I tend to agree with Nat.
You have a whole bunch of SAML vendors, whose sales teams will be
telling business users (about to openid-enable their site), that
openid is structurally insufficient for doing serious stuff, and is
only for website managing assets noone cares about. its even more
effective backroom selling now, since they have the "Proof" of the
GSA categorization.
Now, Im also wary of not following David's advice. He has got us
this far, with the Google home page being openid-empowered, and
Google cloud hosting of OPs! That is one hell of a set of (correct)
judgment calls about websso and actual adoption (vs worrying about
the spin zones of the SAML lobbyists and vendor marketing).
we need some judgments calls. OpenID has done fine with OP-
enablement. But RP enablement is lacking (beyond Facebook excellent
effort), perhaps because of the assurance issue (and the fact that
there is strong competition from SAML2). For what I can tell, even
Google has hedged on the topic, having the likes of Ping's Connect's
cloud-based sso-switch providing bridging - but bridging to the SAAS
RPs with SAML2 or any other protocol, in non-discriminatory fashion.
________________________________
From: [email protected] [[email protected]
] On Behalf Of Nat Sakimura [[email protected]]
Sent: Thursday, August 13, 2009 10:38 AM
To: [email protected]
Cc: OpenID Specs Mailing List; [email protected]; John
Bradley
Subject: Re: [OpenID] OpenID + Government
If not being able to cope with LoA 2 or 3 becomes a barrier for
adoption for even LoA 1, then it may be good to prepare it, even
though nobody uses it. It is just the matter of having a spec for
it. Think of it as a marketing activity.
=nat
On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 2:32 AM, David Recordon <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>> wrote:
In some senses I'm not sure if it makes sense for us to really think
about LoA 2 or 3 right now or worry if it is "OpenID" if we make the
changes required to meet level 3. Let's wait until we have an
amazing set of deployments within the Government where OpenID can be
successful today and then evolve the protocol when there is another
set of absolutely amazing potential deployments that would require
us to do so.
(this might also be a better discussion on the specs@ list since
general@ isn't supposed to get into nitty gritty of the tech)
--David
On Aug 13, 2009, at 10:12 AM, John Bradley wrote:
Again eavesdropping mitigation is a good start for LoA 2.
LoA 3 is not just signing, it requires chaining back to the federal
trust bridge CA.
Remember this is about the US governments requirements.
There are non-repudiation, and revocation requirements for the
signature.
Shibboleth and Infocard are currently working with the GSA on
signing and trust chaining issues at LoA 3.
Hopefully the road will be smother by the time openID gets to it.
Though I do have to ask is it still openID with RSA or ECDSA
signatures?
John B.
On 13-Aug-09, at 9:21 AM, Peter Williams wrote:
Yes, but that means adding rsa to the core of openid (which means
adding asymmetric public key management). It's no longer openid!
For loa2, focus on the eavesdropping requirements (for both
responses AND requests).
For loa3, focus on the nr only, which means certs (or signed xrd
playing the role of x509 format certs).
On Aug 13, 2009, at 9:00 AM, "Nat Sakimura" <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote:
Just to add another merit for artifact, it is very mobile client
friendly.
It is pretty simple to write a spec for it, and to implement it.
RSA-SHA sign, we do not have to wait until 3.0.
If I remember correctly, it was one of the thing to be done in 2.1
timeframe.
=nat
On Fri, Aug 14, 2009 at 12:55 AM, Peter Williams <<mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>>
wrote:
if saml2 satisfies the rule, at "loa=2"and "loa=3", then we don't
have to do any more than SAML2 does.
Why not let a WG profile/amend messages, for use in 12m time, and
choose suitable security mechanisms that address the fact that
assertion communication is indirect (and request communication is
typically indirect).
Now, we faced what openid faces with indirect communication
structures when we (Visa/Mastercard/IBM/VeriSign etc) designed SET;
IBM's OAEP saved the day.
lets reopen the WG for openid auth, for minor releases: 2.1 and 2.2.
Fundamentally, lets add public key techniques to the communication
plane , in the form of the OAEP. I dont know who Will is, but i'll
guess he will implement OAEP in about 30m. Its just a one-time pad,
and the generation/use of reversible trapdoor hash-based KDFs that
generate the encryption/decryption subkey schedule of a DES-era
feistel network).
Define v2.1 as
1. the simple addition of OAEP as a new "signing" method, and
2. the sensitive information values in a signed assertion can now
blank in the cleartext form of the assertion transferred
classically, when OAEP is the signing method.
