On Dec 2, 2009, at 4:04 PM, Glenn Skinner wrote: > > On Dec 2, 2009, at 2:55 PM, Jerry Gilliam wrote: > >> >> An updated spec for this case, included below, is now ready for >> review as a fast-track. The spec includes marks where changed. >> I've reset the timer for a week, to 12/09/2009. > > ... >> The acpihpd is started and stopped using the standard Solaris >> service >> management facility. The acpihpd is an smf service, and will only >> be enabled on >> the platforms which supports IOH/CPU/memory hot plug via an i86pc >> specific | >> profile. Unfortunately, the service has to run as root as it >> relies on the | >> sysevent library which will reject any request from a non-root >> user. The | >> privileges will be restricted to 'basic,! >> proc_info,sys_config,sys_mount, | >> sys_devices'. >> | > > I realize that this case is just working with what it's given and > that that's why running as root is required, but why does the > sysevent library make explicit checks for root in the first place? > Is there something that prevents it from expecting its clients to > have suitable privileges and simply passing failures due to > insufficient privilege back to its clients? > > Stated a bit differently, I'm wondering whether a bug should be > filed against the sysevent library for non-conformance to the > Solaris privilege architecture.
Glenn, It's already been filed: 6816881 sysevent_bind_handle() includes uid==0 check --Mike > > -- Glenn >
