OpenPKG CVS Repository
http://cvs.openpkg.org/
____________________________________________________________________________
Server: cvs.openpkg.org Name: Ralf S. Engelschall
Root: /e/openpkg/cvs Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Module: openpkg-web Date: 19-Feb-2003 16:42:57
Branch: HEAD Handle: 2003021915425700
Modified files:
openpkg-web/security OpenPKG-SA-2003.013-openssl.txt
Log:
final text polishing
Summary:
Revision Changes Path
1.8 +15 -15 openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.013-openssl.txt
____________________________________________________________________________
patch -p0 <<'@@ .'
Index: openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.013-openssl.txt
============================================================================
$ cvs diff -u -r1.7 -r1.8 OpenPKG-SA-2003.013-openssl.txt
--- openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.013-openssl.txt 19 Feb 2003 15:42:03
-0000 1.7
+++ openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.013-openssl.txt 19 Feb 2003 15:42:57
-0000 1.8
@@ -36,24 +36,24 @@
sitecopy snmp socat stunnel sysmon tcpdump w3m
Description:
- In an upcoming CRYPTO 2003 paper, Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen
- (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)
- describe and demonstrate a timing-based attack on CBC ciphersuites
- in SSL and TLS. According to an OpenSSL security advisory [0],
- the OpenSSL implementation is vulnerable to this attack. The
+ In an upcoming CRYPTO 2003 paper, Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain
+ Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL,
+ Ilion) describe and demonstrate a timing-based attack on SSL/TLS
+ with CBC ciphersuites. According to an OpenSSL security advisory
+ [0], the OpenSSL implementation is vulnerable to this attack. The
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id
CAN-2003-0078 [2] to the problem.
- The attack assumes that multiple SSL or TLS connections involve a
- common fixed plaintext block, such as a password. An active attacker
- can substitute specifically made-up ciphertext blocks for blocks sent
+ The attack assumes that multiple SSL/TLS connections involve a common
+ fixed plaintext block, such as a password. An active attacker can
+ substitute specifically made-up ciphertext blocks for blocks sent
by legitimate SSL/TLS parties and measure the time until a response
- arrives: SSL/TLS includes data authentication to ensure that such
+ arrives. SSL/TLS includes data authentication to ensure that such
modified ciphertext blocks will be rejected by the peer (and the
connection aborted), but the attacker may be able to use timing
observations to distinguish between two different error cases, namely
block cipher padding errors and MAC verification errors.
-
+
This is sufficient for an adaptive attack that finally can obtain the
complete plaintext block. Although this cannot be easily exploited,
because the attack requires the ability to be a man-in-the-middle,
@@ -67,11 +67,11 @@
MAC verification was still skipped after detection of a padding error,
which allowed the timing attack.
- Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm
- -q openssl". If you have the "openssl" package installed and its version
- is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade
- it (see Solution) and it's dependent packages (see above), if any,
- too. [3][4]
+ Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q
+ openssl". If you have the "openssl" package installed and its version
+ is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it
+ (see Solution) and it's dependent packages (see above), if any, too.
+ [3][4]
Solution:
Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
@@ .
______________________________________________________________________
The OpenPKG Project www.openpkg.org
CVS Repository Commit List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
