Fixes the "heartbleed" TLS vulnerability (CVE-2014-0160). More information here:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-0160 Patch borrowed from Debian; this is just a tweaked version of the upstream commit (without patching the CHANGES file which otherwise would fail to apply on top of this version). Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <[email protected]> --- .../openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/CVE-2014-0160.patch | 118 +++++++++++++++++++++ .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 119 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/CVE-2014-0160.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/CVE-2014-0160.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/CVE-2014-0160.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c06cd64 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/CVE-2014-0160.patch @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +From 96db9023b881d7cd9f379b0c154650d6c108e9a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Dr. Stephen Henson" <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 6 Apr 2014 00:51:06 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Add heartbeat extension bounds check. + +A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension +can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or +server. + +Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to +Adam Langley <[email protected]> and Bodo Moeller <[email protected]> for +preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) + +Patch (tweaked version of upstream fix without CHANGES change) borrowed +from Debian. + +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <[email protected]> + +--- + ssl/d1_both.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++-------- + ssl/t1_lib.c | 14 +++++++++----- + 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c +index 7a5596a..2e8cf68 100644 +--- a/ssl/d1_both.c ++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c +@@ -1459,26 +1459,36 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) + unsigned int payload; + unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ + +- /* Read type and payload length first */ +- hbtype = *p++; +- n2s(p, payload); +- pl = p; +- + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, + &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, + s, s->msg_callback_arg); + ++ /* Read type and payload length first */ ++ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) ++ return 0; /* silently discard */ ++ hbtype = *p++; ++ n2s(p, payload); ++ if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) ++ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ ++ pl = p; ++ + if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) + { + unsigned char *buffer, *bp; ++ unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ + ++ 2 /* heartbeat length */ + ++ payload + padding; + int r; + ++ if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) ++ return 0; ++ + /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte + * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus + * payload, plus padding + */ +- buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); ++ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length); + bp = buffer; + + /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ +@@ -1489,11 +1499,11 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) + /* Random padding */ + RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding); + +- r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding); ++ r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length); + + if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, +- buffer, 3 + payload + padding, ++ buffer, write_length, + s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + OPENSSL_free(buffer); +diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c +index b82fada..bddffd9 100644 +--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c ++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c +@@ -2588,16 +2588,20 @@ tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) + unsigned int payload; + unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ + +- /* Read type and payload length first */ +- hbtype = *p++; +- n2s(p, payload); +- pl = p; +- + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, + &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, + s, s->msg_callback_arg); + ++ /* Read type and payload length first */ ++ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) ++ return 0; /* silently discard */ ++ hbtype = *p++; ++ n2s(p, payload); ++ if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) ++ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ ++ pl = p; ++ + if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) + { + unsigned char *buffer, *bp; +-- +1.9.1 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb index fa0a648..485112c 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \ file://0001-Fix-for-TLS-record-tampering-bug-CVE-2013-4353.patch \ file://0001-Fix-DTLS-retransmission-from-previous-session.patch \ file://0001-Use-version-in-SSL_METHOD-not-SSL-structure.patch \ + file://CVE-2014-0160.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c" -- 1.9.0 -- _______________________________________________ Openembedded-core mailing list [email protected] http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core
