OpenPKG CVS Repository
  http://cvs.openpkg.org/
  ____________________________________________________________________________

  Server: cvs.openpkg.org                  Name:   Michael Schloh
  Root:   /e/openpkg/cvs                   Email:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Module: openpkg-web                      Date:   18-Feb-2003 14:38:25
  Branch: HEAD                             Handle: 2003021813382500

  Added files:
    openpkg-web/security    OpenPKG-SA-2003.010-php.txt

  Log:
    New security advisory to address PHP security advisory 17. Feburary
    2003.

  Summary:
    Revision    Changes     Path
    1.1         +95 -0      openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.010-php.txt
  ____________________________________________________________________________

  patch -p0 <<'@@ .'
  Index: openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.010-php.txt
  ============================================================================
  $ cvs diff -u -r0 -r1.1 OpenPKG-SA-2003.010-php.txt
  --- /dev/null 2003-02-18 14:38:25.000000000 +0100
  +++ OpenPKG-SA-2003.010-php.txt       2003-02-18 14:38:25.000000000 +0100
  @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
  +
  +________________________________________________________________________
  +
  +OpenPKG Security Advisory                            The OpenPKG Project
  +http://www.openpkg.org/security.html              http://www.openpkg.org
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]                         [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  +OpenPKG-SA-2003.010                                          18-Feb-2003
  +________________________________________________________________________
  +
  +Package:             php, apache
  +Vulnerability:       arbitrary file access and code execution
  +OpenPKG Specific:    no
  +
  +Affected Releases:   Affected Packages:          Corrected Packages:
  +OpenPKG CURRENT      == php-4.3.0-20030115       >= php-4.3.1-20030218
  +                     == apache-1.3.27-20030212   >= apache-1.3.27-20030218
  +                     == apache-1.3.27-20030211   >= apache-1.3.27-20030218
  +                     == apache-1.3.27-20030210   >= apache-1.3.27-20030218
  +                     == apache-1.3.27-20030207   >= apache-1.3.27-20030218
  +                     == apache-1.3.27-20030206   >= apache-1.3.27-20030218
  +                     == apache-1.3.27-20030202   >= apache-1.3.27-20030218
  +                     == apache-1.3.27-20030123   >= apache-1.3.27-20030218
  +                     == apache-1.3.27-20030119   >= apache-1.3.27-20030218
  +                     == apache-1.3.27-20030116   >= apache-1.3.27-20030218
  +                     == apache-1.3.27-20030107   >= apache-1.3.27-20030218
  +                     == apache-1.3.27-20030103   >= apache-1.3.27-20030218
  +                     == apache-1.3.27-20021230   >= apache-1.3.27-20030218
  +                     == apache-1.3.27-20021228   >= apache-1.3.27-20030218
  +OpenPKG 1.2          == php-4.3.0-1.2.0          >= php-4.3.0-1.2.1
  +                     == apache-1.3.27-1.2.0      >= apache-1.3.27-1.2.1
  +OpenPKG 1.1          none                        n.a.
  +
  +Dependent Packages:  none
  +
  +Description:
  +  Kosmas Skiadopoulos discovered a serious security vulnerability [0] in
  +  the CGI SAPI of PHP version 4.3.0. PHP [1] contains code for preventing
  +  direct access to the CGI binary with configure option
  +  '--enable-force-cgi-redirect' and php.ini option 'cgi.force_redirect'.
  +  In PHP 4.3.0 there is a bug which renders these options useless. Please
  +  note that this bug does NOT affect any of the other SAPI modules such as
  +  the Apache or ISAPI modules.
  +
  +  Anyone with access to websites hosted on a web server which employs the
  +  CGI module may exploit this vulnerability to gain access to any file
  +  readable by the user under which the webserver runs. A remote attacker
  +  could also trick PHP into executing arbitrary PHP code if attacker is
  +  able to inject the code into files accessible by the CGI. This could be
  +  for example the web server access-logs.
  +
  +  Please check whether you are affected by running '<prefix>/bin/rpm -qa |
  +  grep php'. If you have either the 'php' or 'apache with mod_php'
  +  packages installed and their version is affected (see above), we
  +  recommend that you immediately upgrade (see Solution) [2][3].
  +
  +Solution:
  +  Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
  +  [4][5], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [6] or a mirror location,
  +  verify its integrity [7], build a corresponding binary RPM from it [2]
  +  and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary RPM [3].
  +  For the release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the following operations to
  +  permanently fix the security problem for apache with mod_php. For
  +  other releases adjust this recipe accordingly.
  +
  +  $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
  +  ftp> bin
  +  ftp> cd release/1.2/UPD
  +  ftp> get apache-1.3.27-1.2.1.src.rpm
  +  ftp> bye
  +  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig apache-1.3.27-1.2.1.src.rpm
  +  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild apache-1.3.27-1.2.1.src.rpm --define 'with_mod_php 
yes'
  +  $ su -
  +  # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/apache-1.3.27-1.2.1.*.rpm
  +________________________________________________________________________
  +
  +References:
  +  [0] http://www.php.net/release_4_3_1.php
  +  [1] http://www.php.net/
  +  [2] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
  +  [3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
  +  [4] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/php-4.3.0-1.2.1.src.rpm
  +  [5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/apache-1.3.27-1.2.1.src.rpm
  +  [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/
  +  [7] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
  +________________________________________________________________________
  +
  +For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with
  +the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>" (ID 63C4CB9F)
  +of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL
  +http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To
  +check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by
  +using GnuPG (http://www.gnupg.org/). For instance, pipe this message to
  +the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com".
  +________________________________________________________________________
  +
  @@ .
______________________________________________________________________
The OpenPKG Project                                    www.openpkg.org
CVS Repository Commit List                     [EMAIL PROTECTED]

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