Acked-by: Philip Balister <[email protected]> I did the same thing and have seen it work.
Philip On 04/23/2019 12:33 AM, [email protected] wrote: > From: Mingli Yu <[email protected]> > > License-Update: Copyright year updated to 2019. > > Remove 8 backported patches. > > Signed-off-by: Mingli Yu <[email protected]> > --- > ...d-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch | 177 ------------ > ...lation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch | 253 ------------------ > ...n-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch | 187 ------------- > ...event-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch | 82 ------ > ...TK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch | 67 ----- > ...6-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch | 135 ---------- > ...multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch | 85 ------ > .../hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch | 44 --- > .../{hostapd_2.6.bb => hostapd_2.8.bb} | 14 +- > 9 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1041 deletions(-) > delete mode 100644 > meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch > delete mode 100644 > meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch > delete mode 100644 > meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch > delete mode 100644 > meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch > delete mode 100644 > meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch > delete mode 100644 > meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch > delete mode 100644 > meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch > delete mode 100644 > meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch > rename meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/{hostapd_2.6.bb => > hostapd_2.8.bb} (64%) > > diff --git > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch > > b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch > deleted file mode 100644 > index 5535a3c5a..000000000 > --- > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch > +++ /dev/null > @@ -1,177 +0,0 @@ > -From 044ae35c5694c39a4aca2a33502cc3897e88f79e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > -From: Mathy Vanhoef <[email protected]> > -Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200 > -Subject: [PATCH 1/7] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake > - > -Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame > -processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids > -issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing > -same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and > -also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed > -frames on RX side. > - > -This issue was introduced by the commit > -0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in > -authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple > -times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is > -needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt > -failed. > - > -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <[email protected]> > - > -Upstream-Status: Backport > -Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <[email protected]> > ---- > - src/ap/ieee802_11.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- > - src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 11 +++++++++++ > - src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++- > - src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++ > - src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 + > - 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > - > -diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c > -index 4e04169..333035f 100644 > ---- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c > -+++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c > -@@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data > *hapd, > - { > - struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap; > - struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap; > -+ int set = 1; > - > - /* > - * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and > -@@ -1848,9 +1849,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data > *hapd, > - * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but > - * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that > - * does not support full AP client state. > -+ * > -+ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the > -+ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for > -+ * the same key. > - */ > -- if (!sta->added_unassoc) > -+ if (!sta->added_unassoc && > -+ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) || > -+ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) { > - hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); > -+ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED); > -+ set = 0; > -+ } > - > - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N > - if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT) > -@@ -1873,11 +1883,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hostapd_data > *hapd, > - sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL, > - sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo, > - sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0, > -- sta->added_unassoc)) { > -+ set)) { > - hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, > - HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE, > - "Could not %s STA to kernel driver", > -- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add"); > -+ set ? "set" : "add"); > - > - if (sta->added_unassoc) { > - hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); > -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > -index 3587086..707971d 100644 > ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > -@@ -1745,6 +1745,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, > enum wpa_event event) > - #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ > - break; > - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ > -+ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED: > -+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; > -+ return 0; > - } > - > - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R > -@@ -3250,6 +3253,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine > *sm) > - } > - > - > -+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) > -+{ > -+ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) > -+ return 0; > -+ return sm->tk_already_set; > -+} > -+ > -+ > - int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, > - struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry) > - { > -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h > -index 0de8d97..97461b0 100644 > ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h > -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h > -@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, > - u8 *data, size_t data_len); > - enum wpa_event { > - WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH, > -- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT > -+ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED > - }; > - void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > - int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event); > -@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > - int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > - int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > - int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > -+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); > - int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, > - struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry); > - struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry * > -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c > -index 42242a5..e63b99a 100644 > ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c > -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c > -@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) > - return; > - } > - > -+ if (sm->tk_already_set) { > -+ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX > -+ * PN in the driver */ > -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, > -+ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); > -+ return; > -+ } > -+ > - /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail > - * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only > - * after association has been completed. This function will be called > -@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) > - > - /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */ > - sm->pairwise_set = TRUE; > -+ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE; > - } > - > - > -@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct > wpa_state_machine *sm, > - > - sm->pairwise = pairwise; > - sm->PTK_valid = TRUE; > -+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; > - wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm); > - > - buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + > -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h > -index 72b7eb3..7fd8f05 100644 > ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h > -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h > -@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine { > - struct wpa_ptk PTK; > - Boolean PTK_valid; > - Boolean pairwise_set; > -+ Boolean tk_already_set; > - int keycount; > - Boolean Pair; > - struct wpa_key_replay_counter { > --- > -1.8.3.1 > - > diff --git > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch > > b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch > deleted file mode 100644 > index 4e57bcaa5..000000000 > --- > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch > +++ /dev/null > @@ -1,253 +0,0 @@ > -From