OpenPKG CVS Repository
  http://cvs.openpkg.org/
  ____________________________________________________________________________

  Server: cvs.openpkg.org                  Name:   Ralf S. Engelschall
  Root:   /e/openpkg/cvs                   Email:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Module: openpkg-web                      Date:   14-Mar-2003 22:28:25
  Branch: HEAD                             Handle: 2003031421282400

  Modified files:
    openpkg-web/security    OpenPKG-SA-2003.018-qpopper.txt

  Log:
    final polishing and signing

  Summary:
    Revision    Changes     Path
    1.2         +23 -14     openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.018-qpopper.txt
  ____________________________________________________________________________

  patch -p0 <<'@@ .'
  Index: openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.018-qpopper.txt
  ============================================================================
  $ cvs diff -u -r1.1 -r1.2 OpenPKG-SA-2003.018-qpopper.txt
  --- openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.018-qpopper.txt      14 Mar 2003 10:23:29 
-0000      1.1
  +++ openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.018-qpopper.txt      14 Mar 2003 21:28:24 
-0000      1.2
  @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
  +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
  +Hash: SHA1
  +
   ________________________________________________________________________
   
   OpenPKG Security Advisory                            The OpenPKG Project
  @@ -19,23 +22,23 @@
   
   Description:
     According to Florian Heinz [0] a remote code execution vulnerability
  -  exists in version 4.0.4 of the qpopper POP3 server [1]. Attackers may
  -  remotely exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code under
  -  the user id of a mailbox owner and the 'mail' group id.
  -
  -  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm
  -  -q qpopper". If you have the "qpopper" package installed and its version
  -  is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade
  -  it (see Solution). [2][4]
  +  exists in the QPopper POP3 server [1]. Attackers may remotely exploit
  +  this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code under the user id of a
  +  mailbox owner and the "mail" group id.
  +
  +  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q
  +  qpopper". If you have the "qpopper" package installed and its version
  +  is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it
  +  (see Solution). [2][3]
   
   Solution:
     Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
  -  [4][6], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [7][8] or a mirror
  +  [4][5], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [6][7] or a mirror
     location, verify its integrity [8], build a corresponding binary RPM
  -  from it [2] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary
  -  RPM [3]. For the current release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the following
  -  operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases
  -  adjust accordingly).
  +  from it [2] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
  +  binary RPM [3]. For the current release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the
  +  following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
  +  other releases adjust accordingly).
   
     $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
     ftp> bin
  @@ -46,7 +49,6 @@
     $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild qpopper-4.0.4-1.2.1.src.rpm
     $ su -
     # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/qpopper-4.0.4-1.2.1.*.rpm
  -
   ________________________________________________________________________
   
   References:
  @@ -70,3 +72,10 @@
   the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com".
   ________________________________________________________________________
   
  +-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
  +Comment: OpenPKG <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
  +
  +iD8DBQE+ckkwgHWT4GPEy58RAosEAJ9ROxlBdCptZ096uBg1KF9eaFw6oQCgy7gT
  +uzDTkM+4oxfNfMVrF0U+kcA=
  +=NNhb
  +-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
  @@ .
______________________________________________________________________
The OpenPKG Project                                    www.openpkg.org
CVS Repository Commit List                     [EMAIL PROTECTED]

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