OpenPKG CVS Repository
  http://cvs.openpkg.org/
  ____________________________________________________________________________

  Server: cvs.openpkg.org                  Name:   Ralf S. Engelschall
  Root:   /e/openpkg/cvs                   Email:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Module: openpkg-web                      Date:   17-Mar-2003 14:58:06
  Branch: HEAD                             Handle: 2003031713580500

  Added files:
    openpkg-web/security    OpenPKG-SA-2003.019-openssl.txt

  Log:
    add first cut for OpenSSL SA

  Summary:
    Revision    Changes     Path
    1.1         +102 -0     openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.019-openssl.txt
  ____________________________________________________________________________

  patch -p0 <<'@@ .'
  Index: openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.019-openssl.txt
  ============================================================================
  $ cvs diff -u -r0 -r1.1 OpenPKG-SA-2003.019-openssl.txt
  --- /dev/null 2003-03-17 14:58:06.000000000 +0100
  +++ OpenPKG-SA-2003.019-openssl.txt   2003-03-17 14:58:06.000000000 +0100
  @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
  +________________________________________________________________________
  +
  +OpenPKG Security Advisory                            The OpenPKG Project
  +http://www.openpkg.org/security.html              http://www.openpkg.org
  [EMAIL PROTECTED]                         [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  +OpenPKG-SA-2003.019                                          17-Mar-2003
  +________________________________________________________________________
  +
  +Package:             openssl
  +Vulnerability:       timing attack
  +OpenPKG Specific:    no
  +
  +Affected Releases:   Affected Packages:         Corrected Packages:
  +OpenPKG CURRENT      <= openssl-0.9.7a-20030219 >= openssl-0.9.7a-20030317
  +OpenPKG 1.2          <= openssl-0.9.7-1.2.1     >= openssl-0.9.7-1.2.2
  +OpenPKG 1.1          <= openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.1    >= openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.2
  +
  +Affected Releases:   Dependent Packages:
  +
  +OpenPKG CURRENT      apache cadaver cpu curl dsniff easysoap ethereal
  +                     exim fetchmail imap imapd inn linc links lynx mico
  +                     mixmaster mozilla mutt nail neon openldap openvpn
  +                     perl-ssl postfix postgresql qpopper samba sendmail
  +                     siege sio sitecopy socat stunnel subversion sysmon
  +                     w3m wget
  +
  +OpenPKG 1.2          apache cpu curl ethereal fetchmail imap inn
  +                     links lynx mico mutt nail neon openldap perl-ssl
  +                     postfix postgresql qpopper samba sendmail siege
  +                     sitecopy socat stunnel sysmon w3m wget
  +
  +OpenPKG 1.1          apache curl fetchmail inn links lynx mutt neon
  +                     openldap perl-ssl postfix postgresql qpopper samba
  +                     siege sitecopy socat stunnel sysmon w3m
  +
  +Description:
  +  David Brumley and Dan Boneh of Stanford University have researched and
  +  documented a timing attack on RSA private keys. [0] The OpenSSL [1]
  +  RSA implementation is generally vulnerable to these type of attacks
  +  unless RSA blinding has been turned on [2]. Typically, RSA blinding
  +  is not enabled by OpenSSL based applications, mainly because it is
  +  not obvious how to do so when using OpenSSL to provide SSL/TLS. This
  +  problem affects mostly all applications using OpenSSL and have to be
  +  rebuilded against the fixed OpenSSL version (where RSA blinding is now
  +  enabled by default) or have to enable RSA blinding explicitly their
  +  own. The performance impact of RSA blinding appears to be small (a few
  +  percent only) and the RSA functionality is still fully compatible. The
  +  Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the id
  +  CAN-2003-0147 [3] to the problem.
  +
  +  Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q
  +  openssl". If you have the "openssl" package installed and its version
  +  is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it
  +  (see Solution) and it's dependent packages (see above), if any, too.
  +  [4][5]
  +
  +Solution:
  +  Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
  +  [6][7], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [8][9] or a mirror
  +  location, verify its integrity [10], build a corresponding binary RPM
  +  from it [4] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary
  +  RPM [5]. For the current release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the following
  +  operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases
  +  adjust accordingly).
  +
  +  $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
  +  ftp> bin
  +  ftp> cd release/1.2/UPD
  +  ftp> get openssl-0.9.7-1.2.1.src.rpm
  +  ftp> bye
  +  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig openssl-0.9.7-1.2.1.src.rpm
  +  $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild openssl-0.9.7-1.2.1.src.rpm
  +  $ su -
  +  # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/openssl-0.9.7-1.2.1.*.rpm
  +
  +  Additionally, you have to rebuild and reinstall all dependent 
  +  packages (see above), too. [4][5]
  +________________________________________________________________________
  +
  +References:
  +  [0] http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf
  +  [1] http://www.openssl.org/
  +  [2] http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=openssl-announce&m=104790732724755&q=raw
  +  [3] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0147
  +  [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
  +  [5] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
  +  [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/openssl-0.9.6g-1.1.2.src.rpm
  +  [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/openssl-0.9.7-1.2.2.src.rpm
  +  [8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/
  +  [9] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/
  +  [10] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
  +________________________________________________________________________
  +
  +For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with
  +the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>" (ID 63C4CB9F)
  +of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL
  +http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To
  +check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by
  +using GnuPG (http://www.gnupg.org/). For instance, pipe this message to
  +the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com".
  +________________________________________________________________________
  +
  @@ .
______________________________________________________________________
The OpenPKG Project                                    www.openpkg.org
CVS Repository Commit List                     [EMAIL PROTECTED]

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