Casper Dik writes: > char *stpcpy(char *restrict s1, const char *restrict s2); > char *stpncpy(char *restrict s1, const char *restrict s2, size_t n); > wchar_t *wcpcpy(wchar_t restrict *ws1, const wchar_t *restrict ws2); > wchar_t *wcpncpy(wchar_t restrict *ws1, const wchar_t *restrict ws2, > size_t > n);
The lint maintainers be notified so that they can add stpcpy and wcpcpy to their list of security-questionable functions warned about via -errsecurity. (At least file an RFE.) This looks to me like a standards-related blunder. "stpncpy" and "wcpncpy" functionality (strncpy-like zero pad to end of the buffer, *and* leaving full destination buffers unterminated) doesn't seem to make much sense in this context. I think it's a shame they didn't do stplcpy and wcplcpy instead. Do we have anyone involved in the standards process who could add comments? Apart from that, big sigh, nose held, and +1. -- James Carlson, Solaris Networking <james.d.carlson at sun.com> Sun Microsystems / 35 Network Drive 71.232W Vox +1 781 442 2084 MS UBUR02-212 / Burlington MA 01803-2757 42.496N Fax +1 781 442 1677
