OpenPKG CVS Repository
http://cvs.openpkg.org/
____________________________________________________________________________
Server: cvs.openpkg.org Name: Michael Schloh
Root: /e/openpkg/cvs Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Module: openpkg-web Date: 14-Jan-2005 16:43:15
Branch: HEAD Handle: 2005011415431500
Added files:
openpkg-web/security OpenPKG-SA-2005.002-sudo.txt
Log:
SA-2005.002 (CAN-2004-1051) describes sudo's bash variable cleansing design
flaw in rebuild_env()
Summary:
Revision Changes Path
1.1 +79 -0 openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2005.002-sudo.txt
____________________________________________________________________________
patch -p0 <<'@@ .'
Index: openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2005.002-sudo.txt
============================================================================
$ cvs diff -u -r0 -r1.1 OpenPKG-SA-2005.002-sudo.txt
--- /dev/null 2005-01-14 16:43:15 +0100
+++ OpenPKG-SA-2005.002-sudo.txt 2005-01-14 16:43:15 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project
+http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
+OpenPKG-SA-2005.002 14-Jan-2005
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+Package: sudo
+Vulnerability: arbitrary code execution
+OpenPKG Specific: no
+
+Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages:
+OpenPKG CURRENT <= sudo-1.6.8p1-20041104 >= sudo-1.6.8p2-20041112
+OpenPKG 2.2 <= sudo-1.6.8p1-2.2.1 >= sudo-1.6.8p1-2.2.2
+OpenPKG 2.1 <= sudo-1.6.7p5-2.1.1 >= sudo-1.6.7p5-2.1.2
+
+Dependent Packages: none
+
+Description:
+ Liam Helmer discovered a design flaw in sudo [0], a program used to
+ control user privilege escalation. The sudo function rebuild_env()
+ fails to sufficiently clean potentially dangerous variables from
+ the environment passed to the program to be executed. An attacker
+ with sudo access to a shell script that uses bash may therefore run
+ arbitrary commands with other (including superuser) privileges. The
+ Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the
+ identifier CAN-2004-1051 [1] to the problem.
+
+ Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/openpkg
+ rpm -q sudo". If you have the "sudo" package installed and its version
+ is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it
+ (see Solution) [2][3].
+
+Workaround:
+ Add a line to the sudoers file containing the text 'Defaults env_reset'.
+ This causes the environment to only contain the variables HOME, LOGNAME,
+ PATH, SHELL, TERM, and USER, thus preventing an attack. Please ignore
+ this workaround and instead apply the full solution as described below.
+
+Solution:
+ Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
+ [4][5], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [6][7] or a mirror
+ location, verify its integrity [8], build a corresponding binary RPM
+ from it [2] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
+ binary RPM [3]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.2, perform the
+ following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
+ other releases adjust accordingly).
+
+ $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
+ ftp> bin
+ ftp> cd release/2.2/UPD
+ ftp> get sudo-1.6.8p1-2.2.2.src.rpm
+ ftp> bye
+ $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -v --checksig sudo-1.6.8p1-2.2.2.src.rpm
+ $ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm --rebuild sudo-1.6.8p1-2.2.2.src.rpm
+ $ su -
+ # <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/sudo-1.6.8p1-2.2.2.*.rpm
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+References:
+ [0] http://www.sudo.ws/
+ [1] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-1051
+ [2] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
+ [3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
+ [4] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/sudo-1.6.8p1-2.2.2.src.rpm
+ [5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.1/UPD/sudo-1.6.7p5-2.1.2.src.rpm
+ [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/
+ [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.1/UPD/
+ [8] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
+OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
+OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
+hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
+for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
+________________________________________________________________________
+
@@ .
______________________________________________________________________
The OpenPKG Project www.openpkg.org
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