OpenPKG CVS Repository
http://cvs.openpkg.org/
____________________________________________________________________________
Server: cvs.openpkg.org Name: Ralf S. Engelschall
Root: /e/openpkg/cvs Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Module: openpkg-web Date: 04-Mar-2003 16:36:41
Branch: HEAD Handle: 2003030415364100
Added files:
openpkg-web/security OpenPKG-SA-2003.015-zlib.txt
Log:
first cut for the whole zlib SA
Summary:
Revision Changes Path
1.1 +103 -0 openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.015-zlib.txt
____________________________________________________________________________
patch -p0 <<'@@ .'
Index: openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.015-zlib.txt
============================================================================
$ cvs diff -u -r0 -r1.1 OpenPKG-SA-2003.015-zlib.txt
--- /dev/null 2003-03-04 16:36:41.000000000 +0100
+++ OpenPKG-SA-2003.015-zlib.txt 2003-03-04 16:36:41.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project
+http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
+OpenPKG-SA-2003.015 03-Mar-2003
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+Package: zlib
+Vulnerability: denial of service, code execution
+OpenPKG Specific: no
+
+Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages:
+OpenPKG CURRENT <= zlib-1.1.4-20020312 >= zlib-1.1.4-20030227
+OpenPKG 1.2 <= zlib-1.1.4-1.2.0 >= zlib-1.1.4-1.2.1
+OpenPKG 1.1 <= zlib-1.1.4-1.1.0 >= zlib-1.1.4-1.1.1
+
+Affected Releases: Dependent Packages:
+OpenPKG CURRENT bar quux
+OpenPKG 1.2 bar quux
+OpenPKG 1.1 bar
+
+Description:
+ The zlib [0] compression library provides an API function gzprintf()
+ which is a convinient printf(3) style formatted output function
+ based on zlib's raw output function gzwrite(). Richard Kettlewell
+ discovered [1] that the implementation of gzprintf() by default uses
+ the portable but unsecure vsprintf(3) function (subject to buffer
+ overflow), although optionally one was able to enable the use of the
+ secure vsnprintf(3) function. Unfortunately, even the optional use
+ of vsnprintf(3) did not take the function return value (number of
+ characters which were written or which would have been written in case
+ a truncation took place) into account.
+
+ As a result gzprintf() will smash the run-time stack if called with
+ arguments that expand to more than Z_PRINTF_BUFSIZE (= 4096 by
+ default) bytes. This allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service
+ (DoS) or possibly execute arbitrary code. The Common Vulnerabilities
+ and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2003-0107 [2] to the
+ problem.
+
+ The OpenPKG zlib packages were fixed by adding the necessary configure
+ script checks to always use the secure vsnprintf(3). Additionally, the
+ code was adjusted to correctly take into account the return value of
+ vsnprintf(3) and especially makes sure that truncated writes are not
+ performed (which in turn can lead to new security issues).
+
+ NOTICE: Keep in mind that our particular code changes fix the
+ problems on our six officially supported Unix platforms only (FreeBSD
+ 4/5, Debian 2.2/3.0 and Solaris 8/9). It is not a general solution
+ applicable to arbitrary Unix platforms where OpenPKG might also work.
+
+ Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm
+ -q zlib". If you have the "zlib" package installed and its version
+ is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade
+ it (see Solution) and it's dependent packages (see above), if any,
+ too. [3][4]
+
+Solution:
+ Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
+ [5][6], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [7][8] or a mirror
+ location, verify its integrity [9], build a corresponding binary RPM
+ from it [3] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary
+ RPM [4]. For the current release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the following
+ operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases
+ adjust accordingly).
+
+ $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
+ ftp> bin
+ ftp> cd release/1.2/UPD
+ ftp> get zlib-1.1.4-1.2.1.src.rpm
+ ftp> bye
+ $ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig zlib-1.1.4-1.2.1.src.rpm
+ $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild zlib-1.1.4-1.2.1.src.rpm
+ $ su -
+ # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/zlib-1.1.4-1.2.1.*.rpm
+
+ Additionally, we recommend that you rebuild and reinstall
+ all dependent packages (see above), if any, too. [3][4]
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+References:
+ [0] http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
+ [1] http://online.securityfocus.com/archive/1/312869
+ [2] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0107
+ [3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
+ [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
+ [5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/zlib-1.1.4-1.1.1.src.rpm
+ [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/zlib-1.1.4-1.2.1.src.rpm
+ [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/
+ [8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/
+ [9] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with
+the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>" (ID 63C4CB9F)
+of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL
+http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To
+check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by
+using GnuPG (http://www.gnupg.org/). For instance, pipe this message to
+the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com".
+________________________________________________________________________
+
@@ .
______________________________________________________________________
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