The point is that the public association + nonces is the source
keying material - that OAEP then uses to generate the one time pad
that encrypts/signs the request or response under the reversible
public key properties of the OAEP scheme.
define v2.2 as
1. the addition of an artifact binding mode. That is, a private
association used by OPs when responding need not sign the assertion
any longer, but can sign (using OAEP) a blank assertion template.
(The use-once private association handle is the artifact id, itself).
2. Over direct channel and existing flow, enable RP to resolve the
private association (= artifactID in SAML speak). Amend verification
response so its message can be optionally signed (using OAEP) using
a public association, thus delivering the ciphertext of the
assertion to the intended recipient as well as the status of the
private association resolution (isvalid=true).
in a v3.0, once you have signed XRD, and add RSA entity public keys
(with signing keyusage only) to the (provider-signed) endpoint XRDs,
we can address non-repudiation for higher levels of assuraces. One
can sign the OAEP ciphertext, using RSA, where the
(rsaciphertext,oaepciphertext) is put into the base64 of an openid
signature type - for either requests or responses.
________________________________________
From: <mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>> [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>> [<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>] On Behalf Of John Bradley [<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>]
Sent: Wednesday, August 12, 2009 10:40 PM
To: Nat Sakimura
Cc: <mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>> [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>
Subject: Re: [OpenID] OpenID + Government
Nat,
Look at sec 8.1.2
Eavesdropping resistance: An authentication protocol is resistant to
eavesdropping attacks if an eavesdropper who records all the messages
passing
between a claimant and a verifier or relying party finds that it is
impractical to
learn the private key, secret key or password or to otherwise obtain
information
that would allow the eavesdropper to impersonate the claimant.
Eavesdropping
resistant protocols make it impractical3 for an attacker to carry out
an off-line
attack where he/she records an authentication protocol run then
analyses it on
his/her own system for an extended period, for example by
systematically
attempting to try every password in a large dictionary, or by brute
force
exhaustion.
Also Table 3 on page 39 Required Protections
Using AX update_url doesn't protect the authentication token.
It would send a unsolicited positive assertion to the RP return_to URL
with a separate token.
Also 8.2.2.2.Assertions requires that the trusted entity(OP)
authenticates to the RP using a secure protocol. As the OP is
connecting to the RP in the AX case mutual TLS would be required.
In AX the store message is a indirect message sorry. It is not
relevant to the LoA 2 case in any event as LoA 2 requires protection
against eavesdroppers on the reply.
Honestly it is better to take LoA 1 now and work on LoA 2 with proper
planning and spec cycle.
A lot of thought went into the decision not to hold up openID LoA 1 by
trying to include LoA 2 in the same profile.
We have only covered some of the issues. Password entropy, identity
proofing, liability, and other issues all come into play at LoA 2.
Getting LoA 1 approved was no cake walk itself.
I have probably said too much as it is.
I look forward to the GSA releasing the profile then people will have
something more concrete to criticize. I will happily take the heat
for that.
John B.
On 12-Aug-09, at 8:48 PM, Nat Sakimura wrote:
Yes. Go for Artifact Binding!
That happens to be the main road block for even writing CX.
If we had that, we could completely reuse the OpenID protocols
already spec'ed out.
Unfortunately it is not the case.
Current thinking is that CX sends the AX store message to OP
Endpoint in direct communication, which sounds like a bit of
stretch. Is that OK from AX stand point???
Hope so. See <http://www.sakimura.org/en/modules/wordpress/index.php?p=89
> http://www.sakimura.org/en/modules/wordpress/index.php?p=89
for details in Section 4, Protocol.
On the assertion disclosure, I do not read that requirement on NIST
SP800-63. It only requires "digitally signed by trusted entity" or
direct communication. (Here, "digitally signed" means signed by
public key cryptography. OpenID "sign" does not qualify).
Which document are you referring to?
To cope with "Digital Signature" issue, we can adopt it in OpenID
2.1. Alternatively, we can profile AX so that it carries rsa-sha256
signature.
=nat
On Thu, Aug 13, 2009 at 5:42 AM, Breno de Medeiros
<<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>> wrote:
Complexity could be minimally increased by defining an artifact
profile.
Encryption using artifact profile requires no specification, comes for
free by having OP SSL endpoints.
Artifact profile would reduce the length of URLs, currently a problem
(not all implementations seem to handle POST very well, and POST can
be annoying on mobile devices or when changing from SSL to non-SSL
context). I think it would be more beneficial on that basis than even
from a security standpoint.
Otherwise, I agree with John's assessment.
