Hi Jussi,
在 2016年10月26日 17:09, Jussi Kukkonen 写道:
On 26 October 2016 at 11:26, Yi Zhao <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
CVE-2016-3945 libtiff: Multiple integer overflows in the (1)
cvt_by_strip and (2) cvt_by_tile functions in the tiff2rgba tool in
LibTIFF 4.0.6 and earlier, when -b mode is enabled, allow remote
attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute
arbitrary code
via a crafted TIFF image, which triggers an out-of-bounds write.
External References:
https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-3945
<https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-3945>
http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2545
<http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2545>
Patch from:
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/7c39352ccd9060d311d3dc9a1f1bc00133a160e6
<https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/7c39352ccd9060d311d3dc9a1f1bc00133a160e6>
Signed-off-by: Yi Zhao <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
---
.../libtiff/files/CVE-2016-3945.patch | 118
+++++++++++++++++++++
meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.0.6.bb
<http://tiff_4.0.6.bb> | 1 +
2 files changed, 119 insertions(+)
create mode 100644
meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2016-3945.patch
diff --git
a/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2016-3945.patch
b/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2016-3945.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d965be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/files/CVE-2016-3945.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+From 7c39352ccd9060d311d3dc9a1f1bc00133a160e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
+From: erouault <erouault>
+Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2016 20:06:40 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] * tools/tiff2rgba.c: Fix integer overflow in size of
+ allocated buffer, when -b mode is enabled, that could result in
out-of-bounds
+ write. Based initially on patch tiff-CVE-2016-3945.patch from
+ libtiff-4.0.3-25.el7_2.src.rpm by Nikola Forro, with correction
for invalid
+ tests that rejected valid files.
+
+CVE: CVE-2016-3945
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/7c39352ccd9060d311d3dc9a1f1bc00133a160e6
<https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/7c39352ccd9060d311d3dc9a1f1bc00133a160e6>
It would be appropriate to point out that this is not the real
upstream, just a nameless github user who maintains a git mirror of
the libtiff repository. It's probably a reasonable choice -- the
current libtiff situation with no real homepage, no real tarball
hosting and a half-hidden cvs server for source control is pretty sad
-- but should still be openly mentioned.
Thank you for your suggestion. This github is a mirror for libtiff cvs
repository in cvs.maptools.org. If the cvs repository is official, take
the patches from it is better.
Yi
Jussi
+
+Signed-off-by: Yi Zhao <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
+---
+ ChangeLog | 8 ++++++++
+ tools/tiff2rgba.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
+index 62dc1b5..9c0ab29 100644
+--- a/ChangeLog
++++ b/ChangeLog
+@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
++2016-08-15 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com
<http://spatialys.com>>
++
++ * tools/tiff2rgba.c: Fix integer overflow in size of allocated
++ buffer, when -b mode is enabled, that could result in
out-of-bounds
++ write. Based initially on patch tiff-CVE-2016-3945.patch from
++ libtiff-4.0.3-25.el7_2.src.rpm by Nikola Forro, with
correction for
++ invalid tests that rejected valid files.
++
+ 2016-07-11 Even Rouault <even.rouault at spatialys.com
<http://spatialys.com>>
+
+ * tools/tiffcrop.c: Avoid access outside of stack
allocated array
+diff --git a/tools/tiff2rgba.c b/tools/tiff2rgba.c
+index b7a81eb..16e3dc4 100644
+--- a/tools/tiff2rgba.c
++++ b/tools/tiff2rgba.c
+@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ cvt_by_tile( TIFF *in, TIFF *out )
+ uint32 row, col;
+ uint32 *wrk_line;
+ int ok = 1;
++ uint32 rastersize, wrk_linesize;
+
+ TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH, &width);
+ TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH, &height);
+@@ -163,7 +164,13 @@ cvt_by_tile( TIFF *in, TIFF *out )
+ /*
+ * Allocate tile buffer
+ */
+- raster = (uint32*)_TIFFmalloc(tile_width * tile_height *
sizeof (uint32));
++ rastersize = tile_width * tile_height * sizeof (uint32);
++ if (tile_width != (rastersize / tile_height) / sizeof( uint32))
++ {
++ TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in), "Integer overflow when
calculating raster buffer");
++ exit(-1);
++ }
++ raster = (uint32*)_TIFFmalloc(rastersize);
+ if (raster == 0) {
+ TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in), "No space for raster buffer");
+ return (0);
+@@ -173,7 +180,13 @@ cvt_by_tile( TIFF *in, TIFF *out )
+ * Allocate a scanline buffer for swapping during the vertical
+ * mirroring pass.
+ */
+- wrk_line = (uint32*)_TIFFmalloc(tile_width * sizeof (uint32));
++ wrk_linesize = tile_width * sizeof (uint32);
++ if (tile_width != wrk_linesize / sizeof (uint32))
++ {
++ TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in), "Integer overflow when
calculating wrk_line buffer");
++ exit(-1);
++ }
++ wrk_line = (uint32*)_TIFFmalloc(wrk_linesize);
+ if (!wrk_line) {
+ TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in), "No space for raster
scanline buffer");
+ ok = 0;
+@@ -249,6 +262,7 @@ cvt_by_strip( TIFF *in, TIFF *out )
+ uint32 row;
+ uint32 *wrk_line;
+ int ok = 1;
++ uint32 rastersize, wrk_linesize;
+
+ TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH, &width);
+ TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH, &height);
+@@ -263,7 +277,13 @@ cvt_by_strip( TIFF *in, TIFF *out )
+ /*
+ * Allocate strip buffer
+ */
+- raster = (uint32*)_TIFFmalloc(width * rowsperstrip * sizeof
(uint32));
++ rastersize = width * rowsperstrip * sizeof (uint32);
++ if (width != (rastersize / rowsperstrip) / sizeof( uint32))
++ {
++ TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in), "Integer overflow when
calculating raster buffer");
++ exit(-1);
++ }
++ raster = (uint32*)_TIFFmalloc(rastersize);
+ if (raster == 0) {
+ TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in), "No space for raster buffer");
+ return (0);
+@@ -273,7 +293,13 @@ cvt_by_strip( TIFF *in, TIFF *out )
+ * Allocate a scanline buffer for swapping during the vertical
+ * mirroring pass.
+ */
+- wrk_line = (uint32*)_TIFFmalloc(width * sizeof (uint32));
++ wrk_linesize = width * sizeof (uint32);
++ if (width != wrk_linesize / sizeof (uint32))
++ {
++ TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in), "Integer overflow when
calculating wrk_line buffer");
++ exit(-1);
++ }
++ wrk_line = (uint32*)_TIFFmalloc(wrk_linesize);
+ if (!wrk_line) {
+ TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in), "No space for raster
scanline buffer");
+ ok = 0;
+--
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.0.6.bb
<http://tiff_4.0.6.bb>
b/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.0.6.bb <http://tiff_4.0.6.bb>
index 8147bc4..b978528 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.0.6.bb
<http://tiff_4.0.6.bb>
+++ b/meta/recipes-multimedia/libtiff/tiff_4.0.6.bb
<http://tiff_4.0.6.bb>
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ SRC_URI =
"http://download.osgeo.org/libtiff/tiff-${PV}.tar.gz
<http://download.osgeo.org/libtiff/tiff-$%7BPV%7D.tar.gz> \
file://CVE-2016-3186.patch \
file://CVE-2016-5321.patch \
file://CVE-2016-5323.patch \
+ file://CVE-2016-3945.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "d1d2e940dea0b5ad435f21f03d96dd72"
--
2.7.4
--
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