I will drop this and proposed patch for 4890 for same reasons as given for scarthgap:
https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-devel/message/127125 https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-devel/message/127126 Thanks, Anuj On Sat, May 23, 2026 at 1:01 PM Ankur Tyagi via lists.openembedded.org <[email protected]> wrote: > > From: Abhishek Bachiphale <[email protected]> > > dnsmasqs extract_name() function can be abused to cause a heap buffer > overflow, allowing an attacker to inject false DNS cache entries, > which could result in DNS lookups to redirect to an attacker-controlled > IP address, or to cause a DoS. > > Reference: > [ https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2291 ] > > Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bachiphale <[email protected]> > Signed-off-by: Khem Raj <[email protected]> > (cherry picked from commit a53328688a239e97b8383ffbfd7b4b4eca108d73) > Signed-off-by: Ankur Tyagi <[email protected]> > --- > .../recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.92.bb | 1 + > .../dnsmasq/files/CVE-2026-2291.patch | 37 +++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 > meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2026-2291.patch > > diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.92.bb > b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.92.bb > index 59509ecba2..bef058aa3e 100644 > --- a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.92.bb > +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.92.bb > @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ SRC_URI = > "http://www.thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/${@['archive/', ''][float(d.getV > file://dnsmasq-resolvconf.service \ > file://dnsmasq-noresolvconf.service \ > file://dnsmasq-resolved.conf \ > + file://CVE-2026-2291.patch \ > " > SRC_URI[sha256sum] = > "fd908e79ff37f73234afcb6d3363f78353e768703d92abd8e3220ade6819b1e1" > > diff --git > a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2026-2291.patch > b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2026-2291.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..6e42f32136 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2026-2291.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ > +commit ec2fbfbbdaa7d7db1c707dce26ce1a37cfe09660 > +Author: Simon Kelley <[email protected]> > +Date: Fri Apr 10 16:29:31 2026 +0100 > + > +Fix buffer overflow in struct bigname. CVE-2026-2291 > + > +All buffers capable of holding a domain name should be > +at least MAXDNAME*2 + 1 bytes long, where MAXDNAME is the maximum > +size of a domain name. The accounts for the trailing zero and the > +fact that some characters are escaped in the internal representation > +of a domain name in dnsmasq. > + > +The declaration of struct bigname get this wrong, with the effect > +that a remote attacker capable of asking DNS queries or answering DNS > +queries can cause a large OOB write in the heap. > + > +This was first spotted by Andrew S. Fasano. > + > +CVE: CVE-2026-2291 > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport [ > https://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=commit;h=014e909f787e808bb35daa546d3f8f3663918de2 > ] > + > +Signed-off-by: Abhishek Bachiphale <[email protected]> > + > +diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h > +index 254bacd..58be09f 100644 > +--- a/src/dnsmasq.h > ++++ b/src/dnsmasq.h > +@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ struct interface_name { > + }; > + > + union bigname { > +- char name[MAXDNAME]; > ++ char name[(2*MAXDNAME) + 1]; > + union bigname *next; /* freelist */ > + }; > + > > >
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