Uh right, but should the language talking about a potential major release binding be removed, then I think the following discussion still becomes relevant.
Then again, maybe we should just derail this in general, just because this seems to have become rather "non-obvious"? (That's a question, not a statement.) GO LAKERS! - jek3 Garrett D'Amore wrote: > Can we stop arguing about this at this point? I think Joe asked for > the case to be modified to remove the contentious language. Either it > will, and all this argument is moot, or it won't, and the case will be > derailed. > > If the former, then having this discussion now is a waste of time. > > If the latter, then having this discussion right now is probably still > a waste of time, because at that point the project team is probably > going to need to prepare more complete case materials. > > Submitter, I haven't noticed, has the spec for this case been updated > as Joe requested? Or are you declining to do so? > > -- Garrett > > Darren Reed wrote: >> james hughes wrote: >> >>> >>> On May 13, 2008, at 4:50 PM, Bart Smaalders wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> How do I log into and configure a blank system image? Is a default >>>> account created that has this privilege, or does the lack of such >>>> an account mean that the system must be repaired by booting >>>> from alternate media? >>> >>> >>> Loosing or breaking the administrator's account is identical to >>> loosing root password. >>> >>>> How will we insure that there are real administrative users present >>>> in the password file? >>> >>> >>> The real administrative users present in the password file because >>> the initial installation put it there. >>> >>> This is not about the elimination of root as a much as it is the >>> ability to create a machine that has a no root password. Previous >>> methods of having root have a password are still possible. >> >> >> Are you not creating a root account or are you creating a root account >> but not using the root username? >> >> If you're creating a system administration account, but simply under >> another name, then there is no security benefit from this change - >> except that someone now has to "guess" the administration account >> name if they don't know it already... >> >> ...and this is where Windows is at today: it's come from having >> "administrator" as the default "root" account to creating a user >> account at install (using your name) that has full privilege, >> meaning malware likely has the required privilege it needs when >> opened via Outlook, even though the user who is logged in is >> not called "administrator", they still have "administrator" power. >> Net result: you have to guess an account name to try and login >> to the system with before going further. >> >> If there is no followup to this case to make the prescribed >> changes to root then I'd like the following questions to be >> answered as part of this case (if it hasn't been derailed yet): >> >> What are the security threats that this change is intended >> to provide protection from? >> >> How does this change mitigate the security threats that >> it is intending to provide protection from? >> >> What are the security risks that this change introduces? >> >> Darren >> > >