c623cc973de525f7411dffe438e957ba86ef4733 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > -From: Mathy Vanhoef <[email protected]> > -Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200 > -Subject: [PATCH 2/7] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key > - > -Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a > -(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do > -not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an > -attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the > -sequence counter associated to the group key. > - > -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <[email protected]> > - > -Upstream-Status: Backport > -Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <[email protected]> > ---- > - src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++ > - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 116 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ > - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++ > - 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) > - > -diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h > -index af1d0f0..d200285 100644 > ---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h > -+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h > -@@ -217,6 +217,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk { > - size_t tk_len; > - }; > - > -+struct wpa_gtk { > -+ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN]; > -+ size_t gtk_len; > -+}; > -+ > -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > -+struct wpa_igtk { > -+ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN]; > -+ size_t igtk_len; > -+}; > -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > - > - /* WPA IE version 1 > - * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type) > -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > -index 3c47879..95bd7be 100644 > ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > -@@ -714,6 +714,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > - const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; > - u8 gtk_buf[32]; > - > -+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ > -+ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && > -+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { > -+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > -+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver > (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", > -+ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); > -+ return 0; > -+ } > -+ > - wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len); > - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > - "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", > -@@ -748,6 +757,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > - } > - os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); > - > -+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; > -+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); > -+ > - return 0; > - } > - > -@@ -854,6 +866,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm > *sm, > - } > - > - > -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > -+static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > -+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) > -+{ > -+ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); > -+ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); > -+ > -+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ > -+ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && > -+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { > -+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > -+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the > driver (keyidx=%d)", > -+ keyidx); > -+ return 0; > -+ } > -+ > -+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > -+ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", > -+ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); > -+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len); > -+ if (keyidx > 4095) { > -+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, > -+ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); > -+ return -1; > -+ } > -+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), > -+ broadcast_ether_addr, > -+ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), > -+ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { > -+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, > -+ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); > -+ return -1; > -+ } > -+ > -+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; > -+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); > -+ > -+ return 0; > -+} > -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > -+ > -+ > - static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, > - struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) > - { > -@@ -864,30 +918,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, > - if (ie->igtk) { > - size_t len; > - const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; > -- u16 keyidx; > -+ > - len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); > - if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len) > - return -1; > -+ > - igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; > -- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); > -- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d " > -- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", > -- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); > -- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", > -- igtk->igtk, len); > -- if (keyidx > 4095) { > -- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, > -- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); > -- return -1; > -- } > -- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), > -- broadcast_ether_addr, > -- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), > -- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { > -- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, > -- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); > -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) > - return -1; > -- } > - } > - > - return 0; > -@@ -2307,7 +2345,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm) > - */ > - void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) > - { > -- int clear_ptk = 1; > -+ int clear_keys = 1; > - > - if (sm == NULL) > - return; > -@@ -2333,11 +2371,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 > *bssid) > - /* Prepare for the next transition */ > - wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL); > - > -- clear_ptk = 0; > -+ clear_keys = 0; > - } > - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ > - > -- if (clear_ptk) { > -+ if (clear_keys) { > - /* > - * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if > - * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition. > -@@ -2347,6 +2385,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 > *bssid) > - os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); > - sm->tptk_set = 0; > - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); > -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); > -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); > -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > - } > - > - #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS > -@@ -2877,6 +2919,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) > - os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk)); > - os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); > - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); > -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); > -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); > -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R > - os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); > - os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0)); > -@@ -2949,29 +2995,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 > subelem_id, u8 *buf) > - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); > - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > - } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) { > -- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd; > -- u16 keyidx; > -- > -- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); > -- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); > -- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2); > -- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6); > -- > -- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid); > -- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen); > -- > -- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)", > -- igd.igtk, keylen); > -- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), > -- broadcast_ether_addr, > -- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn), > -- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) { > -- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in " > -- "WNM mode"); > -- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); > -+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; > -+ > -+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); > -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) > - return -1; > -- } > -- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); > - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > - } else { > - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id"); > -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > -index f653ba6..afc9e37 100644 > ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > -@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { > - u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; > - int rx_replay_counter_set; > - u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; > -+ struct wpa_gtk gtk; > -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > -+ struct wpa_igtk igtk; > -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > - > - struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ > - > --- > -1.8.3.1 > - > diff --git > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch > > b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch > deleted file mode 100644 > index e39bbf63d..000000000 > --- > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch > +++ /dev/null > @@ -1,187 +0,0 @@ > -From a6caab8060ab60876e233306f5c586451169eba1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > -From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > -Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300 > -Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of > WNM-Sleep > - Mode cases > - > -This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value > -separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a > -corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the > -GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to > -detect a possible key reconfiguration. > - > -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > - > -Upstream-Status: Backport > -Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <[email protected]> > ---- > - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- > - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++ > - 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) > - > -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > -index 95bd7be..7a2c68d 100644 > ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > -@@ -709,14 +709,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data { > - > - static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > - const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd, > -- const u8 *key_rsc) > -+ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep) > - { > - const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; > - u8 gtk_buf[32]; > - > - /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ > -- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && > -- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { > -+ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && > -+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) || > -+ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && > -+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, > -+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) { > - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > - "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver > (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", > - gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); > -@@ -757,8 +760,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > - } > - os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); > - > -- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; > -- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); > -+ if (wnm_sleep) { > -+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; > -+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, > -+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len); > -+ } else { > -+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; > -+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); > -+ } > - > - return 0; > - } > -@@ -852,7 +861,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > - (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher, > - gtk_len, gtk_len, > - &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) || > -- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) { > -+ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) { > - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > - "RSN: Failed to install GTK"); > - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); > -@@ -868,14 +877,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm > *sm, > - > - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > - static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > -- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) > -+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk, > -+ int wnm_sleep) > - { > - size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); > - u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); > - > - /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ > -- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && > -- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { > -+ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && > -+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) || > -+ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len && > -+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, > -+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) { > - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > - "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the > driver (keyidx=%d)", > - keyidx); > -@@ -900,8 +913,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm > *sm, > - return -1; > - } > - > -- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; > -- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); > -+ if (wnm_sleep) { > -+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len; > -+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, > -+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len); > -+ } else { > -+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; > -+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); > -+ } > - > - return 0; > - } > -@@ -924,7 +943,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, > - return -1; > - > - igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; > -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) > -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0) > - return -1; > - } > - > -@@ -1574,7 +1593,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct > wpa_sm *sm, > - if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc)) > - key_rsc = null_rsc; > - > -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) || > -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) || > - wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0) > - goto failed; > - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); > -@@ -2386,8 +2405,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 > *bssid) > - sm->tptk_set = 0; > - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); > - os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); > -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); > - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > - os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); > -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); > - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > - } > - > -@@ -2920,8 +2941,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) > - os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); > - os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); > - os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); > -+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); > - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > - os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); > -+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); > - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R > - os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); > -@@ -2986,7 +3009,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 > subelem_id, u8 *buf) > - > - wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)", > - gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len); > -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) { > -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) { > - os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); > - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in " > - "WNM mode"); > -@@ -2998,7 +3021,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 > subelem_id, u8 *buf) > - const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; > - > - igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); > -- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) > -+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0) > - return -1; > - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > - } else { > -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > -index afc9e37..9a54631 100644 > ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > -@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { > - int rx_replay_counter_set; > - u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; > - struct wpa_gtk gtk; > -+ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep; > - #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W > - struct wpa_igtk igtk; > -+ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep; > - #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ > - > - struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ > --- > -1.8.3.1 > - > diff --git > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch > > b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch > deleted file mode 100644 > index 510362510..000000000 > --- > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch > +++ /dev/null > @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ > -From abf941647f2dc33b0b59612f525e1b292331cc9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > -From: Mathy Vanhoef <[email protected]> > -Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200 > -Subject: [PATCH 4/7] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK > - > -Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver > -and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from > -trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK. > - > -This fixes the earlier fix in commit > -ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the > -driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account > -possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of > -message 3/4. > - > -Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <[email protected]> > - > -Upstream-Status: Backport > -Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <[email protected]> > ---- > - src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 + > - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 5 ++--- > - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 - > - 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > - > -diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h > -index d200285..1021ccb 100644 > ---- a/src/common/wpa_common.h > -+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h > -@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk { > - size_t kck_len; > - size_t kek_len; > - size_t tk_len; > -+ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */ > - }; > - > - struct wpa_gtk { > -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > -index 7a2c68d..0550a41 100644 > ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > -@@ -510,7 +510,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_4(struct wpa_sm > *sm, > - os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); > - } > - sm->tptk_set = 1; > -- sm->tk_to_set = 1; > - > - kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie; > - kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len; > -@@ -615,7 +614,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > - enum wpa_alg alg; > - const u8 *key_rsc; > - > -- if (!sm->tk_to_set) { > -+ if (sm->ptk.installed) { > - wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, > - "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); > - return 0; > -@@ -659,7 +658,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm, > - > - /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */ > - os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN); > -- sm->tk_to_set = 0; > -+ sm->ptk.installed = 1; > - > - if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) { > - eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL); > -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > -index 9a54631..41f371f 100644 > ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > -@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm { > - struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk; > - int ptk_set, tptk_set; > - unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1; > -- unsigned int tk_to_set:1; > - u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; > - u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */ > - int renew_snonce; > --- > -1.8.3.1 > - > diff --git > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch > > b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch > deleted file mode 100644 > index b0e1df314..000000000 > --- > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch > +++ /dev/null > @@ -1,67 +0,0 @@ > -From 804b9d72808cddd822e7dcec4d60f40c1aceda82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > -From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > -Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300 > -Subject: [PATCH 5/7] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce > - > -The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing > -the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going > -directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to > -determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the > -new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant. > - > -Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state > -for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK. > - > -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > - > -Upstream-Status: Backport > -Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <[email protected]> > ---- > - src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- > - 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > - > -diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > -index 707971d..bf10cc1 100644 > ---- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > -+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c > -@@ -1901,6 +1901,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2) > - } > - > - > -+static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) > -+{ > -+ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) { > -+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, > -+ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce"); > -+ sm->Disconnect = TRUE; > -+ return -1; > -+ } > -+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce, > -+ WPA_NONCE_LEN); > -+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0; > -+ return 0; > -+} > -+ > -+ > - SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK) > - { > - u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN]; > -@@ -2458,9 +2473,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK) > - SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION); > - else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest) > - SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2); > -- else if (sm->PTKRequest) > -- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); > -- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { > -+ else if (sm->PTKRequest) { > -+ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0) > -+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED); > -+ else > -+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); > -+ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { > - case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE: > - break; > - case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT: > --- > -1.8.3.1 > - > diff --git > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch > > b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch > deleted file mode 100644 > index 72c7d51e1..000000000 > --- > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch > +++ /dev/null > @@ -1,135 +0,0 @@ > -From 7fd26db2d8147ed662db192c41d7bc15752a601d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > -From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > -Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300 > -Subject: [PATCH 6/7] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration > - > -Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has > -been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues > -related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check > -for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so > -that behavior does not get modified. > - > -For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was > -followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating > -the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e., > -ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path > -and simple replay attacks are not feasible. > - > -As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if > -the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros. > - > -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > - > -Upstream-Status: Backport > -Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <[email protected]> > ---- > - src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > - 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > - > -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c > -index e424168..9eb9738 100644 > ---- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c > -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c > -@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer { > - u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */ > - } tpk; > - int tpk_set; > -+ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */ > - int tpk_success; > - int tpk_in_progress; > - > -@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct > wpa_tdls_peer *peer) > - u8 rsc[6]; > - enum wpa_alg alg; > - > -+ if (peer->tk_set) { > -+ /* > -+ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver > -+ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an > -+ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing > -+ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must > -+ * not allow that to happen. > -+ */ > -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR > -+ " has already been configured to the driver - do not > reconfigure", > -+ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); > -+ return -1; > -+ } > -+ > - os_memset(rsc, 0, 6); > - > - switch (peer->cipher) { > -@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct > wpa_tdls_peer *peer) > - return -1; > - } > - > -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR, > -+ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); > - if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1, > - rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) { > - wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the " > - "driver"); > - return -1; > - } > -+ peer->tk_set = 1; > - return 0; > - } > - > -@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, > struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer) > - peer->cipher = 0; > - peer->qos_info = 0; > - peer->wmm_capable = 0; > -- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; > -+ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; > - peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0; > - os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk)); > - os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN); > -@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie: > - wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer); > - return -1; > - } > -+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ > - wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake", > - peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); > - os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); > -@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, > struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer, > - } > - > - > -+static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce) > -+{ > -+ int i; > -+ > -+ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) { > -+ if (nonce[i]) > -+ return 1; > -+ } > -+ > -+ return 0; > -+} > -+ > -+ > - static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, > - const u8 *buf, size_t len) > - { > -@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn: > - peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len; > - peer->cipher = cipher; > - > -- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) { > -+ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 || > -+ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) { > - /* > - * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained > - * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the > -@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn: > - "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder > nonce"); > - goto error; > - } > -+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ > - } > - > - #if 0 > --- > -1.8.3.1 > - > diff --git > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch > > b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch > deleted file mode 100644 > index d0978c797..000000000 > --- > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch > +++ /dev/null > @@ -1,85 +0,0 @@ > -From a42eb67c42f845faf266b0633d52e17f2a82f511 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > -From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > -Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300 > -Subject: [PATCH 7/7] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames > - > -The driver is expected to not report a second association event without > -the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this > -case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same > -pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues, > -be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this > -even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected > -Reassociation Response frame. > - > -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> > - > -Upstream-Status: Backport > -Signed-off-by: Zheng Ruoqin <[email protected]> > ---- > - src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++ > - src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++ > - src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 + > - 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+) > - > -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > -index 0550a41..2a53c6f 100644 > ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > -@@ -2440,6 +2440,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm) > - #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS > - wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm); > - #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */ > -+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R > -+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; > -+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ > - > - /* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */ > - wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm); > -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c > -index 205793e..d45bb45 100644 > ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c > -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c > -@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t > *len, > - u16 capab; > - > - sm->ft_completed = 0; > -+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; > - > - buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + > - 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100; > -@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, > const u8 *ies, > - return -1; > - } > - > -+ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) { > -+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been > completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission"); > -+ return 0; > -+ } > -+ > - if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) { > - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs"); > - return -1; > -@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, > const u8 *ies, > - return -1; > - } > - > -+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1; > -+ > - if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0) > - return -1; > - > -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > -index 41f371f..56f88dc 100644 > ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h > -@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm { > - size_t r0kh_id_len; > - u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN]; > - int ft_completed; > -+ int ft_reassoc_completed; > - int over_the_ds_in_progress; > - u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */ > - int set_ptk_after_assoc; > --- > -1.8.3.1 > - > diff --git > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch > b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch > deleted file mode 100644 > index 522fc394b..000000000 > --- > a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch > +++ /dev/null > @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ > -hostapd-2.6: Fix CVE-2018-14526 > - > -[No upstream tracking] -- > https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt > - > -wpa: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data > - > -Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant > -processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted > -flag set, but not the MIC flag. > - > -When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but > -not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying > -the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when > -negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that > -unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary > -could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information > -in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key). > - > -Upstream-Status: Backport > [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c?id=3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961] > -CVE: CVE-2018-14526 > -Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <[email protected]> > - > -diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > -index 3c47879..6bdf923 100644 > ---- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > -+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c > -@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 > *src_addr, > - > - if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) && > - (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) { > -+ /* > -+ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity > -+ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not > -+ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0 > -+ * which is the case in this code branch. > -+ */ > -+ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) { > -+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, > -+ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but > unauthenticated data"); > -+ goto out; > -+ } > - if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data, > - &key_data_len)) > - goto out; > diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb > b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.8.bb > similarity index 64% > rename from meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb > rename to meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.8.bb > index 42aae4279..15884d0d0 100644 > --- a/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.6.bb > +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.8.bb > @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ SUMMARY = "User space daemon for extended IEEE 802.11 > management" > HOMEPAGE = "http://w1.fi/hostapd/"; > SECTION = "kernel/userland" > LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause" > -LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = > "file://hostapd/README;md5=8aa4e8c78b59b12016c4cb2d0a8db350" > +LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = > "file://hostapd/README;md5=1ec986bec88070e2a59c68c95d763f89" > > DEPENDS = "libnl openssl" > > @@ -11,18 +11,10 @@ SRC_URI = " \ > file://defconfig \ > file://init \ > file://hostapd.service \ > - file://0001-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch \ > - file://0002-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch \ > - file://0003-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch \ > - file://0004-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch \ > - file://0005-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch \ > - file://0006-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch \ > - file://0007-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch \ > - file://hostapd-CVE-2018-14526.patch \ > " > > -SRC_URI[md5sum] = "eaa56dce9bd8f1d195eb62596eab34c7" > -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = > "01526b90c1d23bec4b0f052039cc4456c2fd19347b4d830d1d58a0a6aea7117d" > +SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ed2c254e5f400838cb9d8e7b6e43b86c" > +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = > "929f522be6eeec38c53147e7bc084df028f65f148a3f7e4fa6c4c3f955cee4b0" > > S = "${WORKDIR}/hostapd-${PV}" > B = "${WORKDIR}/hostapd-${PV}/hostapd" > -- _______________________________________________ Openembedded-devel mailing list [email protected] http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-devel
