That is a problem for all redirect protocols, and has nothing to do with openID directly.
Each Identity service provider has many options to eliminate phishing attacks. Many providers offer there customers those choices now. John B. On 2010-10-14, at 9:27 PM, Nat Sakimura wrote: > Looks like we have to submit some kind of comment by this Friday. > > OpenID mentioned as "Phishing Heaven" is not good. > > Don, could you get in touch with them to fix those paragraphs? > > I will try to send my personal comments as well. > > Here is the problematic sentence: > > As a server-side solution, OpenID and successor technologies have the > advantage of only relying on server-side HTTP redirects, and so in general > works independent of browsers. Very seriously, OpenID 2.0 Authentication does > not require relying parties to validate, and so has been described as > phishing heaven, since it allows any OpenID-enabled site to redirect a user > to a fake OpenID provider, that then steals the user's credentials. > > On Thu, Oct 14, 2010 at 10:57 AM, Nat Sakimura <[email protected]> wrote: > I just stumbled upon this document "Final Report - Social Web XG Wiki " > > http://www.w3.org/2005/Incubator/socialweb/wiki/FinalReport#Identity > > Perhaps we should locate a volunteer to help them write more > accurately about OpenID? > > -- > Nat Sakimura (=nat) > http://www.sakimura.org/en/ > http://twitter.com/_nat_en > > > > -- > Nat Sakimura (=nat) > http://www.sakimura.org/en/ > http://twitter.com/_nat_en > _______________________________________________ > board mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-board
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