Quoting r. Hugh Dickins <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > Subject: Re: [openib-general] Re: madvise MADV_DONTFORK/MADV_DOFORK > > On Mon, 13 Feb 2006, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > > > Like this then? > > Almost. I would still prefer madvise_vma to allow MADV_DONTFORK > on a VM_IO vma, even though it must prohibit MADV_DOFORK there. > But if Linus disagrees, of course ignore me.
I'm not sure about this point. Linus? > Comments much better, thanks. I didn't get your point about mlock'd > memory, but I'm content to believe you're thinking of an issue that > hasn't occurred to me. I'm referring to the follwing, from man mlock(2): "Cryptographic security software often handles critical bytes like passwords or secret keys as data structures. As a result of paging, these secrets could be transfered onto a persistent swap store medium, where they might be accessible to the enemy long after the security software has erased the secrets in RAM and terminated." -- Michael S. Tsirkin Staff Engineer, Mellanox Technologies _______________________________________________ openib-general mailing list [email protected] http://openib.org/mailman/listinfo/openib-general To unsubscribe, please visit http://openib.org/mailman/listinfo/openib-general
