* CVE-2018-10906-1:
fusermount: don't feed "escaped commas" into mount options
The old code permits the following behavior:
$ _FUSE_COMMFD=10000 priv_strace -etrace=mount -s200 fusermount -o
'foobar=\,allow_other' mount
mount("/dev/fuse", ".", "fuse", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV,
"foobar=\\,allow_other,fd=3,rootmode=40000,user_id=1000,group_id=1000") = -1
EINVAL (Invalid argument)
However, backslashes do not have any special meaning for the kernel here.
As it happens, you can't abuse this because there is no FUSE mount option
that takes a string value that can contain backslashes; but this is very
brittle. Don't interpret "escape characters" in places where they don't
work.
* CVE-2018-10906-2:
fusermount: refuse unknown options
Blacklists are notoriously fragile; especially if the kernel wishes to add
some security-critical mount option at a later date, all existing systems
with older versions of fusermount installed will suddenly have a security
problem.
Additionally, if the kernel's option parsing became a tiny bit laxer, the
blacklist could probably be bypassed.
Whitelist known-harmless flags instead, even if it's slightly more
inconvenient.
Affects fuse < 2.9.8 and fuse < 3.2.5
Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <[email protected]>
---
.../fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-1.patch | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++
.../fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++
.../recipes-support/fuse/fuse_2.9.7.bb | 2 +
3 files changed, 102 insertions(+)
create mode 100644
meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-1.patch
create mode 100644
meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch
diff --git a/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-1.patch
b/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..83bef30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 28bdae3d113ef479c1660a581ef720cdc33bf466 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2018 15:15:36 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] fusermount: don't feed "escaped commas" into mount options
+
+The old code permits the following behavior:
+
+$ _FUSE_COMMFD=10000 priv_strace -etrace=mount -s200 fusermount -o
'foobar=\,allow_other' mount
+mount("/dev/fuse", ".", "fuse", MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV,
"foobar=\\,allow_other,fd=3,rootmode=40000,user_id=1000,group_id=1000") = -1
EINVAL (Invalid argument)
+
+However, backslashes do not have any special meaning for the kernel here.
+
+As it happens, you can't abuse this because there is no FUSE mount option
+that takes a string value that can contain backslashes; but this is very
+brittle. Don't interpret "escape characters" in places where they don't
+work.
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-10906
+Upstream-Status: Backport
[https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/commit/28bdae3d113ef479c1660a581ef720cdc33bf466]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <[email protected]>
+---
+ util/fusermount.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/util/fusermount.c b/util/fusermount.c
+index 0e1d34d..143bd4a 100644
+--- a/util/fusermount.c
++++ b/util/fusermount.c
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+ #include <sys/utsname.h>
+ #include <sched.h>
++#include <stdbool.h>
+
+ #define FUSE_COMMFD_ENV "_FUSE_COMMFD"
+
+@@ -754,8 +755,10 @@ static int do_mount(const char *mnt, char **typep, mode_t
rootmode,
+ unsigned len;
+ const char *fsname_str = "fsname=";
+ const char *subtype_str = "subtype=";
++ bool escape_ok = begins_with(s, fsname_str) ||
++ begins_with(s, subtype_str);
+ for (len = 0; s[len]; len++) {
+- if (s[len] == '\\' && s[len + 1])
++ if (escape_ok && s[len] == '\\' && s[len + 1])
+ len++;
+ else if (s[len] == ',')
+ break;
+--
+2.13.3
+
diff --git a/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch
b/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..597e12b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/files/CVE-2018-10906-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From 5018a0c016495155ee598b7e0167b43d5d902414 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 14 Jul 2018 03:47:50 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] fusermount: refuse unknown options
+
+Blacklists are notoriously fragile; especially if the kernel wishes to add
+some security-critical mount option at a later date, all existing systems
+with older versions of fusermount installed will suddenly have a security
+problem.
+Additionally, if the kernel's option parsing became a tiny bit laxer, the
+blacklist could probably be bypassed.
+
+Whitelist known-harmless flags instead, even if it's slightly more
+inconvenient.
+
+CVE: CVE-2018-10906
+Upstream-Status: Backport
[https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/commit/5018a0c016495155ee598b7e0167b43d5d902414]
+
+Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <[email protected]>
+---
+ util/fusermount.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/util/fusermount.c b/util/fusermount.c
+index 4e0f51a..2792407 100644
+--- a/util/fusermount.c
++++ b/util/fusermount.c
+@@ -819,10 +819,16 @@ static int do_mount(const char *mnt, char **typep,
mode_t rootmode,
+ flags |= flag;
+ else
+ flags &= ~flag;
+- } else {
++ } else if (opt_eq(s, len,
"default_permissions") ||
++ opt_eq(s, len, "allow_other") ||
++ begins_with(s, "max_read=") ||
++ begins_with(s, "blksize=")) {
+ memcpy(d, s, len);
+ d += len;
+ *d++ = ',';
++ } else {
++ fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown option
'%.*s'\n", progname, len, s);
++ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+--
+2.13.3
+
diff --git a/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/fuse_2.9.7.bb
b/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/fuse_2.9.7.bb
index 202d4c3..1eb9b70 100644
--- a/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/fuse_2.9.7.bb
+++ b/meta-filesystems/recipes-support/fuse/fuse_2.9.7.bb
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ SRC_URI =
"https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/releases/download/${BP}/${BP}.tar.
file://aarch64.patch \
file://0001-fuse-fix-the-return-value-of-help-option.patch \
file://fuse.conf \
+ file://CVE-2018-10906-1.patch \
+ file://CVE-2018-10906-2.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9bd4ce8184745fd3d000ca2692adacdb"
SRC_URI[sha256sum] =
"832432d1ad4f833c20e13b57cf40ce5277a9d33e483205fc63c78111b3358874"
--
2.7.4
--
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