At least with regards to HuffPo we ended up removing attributes from the request to get under the 2KB url limit, which eliminated the security warning since we can return the response via GET instead of POST.
At least in the near term, I¹d like to compact AX so that we can squeeze in more data we should be able to do this for AX 1.1. OPs can also implement this internal artifact mechanism to switch from HTTPS to HTTP before returning the data. In the longer term, some form of Artifact Binding would probably be better, but I guess this would take longer to implement. Allen On 1/22/10 10:59 AM, "Brian Kissel" <[email protected]> wrote: > +1 Allen, here¹s what I get on HuffPo, not very compelling and probably a > trigger to ³Cancel² to most users. We need to fix this ASAP! > > > > > Cheers, > > Brian > ___________ > > Brian Kissel <http://www.linkedin.com/pub/0/10/254> > CEO - JanRain, Inc. > [email protected] > Mobile: 503.342.2668 | Fax: 503.296.5502 > 519 SW 3rd Ave. Suite 600 Portland, OR 97204 > > Increase registrations, engage users, and grow your brand with RPX. Learn > more at www.rpxnow.com <http://www.rpxnow.com/> > > > From: [email protected] > [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Allen Tom > Sent: Friday, January 22, 2010 10:43 AM > To: Andrew Arnott; John Bradley; Breno de Medeiros; specs > Subject: Re: Problem with nonces and HTTP GET > > The SSL security warning is a really terrible UX, and I agree that it doesn¹t > make sense to warn on POST but not on GET. > > Yahoo is running into the 2KB limit (and the associated SSL warning) with > alarming frequency and it¹s really hurting OpenID relative to the proprietary > SSO solutions. > > For a real live example of how the giant AX names are hurting OpenID, see > http://www.huffingtonpost.com click on the Login link, then the ³Connect > with Yahoo² button. This kicks off the Hybrid OpenID+Oauth+AX flow which > requires a POST response forcing the user to click through a security > warning to complete the sign in flow. The non-OpenID SSO choices > (Facebook/Twitter/GFC) do not have this issue. > > With regards to changing browsers to not display SSL warnings for POST, or > relying on smart OpenID clients we really need a solution right now, since > the proprietary alternatives are rapidly being adopted. > > WRT the nonce I think it would make more sense for RPs to just check the > timestamp, and allow replay for a ³narrow² window, like 10 minutes. There are > many legitimate reasons why a request could be replayed intermediate proxy > servers might do weird things, the user might hit reload/back/forward etc. > > Allen > > > On 1/22/10 10:06 AM, "Andrew Arnott" <[email protected]> wrote: > Ideally we could use POST, but avoid the browser warning that information is > crossing the SSL world into the non-SSL world. This might be arguable anyway > since sending information can be done with GET or POST, so why warn for POST > and not for GET? If we can get browsers to not warn for POST we're gold. > > Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, if we're moving in the direction of > smart client browser (plugins), and these have been shown to benefit from > extensions to the OpenID spec, perhaps we can leverage these to always use > POST without displaying the warning to the user somehow. > -- > Andrew Arnott > "I [may] not agree with what you have to say, but I'll defend to the death > your right to say it." - S. G. Tallentyre > > > On Fri, Jan 22, 2010 at 9:14 AM, John Bradley <[email protected]> wrote: > The big problem with POST is RP's that use non-ssl endpoints. > > One possibility is that the IdP could look at the return_to and discover if it > is safe to use POST. > > In SAML SSO POST is the most common way to return the token. > > The other option is artifact binding. That way the nonce is not in the GET, > though you probably wind up with the same effect if the RP tries to resolve > the artifact more than once. > > John B. > On 2010-01-22, at 12:39 PM, Andrew Arnott wrote: > HTTP GET is supposed to be completely effect-free on the server. But nonces > in OpenID messages violate that aspect of the HTTP spec, since any subsequent > GET with the same positive assertion will (or should) fail. I speculate that > some random login failures on StackOverflow > <http://meta.stackoverflow.com/questions/32247/cant-login-to-so-with-openid-th > e-signature-verification-failed/36583#36583> may be caused because a browser, > an accelerator plugin, or a proxy attempted to repeat the assertion-carrying > GET request (since that's supposed to be safe), and a subsequent request is > the one whose response is displayed in the browser, failing user login. > > <http://meta.stackoverflow.com/questions/32247/cant-login-to-so-with-openid-th > e-signature-verification-failed/36583#36583> > POST is a better fit with the HTTP spec for how the message is actually > processed on the server. I know lately we've been looking for ways to cram > more data into < 2KB payloads so we can get off POST and onto GET since the > user experience is better. But I wonder if we can put our heads together and > figure out how to have our cake and eat it too with this nonce problem. This > error doesn't come up often, but it can come up, apparently does come up, and > is a natural side-effect of the way OpenID communicates. > > Any ideas? > > -- > Andrew Arnott > "I [may] not agree with what you have to say, but I'll defend to the death > your right to say it." - S. G. Tallentyre > _______________________________________________ > specs mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-specs > > > > > _______________________________________________ > specs mailing list > [email protected] > http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-specs >
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