OpenPKG CVS Repository
  http://cvs.openpkg.org/
  ____________________________________________________________________________

  Server: cvs.openpkg.org                  Name:   Ralf S. Engelschall
  Root:   /e/openpkg/cvs                   Email:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Module: openpkg-web                      Date:   04-Aug-2004 17:11:55
  Branch: HEAD                             Handle: 2004080416115500

  Modified files:
    openpkg-web/security    OpenPKG-SA-2004.035-png.txt

  Log:
    cleanups

  Summary:
    Revision    Changes     Path
    1.3         +12 -14     openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2004.035-png.txt
  ____________________________________________________________________________

  patch -p0 <<'@@ .'
  Index: openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2004.035-png.txt
  ============================================================================
  $ cvs diff -u -r1.2 -r1.3 OpenPKG-SA-2004.035-png.txt
  --- openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2004.035-png.txt  4 Aug 2004 14:05:49 -0000      
 1.2
  +++ openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2004.035-png.txt  4 Aug 2004 15:11:55 -0000      
 1.3
  @@ -56,14 +56,13 @@
                        webalizer wml xfig xv
   
   Description:
  -  According to a security advisory [0] from Chris Evans he found and
  -  fixed a couple of problems in the Portable Network Graphics (PNG)
  -  library libpng [1], some of which are security relevant. This OpenPKG
  -  update fixes all known issues.
  +  During a source code audit, Chris Evans discovered several problems in
  +  the Portable Network Graphics (PNG) library libpng [1], some of which
  +  are security relevant. This OpenPKG update fixes all known issues.
   
     A stack-based buffer overflow in libpng which can be triggered to run
  -  arbitrary code by a malicious png file. The Common Vulnerabilities and
  -  Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2004-0597 [2] to the
  +  arbitrary code by a malicious png file. The Common Vulnerabilities
  +  and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2004-0597 [2] to the
     problem.
   
     A NULL-pointer crash in libpng which can be triggered by a malicious
  @@ -74,17 +73,17 @@
     consequences. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project
     assigned the id CAN-2004-0599 [4] to the problem.
   
  -  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm
  -  -q png". If you have the "png" package installed and its version
  -  is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade
  -  it (see Solution) and its dependent packages (see above), if any,
  -  too [5][6].
  +  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/openpkg
  +  rpm -q png". If you have the "png" package installed and its version
  +  is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it
  +  (see Solution) and its dependent packages (see above), if any, too
  +  [5][6].
   
   Solution:
     Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
     [7][8], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [9][10] or a mirror
  -  location, verify its integrity [11], build a corresponding binary RPM
  -  from it [5] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
  +  location, verify its integrity [11], build a corresponding binary
  +  RPM from it [5] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
     binary RPM [6]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.1, perform the
     following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
     other releases adjust accordingly).
  @@ -104,7 +103,6 @@
   ________________________________________________________________________
   
   References:
  -  [0] http://www.example.com/bugfinder.html
     [1] http://www.libpng.org/pub/png/
     [2] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0597
     [3] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0598
  @@ .
______________________________________________________________________
The OpenPKG Project                                    www.openpkg.org
CVS Repository Commit List                     [EMAIL PROTECTED]

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