On 13 November 2015 at 13:08, Hongxu Jia <[email protected]> wrote:
> Backport patch from http://w1.fi/security/2015-5/ > and rebase for wpa-supplicant 2.4 There's a thread about upgrading master to 2.5 (which should fix this) already. The patch probably still makes sense for jethro though. - Jussi > Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]> > --- > ...load-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch | 64 > ++++++++++++++++++++++ > .../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb | 1 + > 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 > meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch > > diff --git > a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch > b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..bc1d1e5 > --- /dev/null > +++ > b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ > +From c13401c723a039971bcd91b3856d76c6041b15f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > +Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2015 05:54:18 -0500 > +Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF record parser > + > +It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up > +wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload > +length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to > +2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large > +payload length value and the record type filter reading up to about 20 > +bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the process. > +This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32 bytes of > +heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow of the > +same length which would most likely result in the process termination. > +In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there > +would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result in an > +infinite loop in ndef_parse_records(). > + > +Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of service > +attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or > +sending them during NFC connection handover if the application providing > +the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the > +received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC stack > +that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing, > +hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included > +here. > + > +Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that > +detects integer overflow. (CID 122668) > + > +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport [from http://w1.fi/security/2015-5/] > +Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]> > +--- > + src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++- > + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > + > +diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c > +index d45dfc8..f7f729b 100644 > +--- a/src/wps/ndef.c > ++++ b/src/wps/ndef.c > +@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size, > + if (size < 6) > + return -1; > + record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos); > ++ if (record->payload_length > size - 6) > ++ return -1; > + pos += sizeof(u32); > + } > + > +@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data, u32 size, > + pos += record->payload_length; > + > + record->total_length = pos - data; > +- if (record->total_length > size) > ++ if (record->total_length > size || > ++ record->total_length < record->payload_length) > + return -1; > + return 0; > + } > +-- > +1.9.1 > + > diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/ > wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/ > wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb > index a124cf2..6e4d028 100644 > --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb > +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb > @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ SRC_URI = " > http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ > > file://0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch \ > > file://0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch \ > > file://0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch \ > + > file://0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch \ > " > SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f0037dbe03897dcaf2ad2722e659095d" > SRC_URI[sha256sum] = > "058dc832c096139a059e6df814080f50251a8d313c21b13364c54a1e70109122" > -- > 1.9.1 > > -- > _______________________________________________ > Openembedded-core mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core >
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