Robert, On 1/15/22 1:33 PM, Robert Joslyn wrote: > This is a security and bugfix release. With this update, the backported > patches for CVE-2021-2314 and CVE-2021-23222 are no longer needed. Full > release notes are available at: > https://www.postgresql.org/docs/release/13.5/
If a patch to update master has not been sent, please do so as it currently has the same version as hardknott. thanks, Armin > > Signed-off-by: Robert Joslyn <[email protected]> > --- > .../files/0001-Add-support-for-RISC-V.patch | 10 +- > ...n-bypass-autoconf-2.69-version-check.patch | 2 +- > .../postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch | 116 ---------------- > .../postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch | 131 ------------------ > ...{postgresql_13.4.bb => postgresql_13.5.bb} | 4 +- > 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 255 deletions(-) > delete mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch > delete mode 100644 meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch > rename meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/{postgresql_13.4.bb => > postgresql_13.5.bb} (67%) > > diff --git > a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-Add-support-for-RISC-V.patch > b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-Add-support-for-RISC-V.patch > index 0dc6ece6d..5c65e6185 100644 > --- a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-Add-support-for-RISC-V.patch > +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-Add-support-for-RISC-V.patch > @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ > -From b06a228a5fd1589fc9bed654b3288b321fc21aa1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From 0b60fe3c39b2f62f9867d955da82d9d20c42d028 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: "Richard W.M. Jones" <[email protected]> > Date: Sun, 20 Nov 2016 15:04:52 +0000 > Subject: [PATCH] Add support for RISC-V. > @@ -9,9 +9,11 @@ extending the existing aarch64 macro works. > src/include/storage/s_lock.h | 5 +++-- > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > +diff --git a/src/include/storage/s_lock.h b/src/include/storage/s_lock.h > +index 6b368a5..f7d3387 100644 > --- a/src/include/storage/s_lock.h > +++ b/src/include/storage/s_lock.h > -@@ -316,11 +316,12 @@ tas(volatile slock_t *lock) > +@@ -317,11 +317,12 @@ tas(volatile slock_t *lock) > > /* > * On ARM and ARM64, we use __sync_lock_test_and_set(int *, int) if > available. > @@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ extending the existing aarch64 macro works. > #ifdef HAVE_GCC__SYNC_INT32_TAS > #define HAS_TEST_AND_SET > > -@@ -337,7 +338,7 @@ tas(volatile slock_t *lock) > +@@ -338,7 +339,7 @@ tas(volatile slock_t *lock) > #define S_UNLOCK(lock) __sync_lock_release(lock) > > #endif /* HAVE_GCC__SYNC_INT32_TAS */ > @@ -33,4 +35,4 @@ extending the existing aarch64 macro works. > +#endif /* __arm__ || __arm || __aarch64__ || __aarch64 || __riscv */ > > > - /* S/390 and S/390x Linux (32- and 64-bit zSeries) */ > + /* > diff --git > a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-configure.in-bypass-autoconf-2.69-version-check.patch > > b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-configure.in-bypass-autoconf-2.69-version-check.patch > index db9769f82..17ba04b66 100644 > --- > a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-configure.in-bypass-autoconf-2.69-version-check.patch > +++ > b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/0001-configure.in-bypass-autoconf-2.69-version-check.patch > @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ index fb14dcc..a2b4a4f 100644 > +++ b/configure.in > @@ -19,10 +19,6 @@ m4_pattern_forbid(^PGAC_)dnl to catch undefined macros > > - AC_INIT([PostgreSQL], [13.4], [[email protected]], [], > [https://www.postgresql.org/]) > + AC_INIT([PostgreSQL], [13.5], [[email protected]], [], > [https://www.postgresql.org/]) > > -m4_if(m4_defn([m4_PACKAGE_VERSION]), [2.69], [], [m4_fatal([Autoconf > version 2.69 is required. > -Untested combinations of 'autoconf' and PostgreSQL versions are not > diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch > b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch > deleted file mode 100644 > index 58bf81062..000000000 > --- a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23214.patch > +++ /dev/null > @@ -1,116 +0,0 @@ > -From 24c2b9e42edb6d2f4ef2cead3b0aa1d6196adfce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > -From: Tom Lane <[email protected]> > -Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 11:01:43 -0500 > -Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption > - handshake. > - > -The server collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data > -from the client socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested > -during startup, any additional data received with the initial > -request message remained in the buffer, and would be treated as > -already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed. > -Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the > -TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of > -a supposedly encryption-protected database session. > - > -This could be abused to send faked SQL commands to the server, > -although that would only work if the server did not demand any > -authentication data. (However, a server relying on SSL certificate > -authentication might well not do so.) > - > -To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer > -is not empty after the encryption handshake. > - > -Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. > - > -Security: