From: Hugo SIMELIERE <[email protected]> Backport a fix from Debian: https://sources.debian.org/patches/libwebsockets/4.3.5-1+deb13u1/CVE-2025-11678.patch Upstream commit: https://github.com/warmcat/libwebsockets/commit/2bb9598562b37c942ba5b04bcde3f7fdf66a9d3a
Signed-off-by: Bruno VERNAY <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE <[email protected]> --- .../libwebsockets/CVE-2025-11678.patch | 128 ++++++++++++++++++ .../libwebsockets/libwebsockets_4.3.3.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 129 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libwebsockets/libwebsockets/CVE-2025-11678.patch diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libwebsockets/libwebsockets/CVE-2025-11678.patch b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libwebsockets/libwebsockets/CVE-2025-11678.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3489a7e6a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libwebsockets/libwebsockets/CVE-2025-11678.patch @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +From e1d4c32bf773b8cf01eb5e368a4a21679e0b670a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Hugo SIMELIERE <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2025 17:03:33 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] NN-2025-0103: ADNS crafted response overflow + +This document contains sensitive information collected during our +security research activities related with the Libwebsockets library made +by Andy Green (warmcat). + ++-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| Report information | ++:===================================:+:===============================================================:+ +| Vendor | warmcat | ++-------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------+ +| Vendor URL | https://libwebsockets.org/git/libwebsockets | ++-------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------+ +| Affected component | Ecostruxure Automation Expert | ++-------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------+ +| Affected version | 4.4 | ++-------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------+ +| Vulnerability | CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow | ++-------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------+ +| Proposed CVSS v3.1 Base Score | 7.5 | ++-------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------+ +| Proposed CVSS v3.1 Vector | CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N | ++-------------------------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------+ + ++-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +| Security Researcher(s) | ++:===================================:+:=====================================:+ +| Name | **Email address** | ++-------------------------------------+---------------------------------------+ +| Raffaele Bova | [email protected] | ++-------------------------------------+---------------------------------------+ + +**\** + +Libwebsockes is a C library that provides client and server +implementation for various protocols (e.g., HTTP, websockets, MQTT) and +more. + +Nozomi Networks Lab discovered a "CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow" +in the latest software version of libwebsockets, specifically in the +async-dns component. + +The vulnerability allows an attacker that can inspect DNS requests made +by the victim (e.g. being in the same wireless network) to forge a DNS +response packet that overflows the stack and may lead to arbitrary code +execution (depending on the platform and compiler options). + +The issue resides in `lws_adns_parse_label` function in +`lib/system/async-dns/async-dns-parse.c`; this function iteratively parses +a label however it does not correctly check the number of bytes written +in the destination buffer. + +Specifically, the size of the dest output buffer is specified in the `dl` +argument, however during the read of each substring of the label only +the length of the current substring of the label is accounted for not +overflowing the destination buffer, but previous reads are not accounted +for. + +This means that a label of arbitrary size and content can be supplied +and is copied onto the stack, however it must be split into substrings +of size less than `dl`. + +To trigger the vulnerability an attacker must be able to sniff the DNS +request packet to send a response with a matching identifier, otherwise +the implantation correctly ignores the response. + +We have provided a harness for testing, for ease of use copy the harness +in a subdirectory, for example in minimal-examples-lowlevel/api-tests/, +and build it + +``` +cmake -B build -DLWS_WITH_SYS_ASYNC_DNS=1 -DLWS_WITH_SSL=0 +-DCMAKE_C_FLAGS="-fsanitize=address" . && make -C build lws-test-async-dns +``` + +Then it can be run `./build/bin/lws-test-async-dns < poc_stackbof` + + + +We suggest keeping track of the number of bytes currently written on the +dest buffer, this could be done by saving the original dest pointer, +decrementing dl on each substring memcpy, or using an auxiliary +variable. + +CVE: CVE-2025-11678 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/warmcat/libwebsockets/commit/2bb9598562b37c942ba5b04bcde3f7fdf66a9d3a] + +Signed-off-by: Hugo SIMELIERE <[email protected]> +--- + lib/system/async-dns/async-dns-parse.c | 5 +++-- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/system/async-dns/async-dns-parse.c b/lib/system/async-dns/async-dns-parse.c +index bdfe2050..81743b3f 100644 +--- a/lib/system/async-dns/async-dns-parse.c ++++ b/lib/system/async-dns/async-dns-parse.c +@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ lws_adns_parse_label(const uint8_t *pkt, int len, const uint8_t *ls, int budget, + const uint8_t *e = pkt + len, *ols = ls; + char pointer = 0, first = 1; + uint8_t ll; +- int n; ++ int n, readsize = 0; + + if (budget < 1) + return 0; +@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ again1: + return -1; + } + +- if ((unsigned int)ll + 2 > dl) { ++ if ((unsigned int)(ll + 2 + readsize) > dl) { + lwsl_notice("%s: qname too large\n", __func__); + + return -1; +@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ again1: + (*dest)[ll + 1] = '\0'; + *dest += ll + 1; + ls += ll; ++ readsize += ll + 1; + + if (pointer) { + if (*ls) +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libwebsockets/libwebsockets_4.3.3.bb b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libwebsockets/libwebsockets_4.3.3.bb index d0a2aa0923..90ac0c3eb3 100644 --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libwebsockets/libwebsockets_4.3.3.bb +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/libwebsockets/libwebsockets_4.3.3.bb @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ S = "${WORKDIR}/git" SRCREV = "4415e84c095857629863804e941b9e1c2e9347ef" SRC_URI = "git://github.com/warmcat/libwebsockets.git;protocol=https;branch=v4.3-stable \ file://CVE-2025-11677.patch \ + file://CVE-2025-11678.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/warmcat/${BPN}/releases"; -- 2.43.0
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