OpenPKG CVS Repository
http://cvs.openpkg.org/
____________________________________________________________________________
Server: cvs.openpkg.org Name: Ralf S. Engelschall
Root: /e/openpkg/cvs Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Module: openpkg-web Date: 11-Jun-2003 13:04:02
Branch: HEAD Handle: 2003061112040100
Added files:
openpkg-web/security OpenPKG-SA-2003.031-gzip.txt
Modified files:
openpkg-web/security page.pl
Log:
add gzip SA
Summary:
Revision Changes Path
1.1 +85 -0 openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.031-gzip.txt
1.17 +1 -1 openpkg-web/security/page.pl
____________________________________________________________________________
patch -p0 <<'@@ .'
Index: openpkg-web/security/OpenPKG-SA-2003.031-gzip.txt
============================================================================
$ cvs diff -u -r0 -r1.1 OpenPKG-SA-2003.031-gzip.txt
--- /dev/null 2003-06-11 13:04:01.000000000 +0200
+++ OpenPKG-SA-2003.031-gzip.txt 2003-06-11 13:04:01.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA1
+
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project
+http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
+OpenPKG-SA-2003.031 11-Jun-2003
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+Package: gzip
+Vulnerability: insecure creation of temporary files
+OpenPKG Specific: no
+
+Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages:
+OpenPKG CURRENT <= gzip-1.3.5-20030409 >= gzip-1.3.5-20030610
+OpenPKG 1.2 <= gzip-1.3.5-1.2.0 >= gzip-1.3.5-1.2.1
+OpenPKG 1.1 <= gzip-1.3.3-1.1.0 >= gzip-1.3.3-1.1.1
+
+Dependent Packages: none
+
+Description:
+ According to a Debian security advisory [0], based on hints from Paul
+ Szabo, a vulnerability exists in the creation of temporary files in
+ the znew(1) utility contained in GNU Zip (gzip) [1]. The GNU Bash
+ based znew(1) shell script tried to prevent itself from overwriting
+ existing files on shell redirection by using the POSIX "noclobber"
+ shell option, but accidentally forgot to check for the results, and
+ in case of existing files, stop further processing. This allowed a
+ classical "symlink" attack. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
+ (CVE) project assigned the id CAN-2003-0367 [2] to the problem.
+
+ Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm
+ -q gzip". If you have the "gzip" package installed and its version
+ is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade
+ it (see Solution). [3][4]
+
+Solution:
+ Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
+ [5][6], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [7][8] or a mirror
+ location, verify its integrity [9], build a corresponding binary RPM
+ from it [3] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary
+ RPM [4]. For the current release OpenPKG 1.2, perform the following
+ operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases
+ adjust accordingly).
+
+ $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
+ ftp> bin
+ ftp> cd release/1.2/UPD
+ ftp> get gzip-1.3.5-1.2.1.src.rpm
+ ftp> bye
+ $ <prefix>/bin/rpm -v --checksig gzip-1.3.5-1.2.1.src.rpm
+ $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild gzip-1.3.5-1.2.1.src.rpm
+ $ su -
+ # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/gzip-1.3.5-1.2.1.*.rpm
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+References:
+ [0] http://www.debian.org/security/2003/dsa-308
+ [1] http://www.gzip.org/
+ [2] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0367
+ [3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
+ [4] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
+ [5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/gzip-1.3.3-1.1.1.src.rpm
+ [6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/gzip-1.3.5-1.2.1.src.rpm
+ [7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.1/UPD/
+ [8] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.2/UPD/
+ [9] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
+OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
+OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
+hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
+for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
+________________________________________________________________________
+
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+Comment: OpenPKG <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
+
+iD8DBQE+5wxwgHWT4GPEy58RAo7HAJ9wSKcl4OYE8REbyFh78RLVdUrgkwCggtov
+FVTXv08CamBk5CgoW3mYDWM=
+=ClM5
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
@@ .
patch -p0 <<'@@ .'
Index: openpkg-web/security/page.pl
============================================================================
$ cvs diff -u -r1.16 -r1.17 page.pl
--- openpkg-web/security/page.pl 3 Jun 2003 13:44:01 -0000 1.16
+++ openpkg-web/security/page.pl 11 Jun 2003 11:04:01 -0000 1.17
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
foreach my $sa (reverse sort @SA) {
my ($base, $name, $year) = ($sa =~ m|^(OpenPKG-SA-((\d+)\..+))\.txt$|);
next if ($name =~ m|^0000|);
- next if ($name =~ m|^2003\.03[1-9]|);
+ next if ($name =~ m|^2003\.03[2-9]|);
if ($this_year ne $year) {
$sidebar .= "<br>\n";
$this_year = $year;
@@ .
______________________________________________________________________
The OpenPKG Project www.openpkg.org
CVS Repository Commit List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