CVE-2021-23214 > - > -Upstream-Status: > Backport[https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/28e24125541545483093819efae9bca603441951] > -CVE: CVE-2021-23214 > - > -Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <[email protected]> > - > ---- > - src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c | 11 +++++++++++ > - src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- > - src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 1 + > - 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > - > -diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c > -index ee2cd86..4dd1c02 100644 > ---- a/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c > -+++ b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c > -@@ -1183,6 +1183,17 @@ pq_getstring(StringInfo s) > - } > - } > - > -+/* ------------------------------- > -+ * pq_buffer_has_data - is any buffered data > available to read? > -+ * > -+ * This will *not* attempt to read more data. > -+ * -------------------------------- > -+ */ > -+bool > -+pq_buffer_has_data(void) > -+{ > -+ return (PqRecvPointer < PqRecvLength); > -+} > - > - /* -------------------------------- > - * pq_startmsgread - begin reading a message from the client. > -diff --git a/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c > b/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c > -index 5775fc0..1fcc3f8 100644 > ---- a/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c > -+++ b/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c > -@@ -2049,6 +2049,17 @@ retry1: > - return STATUS_ERROR; > - #endif > - > -+ /* > -+ * At this point we should have no data already buffered. If we > do, > -+ * it was received before we performed the SSL handshake, so it > wasn't > -+ * encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a > man-in-the-middle. > -+ * We report this case to the client. > -+ */ > -+ if (pq_buffer_has_data()) > -+ ereport(FATAL, > -+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), > -+ errmsg("received unencrypted data after SSL > request"), > -+ errdetail("This could be either a > client-software bug or evidence of an attempted man-in-the-middle attack."))); > - /* > - * regular startup packet, cancel, etc packet should follow, > but not > - * another SSL negotiation request, and a GSS request should > only > -@@ -2080,7 +2091,17 @@ retry1: > - if (GSSok == 'G' && secure_open_gssapi(port) == -1) > - return STATUS_ERROR; > - #endif > -- > -+ /* > -+ * At this point we should have no data already buffered. If we > do, > -+ * it was received before we performed the GSS handshake, so it > wasn't > -+ * encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a > man-in-the-middle. > -+ * We report this case to the client. > -+ */ > -+ if (pq_buffer_has_data()) > -+ ereport(FATAL, > -+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), > -+ errmsg("received unencrypted data after GSSAPI > encryption request"), > -+ errdetail("This could be either a > client-software bug or evidence of an attempted man-in-the-middle attack."))); > - /* > - * regular startup packet, cancel, etc packet should follow, > but not > - * another GSS negotiation request, and an SSL request should > only > -diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h > -index b115247..9969692 100644 > ---- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h > -+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h > -@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern int pq_getbyte(void); > - extern int pq_peekbyte(void); > - extern int pq_getbyte_if_available(unsigned char *c); > - extern int pq_putbytes(const char *s, size_t len); > -+extern bool pq_buffer_has_data(void); > - > - /* > - * prototypes for functions in be-secure.c > --- > -2.17.1 > - > diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch > b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch > deleted file mode 100644 > index 42b78539b..000000000 > --- a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/files/CVE-2021-23222.patch > +++ /dev/null > @@ -1,131 +0,0 @@ > -From 79125ead2a6a234086844bb42f06d49603fe6ca0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > -From: Tom Lane <[email protected]> > -Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 11:14:56 -0500 > -Subject: [PATCH 1/2] libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS > encryption > - handshake. > - > -libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from > -the socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup, > -any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply > -remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data > -once the encryption handshake completed. Thus, a man-in-the-middle > -with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff > -some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected > -database session. > - > -This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the > -client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior > -make that harder than it sounds. A different line of attack is to > -exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might > -be sent early in the session. That has been shown to be possible with > -a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214. > - > -To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer > -is not empty after the encryption handshake. > - > -Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. > - > -Security: CVE-2021-23222 > - > -Upstream-Status: > Backport[https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/160c0258802d10b0600d7671b1bbea55d8e17d45] > -CVE: CVE-2021-23222 > - > -Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <[email protected]> > ---- > - doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > - src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > - 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+) > - > -diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml > -index e26619e1b5..b692648fca 100644 > ---- a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml > -+++ b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml > -@@ -1471,6 +1471,20 @@ SELCT 1/0;<!