c ++++ b/filter/image-gif.c +@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ gif_get_code(FILE *fp, /* I - File to read from */ + * Read in another buffer... + */ + +- if ((count = gif_get_block (fp, buf + last_byte)) <= 0) ++ if ((count = gif_get_block(fp, buf + last_byte)) <= 0) + { + /* + * Whoops, no more data! +@@ -582,19 +582,13 @@ gif_read_lzw(FILE *fp, /* I - File to read from */ + gif_get_code(fp, 0, 1); + + /* +- * Wipe the decompressor table... ++ * Wipe the decompressor table (already mostly 0 due to the calloc above...) + */ + + fresh = 1; + +- for (i = 0; i < clear_code; i ++) +- { +- table[0][i] = 0; ++ for (i = 1; i < clear_code; i ++) + table[1][i] = i; +- } +- +- for (; i < 4096; i ++) +- table[0][i] = table[1][0] = 0; + + sp = stack; + +@@ -605,29 +599,30 @@ gif_read_lzw(FILE *fp, /* I - File to read from */ + fresh = 0; + + do ++ { + firstcode = oldcode = gif_get_code(fp, code_size, 0); ++ } + while (firstcode == clear_code); + +- return (firstcode); ++ return (firstcode & 255); + } + else if (!table) + return (0); + + if (sp > stack) +- return (*--sp); ++ return ((*--sp) & 255); + +- while ((code = gif_get_code (fp, code_size, 0)) >= 0) ++ while ((code = gif_get_code(fp, code_size, 0)) >= 0) + { + if (code == clear_code) + { +- for (i = 0; i < clear_code; i ++) +- { +- table[0][i] = 0; +- table[1][i] = i; +- } ++ /* ++ * Clear/reset the compression table... ++ */ + +- for (; i < 4096; i ++) +- table[0][i] = table[1][i] = 0; ++ memset(table, 0, 2 * sizeof(gif_table_t)); ++ for (i = 1; i < clear_code; i ++) ++ table[1][i] = i; + + code_size = set_code_size + 1; + max_code_size = 2 * clear_code; +@@ -637,12 +632,11 @@ gif_read_lzw(FILE *fp, /* I - File to read from */ + + firstcode = oldcode = gif_get_code(fp, code_size, 0); + +- return (firstcode); ++ return (firstcode & 255); + } +- else if (code == end_code) ++ else if (code == end_code || code > max_code) + { +- unsigned char buf[260]; +- ++ unsigned char buf[260]; /* Block buffer */ + + if (!gif_eof) + while (gif_get_block(fp, buf) > 0); +@@ -652,7 +646,7 @@ gif_read_lzw(FILE *fp, /* I - File to read from */ + + incode = code; + +- if (code >= max_code) ++ if (code == max_code) + { + if (sp < (stack + 8192)) + *sp++ = firstcode; +@@ -690,10 +684,10 @@ gif_read_lzw(FILE *fp, /* I - File to read from */ + oldcode = incode; + + if (sp > stack) +- return (*--sp); ++ return ((*--sp) & 255); + } + +- return (code); ++ return (code & 255); + } + + +-- +1.7.0.5 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups_1.4.6.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups_1.4.6.bb index 53dc149..7cecd7f 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups_1.4.6.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-extended/cups/cups_1.4.6.bb @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ require cups14.inc -PR = "r7" +PR = "r8" DEPENDS += "libusb \ ${@base_contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', 'libpam', '', d)}" @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ SRC_URI += " \ file://use_echo_only_in_init.patch \ file://0001-don-t-try-to-run-generated-binaries.patch \ file://cups_serverbin.patch \ + file://cups-CVE-2011-2896.patch \ file://cups-CVE-2012-5519.patch \ " -- 1.7.10.4 _______________________________________________ Openembedded-core mailing list [email protected] http://lists.linuxtogo.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core
