Can we also prioritize backporting this to older releases as well - pyro, morty?
Armin, Martin, Do you need separate patches submitted? Please let me know if you need help. Thanks! -- Denys On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 12:43:36PM -0400, Mark Hatle wrote: > Note, hostapd and wpa_supplicant use the same sources. This commit is based > on Ross Burton's change to OpenEmbedded-core. Below is Ross's commit message > from OpenEmbedded-Core. > > WPA2 is vulnerable to replay attacks which result in unauthenticated users > having access to the network. > > * CVE-2017-13077: reinstallation of the pairwise key in the Four-way > handshake > > * CVE-2017-13078: reinstallation of the group key in the Four-way > handshake > > * CVE-2017-13079: reinstallation of the integrity group key in the > Four-way > handshake > > * CVE-2017-13080: reinstallation of the group key in the Group Key > handshake > > * CVE-2017-13081: reinstallation of the integrity group key in the Group > Key > handshake > > * CVE-2017-13082: accepting a retransmitted Fast BSS Transition > Reassociation > Request and reinstalling the pairwise key while processing it > > * CVE-2017-13086: reinstallation of the Tunneled Direct-Link Setup (TDLS) > PeerKey (TPK) key in the TDLS handshake > > * CVE-2017-13087: reinstallation of the group key (GTK) when processing a > Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame > > * CVE-2017-13088: reinstallation of the integrity group key (IGTK) when > processing a Wireless Network Management (WNM) Sleep Mode Response frame > > Backport patches from upstream to resolve these CVEs. > > Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.bur...@intel.com> > > The hunk: > > [PATCH 7/8] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending request > > does not apply to hostapd and was removed from the patch. > > Signed-off-by: Mark Hatle <mark.ha...@windriver.com> > --- > .../hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch | 984 > +++++++++++++++++++++ > .../recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb | 1 + > 2 files changed, 985 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 > meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch > > diff --git > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch > b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..694da8f > --- /dev/null > +++ > b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,984 @@ > +The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which > can > +result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network. > + > +Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this. > + > +CVE: CVE-2017-13077 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13078 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13079 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13080 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13081 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13082 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13086 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13087 > +CVE: CVE-2017-13088 > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport > +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.bur...@intel.com> > + > +From cf4cab804c7afd5c45505528a8d16e46163243a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanh...@cs.kuleuven.be> > +Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200 > +Subject: [PATCH 1/8] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake > + > +Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame > +processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids > +issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing > +same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and > +also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed > +frames on RX side. > + > +This issue was introduced by the commit > +0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in > +authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple > +times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is > +needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt > +failed. > + > +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanh...@cs.kuleuven.be> > +--- > + src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- > + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++ > + src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++- > + src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++ > + src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 + > + 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c > +index 4e04169..333035f 100644 > +--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c > ++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c > +@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data > *hapd, > + { > + struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap; > + struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap; > ++ int set = 1; > + > + /* > + * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and > +@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data > *hapd, > + * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but > + * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that > + * does not support full AP client state. > ++ * > ++ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the > ++ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for > ++ * the same key. > + */ > +- if (!sta->added_unassoc) > ++ if (!sta->added_unassoc && > ++ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) || > ++ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) { > + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); > ++ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED); > ++ set = 0; > ++ } > + > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N > + if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT) > +@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data > *hapd, > + sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL, > + sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo, > + sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0, > +- sta->added_unassoc)) { > ++ set)) { > + hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, > + HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE, > + "Could not %s STA to kernel driver", > +- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add"); > ++ set ? "set" : "add"); > + > + if (sta->added_unassoc) { > + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); > +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > +index 3587086..707971d 100644 > +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > +@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, > enum wpa_event event) > + #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ > + break; > + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ > ++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED: > ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; > ++ return 0; > + } > + > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R > +@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine > *sm) > + } > + > + > ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) > ++{ > ++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) > ++ return 0; > ++ return sm->tk_already_set; > ++} > ++ > ++ > + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, > + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry) > + { > +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h > +index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644 > +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h > ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h > +@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, > + u8 *data, size_t data_len); > + enum wpa_event { > + WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH, > +- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT > ++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED > + }; > + void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > + int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event); > +@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > + int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > + int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > + int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, > + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry); > + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry * > +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c > +index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644 > +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c > ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c > +@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) > + return; > + } > + > ++ if (sm->tk_already_set) { > ++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX > ++ * PN in the driver */ > ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, > ++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); > ++ return; > ++ } > ++ > + /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail > + * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only > + * after association has been completed. This function will be called > +@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) > + > + /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */ > + sm->pairwise_set = TRUE; > ++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE; > + } > + > + > +@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct > wpa_state_machine *sm, > + > + sm->pairwise = pairwise; > + sm->PTK_valid = TRUE; > ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; > + wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm); > + > + buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + > +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h > +index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644 > +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h > ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h > +@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine { > + struct wpa_ptk PTK; > + Boolean PTK_valid; > + Boolean pairwise_set; > ++ Boolean tk_already_set; > + int keycount; > + Boolean Pair; > + struct wpa_key_replay_counter { > +-- > +2.7.4 > + > +From 927f891007c402fefd1ff384645b3f07597c3ede Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanh...@cs.kuleuven.be> > +Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200 > +Subject: [PATCH 2/8] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key > + > +Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a > +(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do > +not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an > +attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the > +sequence counter associated to the group key. > + > +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanh...@cs.kuleuven.be> > +--- > + src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++ > + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ > + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++ > + 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h > +index af1d0f0..d200285 100644 > +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h > ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h > +@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk { > + size_t tk_len; > + }; > + > ++struct wpa_gtk { > ++ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN]; > ++ size_t gtk_len; > ++}; > ++ > ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > ++struct wpa_igtk { > ++ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN]; > ++ size_t igtk_len; > ++}; > ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + > + /* WPA IE version 1 > + * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type) > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; > + u8 gtk_buf[32]; > + > ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ > ++ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && > ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { > ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver > (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", > ++ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); > ++ return 0; > ++ } > ++ > + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len); > + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > + "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", > +@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + } > + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); > + > ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; > ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); > ++ > + return 0; > + } > + > +@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm > *sm, > + } > + > + > ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > ++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) > ++{ > ++ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); > ++ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); > ++ > ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ > ++ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && > ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { > ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the > driver (keyidx=%d)", > ++ keyidx); > ++ return 0; > ++ } > ++ > ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > ++ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", > ++ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); > ++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len); > ++ if (keyidx > 4095) { > ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, > ++ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); > ++ return -1; > ++ } > ++ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), > ++ broadcast_ether_addr, > ++ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), > ++ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { > ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, > ++ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); > ++ return -1; > ++ } > ++ > ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; > ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); > ++ > ++ return 0; > ++} > ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > ++ > ++ > + static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) > + { > +@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + if (ie->igtk) { > + size_t len; > + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; > +- u16 keyidx; > ++ > + len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); > + if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len) > + return -1; > ++ > + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; > +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); > +- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d " > +- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", > +- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); > +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", > +- igtk->igtk, len); > +- if (keyidx > 4095) { > +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, > +- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); > +- return -1; > +- } > +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), > +- broadcast_ether_addr, > +- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), > +- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { > +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, > +- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); > ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) > + return -1; > +- } > + } > + > + return 0; > +@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm) > + */ > + void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) > + { > +- int clear_ptk = 1; > ++ int clear_keys = 1; > + > + if (sm == NULL) > + return; > +@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 > *bssid) > + /* Prepare for the next transition */ > + wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL); > + > +- clear_ptk = 0; > ++ clear_keys = 0; > + } > + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ > + > +- if (clear_ptk) { > ++ if (clear_keys) { > + /* > + * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if > + * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition. > +@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 > *bssid) > + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); > + sm->tptk_set = 0; > + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); > ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); > ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); > ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + } > + > + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS > +@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) > + os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk)); > + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); > + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); > ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); > ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); > ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R > + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); > + os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0)); > +@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 > subelem_id, u8 *buf) > + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > + } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) { > +- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd; > +- u16 keyidx; > +- > +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); > +- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); > +- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2); > +- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6); > +- > +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid); > +- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen); > +- > +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)", > +- igd.igtk, keylen); > +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), > +- broadcast_ether_addr, > +- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn), > +- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) { > +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in " > +- "WNM mode"); > +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); > ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; > ++ > ++ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); > ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) > + return -1; > +- } > +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); > + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + } else { > + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id"); > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > +index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > +@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { > + u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; > + int rx_replay_counter_set; > + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; > ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk; > ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk; > ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + > + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ > + > +-- > +2.7.4 > + > +From 8280294e74846ea342389a0cd17215050fa5afe8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi> > +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300 > +Subject: [PATCH 3/8] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of > WNM-Sleep > + Mode cases > + > +This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value > +separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a > +corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the > +GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to > +detect a possible key reconfiguration. > + > +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi> > +--- > + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- > + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++ > + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data { > + > + static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd, > +- const u8 *key_rsc) > ++ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep) > + { > + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; > + u8 gtk_buf[32]; > + > + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ > +- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && > +- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { > ++ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && > ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) || > ++ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && > ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, > ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) { > + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver > (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", > + gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); > +@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + } > + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); > + > +- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; > +- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); > ++ if (wnm_sleep) { > ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; > ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, > ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len); > ++ } else { > ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; > ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); > ++ } > + > + return 0; > + } > +@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher, > + gtk_len, gtk_len, > + &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) || > +- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) { > ++ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) { > + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > + "RSN: Failed to install GTK"); > + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); > +@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm > *sm, > + > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > + static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > +- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) > ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk, > ++ int wnm_sleep) > + { > + size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); > + u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); > + > + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ > +- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && > +- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { > ++ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && > ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) || > ++ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len && > ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, > ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) { > + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the > driver (keyidx=%d)", > + keyidx); > +@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm > *sm, > + return -1; > + } > + > +- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; > +- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); > ++ if (wnm_sleep) { > ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len; > ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, > ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len); > ++ } else { > ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; > ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); > ++ } > + > + return 0; > + } > +@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + return -1; > + > + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; > +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) > ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0) > + return -1; > + } > + > +@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct > wpa_sm *sm, > + if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc)) > + key_rsc = null_rsc; > + > +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) || > ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) || > + wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0) > + goto failed; > + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); > +@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 > *bssid) > + sm->tptk_set = 0; > + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); > + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); > ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); > ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); > + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + } > + > +@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) > + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); > + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); > + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); > ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); > ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); > + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R > + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); > +@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 > subelem_id, u8 *buf) > + > + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)", > + gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len); > +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) { > ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) { > + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); > + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in " > + "WNM mode"); > +@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 > subelem_id, u8 *buf) > + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; > + > + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); > +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) > ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0) > + return -1; > + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + } else { > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > +index afc9e37..9a54631 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > +@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { > + int rx_replay_counter_set; > + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; > + struct wpa_gtk gtk; > ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep; > + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > + struct wpa_igtk igtk; > ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep; > + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > + > + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ > +-- > +2.7.4 > + > +From 8f82bc94e8697a9d47fa8774dfdaaede1084912c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanh...@cs.kuleuven.be> > +Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200 > +Subject: [PATCH 4/8] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK > + > +Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver > +and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from > +trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK. > + > +This fixes the earlier fix in commit > +ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the > +driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account > +possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of > +message 3/4. > + > +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <mathy.vanh...@cs.kuleuven.be> > +--- > + src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 + > + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 5 ++--- > + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 - > + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h > +index d200285..1021ccb 100644 > +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h > ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h > +@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk { > + size_t kck_len; > + size_t kek_len; > + size_t tk_len; > ++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */ > + }; > + > + struct wpa_gtk { > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm > *sm, > + os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); > + } > + sm->tptk_set = 1; > +- sm->tk_to_set = 1; > + > + kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie; > + kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len; > +@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + enum wpa_alg alg; > + const u8 *key_rsc; > + > +- if (!sm->tk_to_set) { > ++ if (sm->ptk.installed) { > + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > + "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); > + return 0; > +@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > + > + /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */ > + os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN); > +- sm->tk_to_set = 0; > ++ sm->ptk.installed = 1; > + > + if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) { > + eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL); > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > +index 9a54631..41f371f 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > +@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm { > + struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk; > + int ptk_set, tptk_set; > + unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1; > +- unsigned int tk_to_set:1; > + u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; > + u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */ > + int renew_snonce; > +-- > +2.7.4 > + > +From 12fac09b437a1dc8a0f253e265934a8aaf4d2f8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi> > +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300 > +Subject: [PATCH 5/8] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce > + > +The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing > +the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going > +directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to > +determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the > +new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant. > + > +Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state > +for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK. > + > +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi> > +--- > + src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- > + 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > +index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644 > +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > +@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2) > + } > + > + > ++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) > ++{ > ++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) { > ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, > ++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce"); > ++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE; > ++ return -1; > ++ } > ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce, > ++ WPA_NONCE_LEN); > ++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0; > ++ return 0; > ++} > ++ > ++ > + SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK) > + { > + u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN]; > +@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK) > + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION); > + else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest) > + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2); > +- else if (sm->PTKRequest) > +- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); > +- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { > ++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) { > ++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0) > ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED); > ++ else > ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); > ++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { > + case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE: > + break; > + case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT: > +-- > +2.7.4 > + > +From 6c4bed4f47d1960ec04981a9d50e5076aea5223d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi> > +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300 > +Subject: [PATCH 6/8] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration > + > +Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has > +been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues > +related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check > +for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so > +that behavior does not get modified. > + > +For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was > +followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating > +the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e., > +ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path > +and simple replay attacks are not feasible. > + > +As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if > +the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros. > + > +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi> > +--- > + src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > + 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c > +index e424168..9eb9738 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c > +@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer { > + u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */ > + } tpk; > + int tpk_set; > ++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */ > + int tpk_success; > + int tpk_in_progress; > + > +@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct > wpa_tdls_peer *peer) > + u8 rsc[6]; > + enum wpa_alg alg; > + > ++ if (peer->tk_set) { > ++ /* > ++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver > ++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an > ++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing > ++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must > ++ * not allow that to happen. > ++ */ > ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR > ++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not > reconfigure", > ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); > ++ return -1; > ++ } > ++ > + os_memset(rsc, 0, 6); > + > + switch (peer->cipher) { > +@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct > wpa_tdls_peer *peer) > + return -1; > + } > + > ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR, > ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); > + if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1, > + rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) { > + wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the " > + "driver"); > + return -1; > + } > ++ peer->tk_set = 1; > + return 0; > + } > + > +@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, > struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) > + peer->cipher = 0; > + peer->qos_info = 0; > + peer->wmm_capable = 0; > +- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; > ++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; > + peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0; > + os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk)); > + os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN); > +@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie: > + wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer); > + return -1; > + } > ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ > + wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake", > + peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); > + os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); > +@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, > struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer, > + } > + > + > ++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce) > ++{ > ++ int i; > ++ > ++ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) { > ++ if (nonce[i]) > ++ return 1; > ++ } > ++ > ++ return 0; > ++} > ++ > ++ > + static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, > + const u8 *buf, size_t len) > + { > +@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn: > + peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len; > + peer->cipher = cipher; > + > +- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) { > ++ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 || > ++ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) { > + /* > + * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained > + * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the > +@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn: > + "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder > nonce"); > + goto error; > + } > ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ > + } > + > + #if 0 > +-- > +2.7.4 > + > +Note: [PATCH 7/8] only applies to wpa_supplicant > + > +From b372ab0b7daea719749194dc554b26e6367603f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi> > +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300 > +Subject: [PATCH 8/8] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames > + > +The driver is expected to not report a second association event without > +the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this > +case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same > +pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues, > +be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this > +even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected > +Reassociation Response frame. > + > +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j...@w1.fi> > +--- > + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++ > + src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++ > + src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 + > + 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+) > + > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > +@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm) > + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS > + wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm); > + #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */ > ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R > ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; > ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ > + > + /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */ > + wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm); > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c > +index 205793e..d45bb45 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c > +@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t > *len, > + u16 capab; > + > + sm->ft_completed = 0; > ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; > + > + buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + > + 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100; > +@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, > const u8 *ies, > + return -1; > + } > + > ++ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) { > ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been > completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission"); > ++ return 0; > ++ } > ++ > + if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) { > + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs"); > + return -1; > +@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, > const u8 *ies, > + return -1; > + } > + > ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1; > ++ > + if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0) > + return -1; > + > +diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > +index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644 > +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > +@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm { > + size_t r0kh_id_len; > + u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN]; > + int ft_completed; > ++ int ft_reassoc_completed; > + int over_the_ds_in_progress; > + u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */ > + int set_ptk_after_assoc; > +-- > +2.7.4 > diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb > b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb > index 3b74f48..c3a1ead 100644 > --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb > +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb > @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ SRC_URI = " \ > file://defconfig \ > file://init \ > file://hostapd.service \ > + file://key-replay-cve-multiple.patch \ > " > > S = "${WORKDIR}/hostapd-${PV}" > -- > 1.8.3.1 > > -- > _______________________________________________ > Openembedded-devel mailing list > Openembedded-devel@lists.openembedded.org > http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-devel -- _______________________________________________ Openembedded-devel mailing list Openembedded-devel@lists.openembedded.org http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-devel