Wrong. This function (and others classified thus) have a very real potential for DOS attacks. Calling them with a random argument will cause a request to the ROBUST services which could be inundated with 10s of thousands of requests by abusers with build/script rights. There is no limit or throttle on them.
- Melanie On 03/08/2015 15:50, Oren Hurvitz wrote: > But what do you think the threat level *should* be? I think this is a safe > function that should be callable by everyone, since names and avatar UUID's > are public knowledge. > > On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 4:46 PM, Mister Blue <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Changing the ThreatLevel as opposed to changing the entry in >> 'osslEnable.ini' would cause existing installation that are using >> ThreatLevels as os function control to allow these functions. The >> ThreatLevel change would change regions that enable os functions but only >> the VeryLow functions. Are there many regions that do this? >> >> As an alternative, leave it ThreatLevel 'low' but change the entry in >> osslEnable.ini to 'true'. This would enable the function for all while >> keeping the previous threat note. Region owners who are using the >> ThreatLevel for control will probably think this is set at the level they >> need. Those who are not using ThreatLevel (and are probably just using the >> osslEnable.ini settings) wouldn't mind changing these functions to be >> enabled. >> >> Also, if changing ThreatLevel is a Good Thing, consider changing >> osGetGridName and osGetGridNick to VeryLow as these functions are needed by >> scripts while HGing. These are already 'true' in osslEnable.ini. >> >> == mb >> >> On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 5:44 AM, Oren Hurvitz <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Currently, osAvatarName2Key has ThreatLevel "Low" and is further >>> restricted to the estate manager or owner. >>> >>> A pending patch will change the permission to VeryLow, and allow the >>> function to be called by anyone. >>> >>> I think that's fine: this doesn't seem like a sensitive function. Is >>> there any reason not to allow this? >>> >>> And while we're at it, osKey2Name is similarly restricted, and I think it >>> should similarly be allowed to be called by anyone. >>> >>> -- >>> Oren Hurvitz >>> VP R&D >>> Kitely Ltd. >>> >>> Email: [email protected] <[email protected]> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Opensim-dev mailing list >>> [email protected] >>> http://opensimulator.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/opensim-dev >>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Opensim-dev mailing list >> [email protected] >> http://opensimulator.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/opensim-dev >> >> > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Opensim-dev mailing list > [email protected] > http://opensimulator.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/opensim-dev _______________________________________________ Opensim-dev mailing list [email protected] http://opensimulator.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/opensim-dev
