On 02/22/2016 12:15 PM, Paul Eggleton wrote:
Hi Robert,
I just noticed this never got merged into jethro. Could you take care of that?
The original patch is here:
Got it, thanks.
// Robert
http://patchwork.openembedded.org/patch/107625/
Joshua, looks like we could use this one in fido as well.
Thanks,
Paul
On Fri, 13 Nov 2015 20:18:09 Hongxu Jia wrote:
On 11/13/2015 08:11 PM, Jussi Kukkonen wrote:
On 13 November 2015 at 13:08, Hongxu Jia <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Backport patch from http://w1.fi/security/2015-5/
and rebase for wpa-supplicant 2.4
There's a thread about upgrading master to 2.5 (which should fix this)
already.
The patch probably still makes sense for jethro though.
Yes, you are right, the 2.5 don't need this, it makes sense for jethro.
//Hongxu
- Jussi
Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
---
...load-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch | 64
++++++++++++++++++++++
.../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb
<http://wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb> | 1 +
2 files changed, 65 insertions(+)
create mode 100644
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-NFC-Fix-p
ayload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
diff --git
a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-NFC-Fix
-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch
b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-NFC-Fi
x-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch new file mode
100644
index 0000000..bc1d1e5
--- /dev/null
+++
b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-NFC-Fix
-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From c13401c723a039971bcd91b3856d76c6041b15f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
+Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2015 05:54:18 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] NFC: Fix payload length validation in NDEF
record parser
+
+It was possible for the 32-bit record->total_length value to end up
+wrapping around due to integer overflow if the longer form of payload
+length field is used and record->payload_length gets a value close to
+2^32. This could result in ndef_parse_record() accepting a too large
+payload length value and the record type filter reading up to
about 20
+bytes beyond the end of the buffer and potentially killing the
process.
+This could also result in an attempt to allocate close to 2^32
bytes of
+heap memory and if that were to succeed, a buffer read overflow
of the
+same length which would most likely result in the process
termination.
+In case of record->total_length ending up getting the value 0, there
+would be no buffer read overflow, but record parsing would result
in an
+infinite loop in ndef_parse_records().
+
+Any of these error cases could potentially be used for denial of
service
+attacks over NFC by using a malformed NDEF record on an NFC Tag or
+sending them during NFC connection handover if the application
providing
+the NDEF message to hostapd/wpa_supplicant did no validation of the
+received records. While such validation is likely done in the NFC
stack
+that needs to parse the NFC messages before further processing,
+hostapd/wpa_supplicant better be prepared for any data being included
+here.
+
+Fix this by validating record->payload_length value in a way that
+detects integer overflow. (CID 122668)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [from http://w1.fi/security/2015-5/]
+Signed-off-by: Hongxu Jia <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
+---
+ src/wps/ndef.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/wps/ndef.c b/src/wps/ndef.c
+index d45dfc8..f7f729b 100644
+--- a/src/wps/ndef.c
++++ b/src/wps/ndef.c
+@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data,
u32 size,
+ if (size < 6)
+ return -1;
+ record->payload_length = ntohl(*(u32 *)pos);
++ if (record->payload_length > size - 6)
++ return -1;
+ pos += sizeof(u32);
+ }
+
+@@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ static int ndef_parse_record(const u8 *data,
u32 size,
+ pos += record->payload_length;
+
+ record->total_length = pos - data;
+- if (record->total_length > size)
++ if (record->total_length > size ||
++ record->total_length < record->payload_length)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+--
+1.9.1
+
diff --git
a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb
<http://wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb>
b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb
<http://wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb>
index a124cf2..6e4d028 100644
---
a/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb
<http://wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb>
+++
b/meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb
<http://wpa-supplicant_2.4.bb>
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ SRC_URI =
"http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz
<http://hostap.epitest.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-$%7BPV%7D.tar.gz> \
file://0003-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment-r.patch
\
file://0004-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-Total-Length-parsing-for-fragment.patch
\
file://0005-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-asymmetric-fragmentation-behavior.patch \
+
file://0001-NFC-Fix-payload-length-validation-in-NDEF-record-par.patc
h
\
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "f0037dbe03897dcaf2ad2722e659095d"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] =
"058dc832c096139a059e6df814080f50251a8d313c21b13364c54a1e70109122"
--
1.9.1
--
_______________________________________________
Openembedded-core mailing list
[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>
http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core
--
_______________________________________________
Openembedded-core mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-core