On Wed, Aug 12, 2009 at 1:32 PM, John
Bradley
<<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>> wrote:
Kids,
The GSA is producing a profile of standards.
OpenID 2.0, PAPE and AX are the only standards.
Surprisingly SREG 1.1 is not a standard (I guess we just forgot in
our
enthusiasm for AX)
The last thing the GSA wants (as I understand it) is to create new
specs and
impose them on the community. This includes picking winners and
losers in
proposed extensions.
The GSA has not said that openID can never be LoA 2+ , only that
given the
existing specs available to profile it doesn't meet the criteria
of SP800-63
for LoA 2.
The protocol MUST prevent assertion disclosure at LoA 2.
That is the main roadblock.
Other protocols encrypt the assertion to the RP or use a direct SSL
connection (artifact binding)
It is a tradeoff that openID community needs to consider carefully,
security can be increased to meet LoA 2 but it will be at the
cost of
increased complexity.
It may not be a good bargain. That however is a decision for the
community
to make and not the GSA or any other government.
I don't believe that CX addresses this issue, it is intended to
solve a
different trust problem.
Nat and I have discussed this.
If there is a extension to openID or changes to the core spec that
allow
openID to be profiled at LoA 2+ then the GSA or whoever can
revisit the
profile.
These things are not cast in stone.
Some of the things in the TFAP are a challenge the Shibboleth
community as
well.
If a bank wants to send your unencrypted data through a browser as a
redirect, good for them.
The GSA and OMB have to live within SP800-63, and given that I
think the
decision to profile openID for LoA 1 while the community sort out
where it
wants to go is reasonable.
My opinions are my own as always, and not representative of any
government
or organization.
Take a deep breath, relax it is all good.
John B.
Message: 5
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2009 12:25:45 -0700
From: Peter Williams <<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>>
Subject: Re: [OpenID] OpenID + Government
To: Paul Madsen <<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>>
Cc: "<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>"
<<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>>
Message-ID: <<mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Ok!
So you did what myspace did: took the defined extension points and
added value . They discarded the dh handshake, and use a vendor
specific association protocol (apparently). Better strength and
assurance hopefully... falling back to default (low) assurance ...
when no better option can be found.
In your case, I'll guess in the endpoint xrd that you advertise -
per
the model -additional extension handler names, so adding value via
the
extension framework. Presumably this offers something suiting
banking
frauds to only those endpoints wanting to rely on xri resolution ...
for capability negotiation and address selection (which is the more
openid way of doing things).
This is all just like ssl, now, where folks up negotiate higher
strength mechanisms and higher level operational assurances.
But look at the difference In my tone and characterization, when
discussing the assurance space.
Let's tell the ssl story using a divisive characterization of
assurances, now:
Oh my god, netscapes 40bit rc4 ciphersuite with crappy pertabators
in
the kdf (broken by a French student) and verisign class 1 client
certs
means ALL of ssl3 is low assurance. Look! GSA confirms it. It's a
fact! Folks must now switch to IPsec, for >loa1 assurance level when
tunelling!
No. Thats not how it was handled. Nsa/Dod comes along, puts in a
missi
ciphersuite, adjusts the handshake flow so missi-style key agreement
can share the record layer with rsa handshakes, and dod office
systems
get all the additional strength of missi ciphers and missi
assurances
when talking amongst themselves (now featuring monthly changing user
keying material, key comprise handling, flash authority removal,
remote cac applet provisioning on gp smartcards...). They can still
interwork with public sites using rsa, at low assurance, however.
(I'm showing my out of dateness In federal systems. By now, missi
will
have been renamed 6 times...)
What we want is Strong, professional security engineering, based
on cc
claims, STD protection profiles, evaluated cryptomodules, even
formal
methods proving the info flow properties of the strong type
system,...
And in grassroots centric openid, We want that all to be developed
in
and shown by common or garden programmers, not just defense
contractors working for GSA-affiliated .gov sites
On Aug 12, 2009, at 8:37 AM, "Paul Madsen" <<mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>>
wrote:
As you acknowledge ('custom extension albeit'), the application you
are
referring to supplemented OpenID's own security in order to meet the
higher assurance requirements.
With the standardization of that 'custom extension' continuing to
progress in the OpenID community, perhaps the GSA will in the future
reevaluate whether the combination can support higher assurance?
The GSA have said (or will say soon I guess) only that OpenID 2.0,
as
profiled, tops out at LOA1 (for US Gov RPs). The profile doeesnt
mention
(I think at least, I havent read it) CX or any other extensions that
might supplement assurance.
paul
p.s. I believe I am as suspicious of the realty industry as you
are of
Liberty
Peter Williams wrote:
So there i am in 2006 trying to let our 100k realtors use their rsa
tokencodes at lots of other websites in the realty universe.