-- this typo is intentional --> > - and proceed without requesting <acronym>SSL</acronym>. > - </para> > - > -+ <para> > -+ When <acronym>SSL</acronym> encryption can be performed, the server > -+ is expected to send only the single <literal>S</literal> byte and then > -+ wait for the frontend to initiate an <acronym>SSL</acronym> handshake. > -+ If additional bytes are available to read at this point, it likely > -+ means that a man-in-the-middle is attempting to perform a > -+ buffer-stuffing attack > -+ (<ulink > url="https://www.postgresql.org/support/security/CVE-2021-23222/";>CVE-2021-23222</ulink>). > -+ Frontends should be coded either to read exactly one byte from the > -+ socket before turning the socket over to their SSL library, or to > -+ treat it as a protocol violation if they find they have read additional > -+ bytes. > -+ </para> > -+ > - <para> > - An initial SSLRequest can also be used in a connection that is being > - opened to send a CancelRequest message. > -@@ -1532,6 +1546,20 @@ SELCT 1/0;<!-- this typo is intentional --> > - encryption. > - </para> > - > -+ <para> > -+ When <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> encryption can be performed, the server > -+ is expected to send only the single <literal>G</literal> byte and then > -+ wait for the frontend to initiate a <acronym>GSSAPI</acronym> handshake. > -+ If additional bytes are available to read at this point, it likely > -+ means that a man-in-the-middle is attempting to perform a > -+ buffer-stuffing attack > -+ (<ulink > url="https://www.postgresql.org/support/security/CVE-2021-23222/";>CVE-2021-23222</ulink>). > -+ Frontends should be coded either to read exactly one byte from the > -+ socket before turning the socket over to their GSSAPI library, or to > -+ treat it as a protocol violation if they find they have read additional > -+ bytes. > -+ </para> > -+ > - <para> > - An initial GSSENCRequest can also be used in a connection that is being > - opened to send a CancelRequest message. > -diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c > b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c > -index f80f4e98d8..57aee95183 100644 > ---- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c > -+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c > -@@ -3076,6 +3076,19 @@ keep_going: > /* We will come back to here until there is > - pollres = pqsecure_open_client(conn); > - if (pollres == PGRES_POLLING_OK) > - { > -+ /* > -+ * At this point we should have no data > already buffered. > -+ * If we do, it was received before we > performed the SSL > -+ * handshake, so it wasn't encrypted > and indeed may have > -+ * been injected by a man-in-the-middle. > -+ */ > -+ if (conn->inCursor != conn->inEnd) > -+ { > -+ > appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, > -+ > libpq_gettext("received unencrypted data after SSL response\n")); > -+ goto error_return; > -+ } > -+ > - /* SSL handshake done, ready to send > startup packet */ > - conn->status = CONNECTION_MADE; > - return PGRES_POLLING_WRITING; > -@@ -3175,6 +3188,19 @@ keep_going: > /* We will come back to here until there is > - pollres = pqsecure_open_gss(conn); > - if (pollres == PGRES_POLLING_OK) > - { > -+ /* > -+ * At this point we should have no data > already buffered. > -+ * If we do, it was received before we > performed the GSS > -+ * handshake, so it wasn't encrypted > and indeed may have > -+ * been injected by a man-in-the-middle. > -+ */ > -+ if (conn->inCursor != conn->inEnd) > -+ { > -+ > appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, > -+ > libpq_gettext("received unencrypted data after GSSAPI encryption > response\n")); > -+ goto error_return; > -+ } > -+ > - /* All set for startup packet */ > - conn->status = CONNECTION_MADE; > - return PGRES_POLLING_WRITING; > --- > -2.17.1 > - > diff --git a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.4.bb > b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.5.bb > similarity index 67% > rename from meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.4.bb > rename to meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.5.bb > index 2ed0fa49b..81193e30e 100644 > --- a/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.4.bb > +++ b/meta-oe/recipes-dbs/postgresql/postgresql_13.5.bb > @@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ SRC_URI += "\ > file://0001-Add-support-for-RISC-V.patch \ > file://0001-Improve-reproducibility.patch \ > file://0001-configure.in-bypass-autoconf-2.69-version-check.patch \ > - file://CVE-2021-23214.patch \ > - file://CVE-2021-23222.patch \ > " > > -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = > "ea93e10390245f1ce461a54eb5f99a48d8cabd3a08ce4d652ec2169a357bc0cd" > +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = > "9b81067a55edbaabc418aacef457dd8477642827499560b00615a6ea6c13f6b3" > > >
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