OpenPKG CVS Repository
http://cvs.openpkg.org/
____________________________________________________________________________
Server: cvs.openpkg.org Name: Ralf S. Engelschall
Root: /e/openpkg/cvs Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Module: openpkg-web Date: 18-Mar-2003 16:26:15
Branch: HEAD Handle: 2003031815261500
Added files:
openpkg-web/security OpenPKG-SA-2003.020-modssl.txt
Modified files:
openpkg-web/security page.pl
Log:
add mod_ssl SA
Summary:
Revision Changes Path
1.1 +93 -0 openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.020-modssl.txt
1.5 +1 -1 openpkg-web/security/page.pl
____________________________________________________________________________
patch -p0 <<'@@ .'
Index: openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.020-modssl.txt
============================================================================
$ cvs diff -u -r0 -r1.1 OpenPKG-SA-2003.020-modssl.txt
--- /dev/null 2003-03-18 16:26:15.000000000 +0100
+++ OpenPKG-SA-2003.020-modssl.txt 2003-03-18 16:26:15.000000000 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA1
+
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project
+http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
+OpenPKG-SA-2003.020 18-Mar-2003
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+Package: apache ("apache::with_mod_ssl = yes" only)
+Vulnerability: local and remote extraction of RSA private key
+OpenPKG Specific: no
+
+Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages:
+OpenPKG CURRENT <= apache-1.3.27-20030305 >= apache-1.3.27-20030318
+OpenPKG 1.2 <= apache-1.3.27-1.2.1 >= apache-1.3.27-1.2.2
+OpenPKG 1.1 <= apache-1.3.26-1.1.3 >= apache-1.3.26-1.1.4
+
+Dependent Packages: none
+
+Description:
+ David Brumley and Dan Boneh of Stanford University have researched
+ and documented a timing attack on OpenSSL which allows local and
+ remote attackers to extract the RSA private key of an SSL/TLS server
+ like Apache/mod_ssl. [0] The OpenSSL [1] RSA implementation is
+ generally vulnerable to these type of attacks unless RSA blinding has
+ been turned on [2].
+
+ RSA blinding previously was not explicitly enabled by mod_ssl. If
+ Apache/mod_ssl is linked against the already fixed OpenSSL versions
+ (see security advisory OpenPKG-SA-2003.019 [3]), the problem is
+ already implicity fixed inside OpenSSL. Nevertheless, mod_ssl 2.8.13
+ now explicitly enables RSA blinding for RSA private keys. For older
+ versions, we include this prevention change in OpenPKG, too.
+
+ Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -q
+ apache" and "<prefix>/bin/rpm -qi apache | grep with_mod_ssl". If you
+ have the "apache" package with option "with_mod_ssl" installed and its
+ version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately
+ upgrade (see Solution) [4][5].
+
+Solution:
+ Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
+ [6][7], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [8][9] or a mirror
+ location, verify its integrity [10], build a corresponding binary RPM
+ from it [4] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary
+ RPM [5]. For the current release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the following
+ operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases
+ adjust accordingly).
+
+ $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
+ ftp> bin
+ ftp> cd release/1.2/UPD
+ ftp> get apache-1.3.27-1.2.2.src.rpm
+ ftp> bye
+ $ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig apache-1.3.27-1.2.2.src.rpm
+ $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild apache-1.3.27-1.2.2.src.rpm
+ $ su -
+ # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/apache-1.3.27-1.2.2.*.rpm
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+References:
+ [0] http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf
+ [1] http://www.openssl.org/
+ [2] http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030317.txt
+ [3] http://www.openpkg.org/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.019-openssl.html
+ [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
+ [5] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
+ [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/apache-1.3.26-1.1.4.src.rpm
+ [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/apache-1.3.27-1.2.2.src.rpm
+ [8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/
+ [9] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/
+ [10] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with
+the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>" (ID 63C4CB9F)
+of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL
+http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To
+check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by
+using GnuPG (http://www.gnupg.org/). For instance, pipe this message to
+the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com".
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+Comment: OpenPKG <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
+
+iD8DBQE+dzpvgHWT4GPEy58RAkgUAKC+xrvk5VySQi2XEtTLckv0w8HnvACfX9RM
+Jij5pwnd0KyHv41pzZQc8wc=
+=ZetT
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
@@ .
patch -p0 <<'@@ .'
Index: openpkg-web/security/page.pl
============================================================================
$ cvs diff -u -r1.4 -r1.5 page.pl
--- openpkg-web/security/page.pl 18 Mar 2003 10:18:04 -0000 1.4
+++ openpkg-web/security/page.pl 18 Mar 2003 15:26:15 -0000 1.5
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
foreach my $sa (reverse sort @SA) {
my ($base, $name) = ($sa =~ m|^(OpenPKG-SA-(.+))\.txt$|);
next if ($name =~ m|^0000|);
- next if ($name =~ m|^2003\.02[0-3]|);
+ next if ($name =~ m|^2003\.02[1-9]|);
$sidebar .= "<a href=\"$base.html\">$name</a><br>";
}
@@ .
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