Sounds simple, no?
And I walk into this religion style war of words, of spin
meistering,
claim and counterclaim ...and a omnipresent culture of the putdown.
Generally: an intense over sensitivity, in the saml camp. And it's
not
because realty is a hot new market for websso sales!
As a lapsed security engineer, i love seeing the passion (and i also
love the saml product we selected, which we use everyday at a cost
of
deployment now of about $2000 partner link (taking about 3 days, in
most cases)). But the "edginess" I see displayed across not one but
several companies is a real issue for going further with saml. I
feel
like I'm stepping across a precipice.
And the edginess gets noticibly stronger the moment i talk about
(also) using openid in our customers trust networks.
Now you are a good person to challenge on the bretts topic of "GSA
has
declared openid as inherently unable to address more than loa1
assurance requirements". A firm you associate with has been using
openid (with a custom extension albeit) for banking transactions-
which are not trivial transactions for which low assurance is
appropriate.how can I reconcile those 2 statements?
Now I feel I'm being spun to even more. Brett made, in literary
analysis, a reaching for that "defining" gsa classification. And in
that act of reaching underminded his case for being impartial. A
good
politician doesn't reach for the very classification device that
devides folks. He or she enables (almost magically) a acceptable
tradeoff.
Is kantara going to formally disarm the samlista brigade and move
forward, or have we just got a new name for the same old warhorse?
Grudgingly, they acceptedn
On Aug 12, 2009, at 4:10 AM, "Paul Madsen" <<mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>>
wrote:
Peter, a good theory. But you forget to mention that NORAD
intentionally
scrambled the fighters late to allow the planes to get to the
towers.
Peter Williams wrote:
My value- such as it is- is as an outsider.
I measured 4 sources:
Sun Micro rsa conference presentation on their openid pilot;
rationales for never being an rp
Ping identity factors gating speed of adoption of openid2 -
privileged acess
Scott cantors view on openid2 generally, and saml as used in xrd;
raw opinion, shared freely
How the uk jisc pilot of openid framed the basis for it's total
adoption failure in uk academia. Was it geared to fail?
Given these 4 inputs, I simply conjectured a link (liberty). I
tested my conjecture by being a bit outlandish. CoMpared to the
norm (fox news and msnbc), I was MILD in the imputations. Lots of
Ifs, buts, shoulds, mays....that mature heads would recognize as
method.
Don't get upset. It's just an experiment.
Little, powerless, clueless, skilless, informationless peter throws
tiny word stone at mighty million dollar liberty standards lobbying
machine ...and gets "over the top" reaction.
Why? Why such sensitivity?
On Aug 11, 2009, at 5:29 PM, "John Bradley"
<<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>><mailto:<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>>> wrote:
Peter, Brett
As a member of Liberty, Kantara, ICF, and OIDF. I can say that I
have never seen any indication of Liberty plotting against openID
or info-card. (I do go to most of the secret meetings)
The issue with physical access is more one of not trying to boil
the ocean.
There is real desire by real government RPs to use open
technologies and work with commercial identity providers. There
are RPs I am working with who want this yesterday.
This first step is hard enough. Many people have been working hard
for many months.
One of the ways we have been able to make progress is by limiting
the scope.
We could have done physical access, LoA 4, p-cards and other
things.
The initial program by the GSA is a start not an end to the
process.
There will be changes to the initial profiles and additional
profiles as time and requirements permit.
This first step is a scary amount of work, give us time please.
John B.
On 11-Aug-09, at 5:04 PM, <mailto:<mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>> [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>><mailto:<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>
wrote:
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2009 13:43:29 -0700
From: Peter Williams
<<mailto:<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>><mailto:<mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Subject: Re: [OpenID] OpenID + Government
To: Brett McDowell
<<mailto:<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>><mailto:<mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Cc: OpenID List
<<mailto:<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>><mailto:<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>>
Message-ID: <<mailto:<mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
<mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
>> [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]
><mailto:7911DEBA-<mailto:7911DEBA->[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>><mailto:<mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
If the infocard stack is technically reputable, can you explain why
an
accredited provider would be excluded from using it (and openid)
from
making assertions of physical presence?
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>>[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]><mailto:[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>>
<http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-general>
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--
--Breno
+1 (650) 214-1007 desk
+1 (408) 212-0135 (Grand Central)
MTV-41-3 : 383-A
PST (GMT-8) / PDT(GMT-7)
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