On Wed, Jan 06, 2010 at 11:51:19AM -0800, Gary Winiger wrote:
> For some reason, this never made it to the case log or my inbox.
> Sorry for the delay.
> 
> > From: Richard L. Hamilton <rlhamil at smart.net>
> > To: opensolaris-arc at opensolaris.org
> > Subject: Re: User object audit token [PSARC/2010/001 FastTrack timeout
> > 01/11/2010]
> > Date: Sat, 02 Jan 2010 05:39:59 -0800 (PST)
> > 
> > Is the user SID also in audit output?  If it isn't, shouldn't it be, if 
> > available, esp.
> > if the UID is ephemeral?  Wouldn't it be worth recording for forensics?
> 
>       The short answer is no presuming SIDs are Windows Security IDs
>       as opposed to Solaris Audit Session IDs.
> 
>       Windows SIDs are not presently part of OpenSolaris.  Auditing
>       covers identified and authenticated users logged into OpenSolaris.
>       No OpenSolaris user has an ephemeral user ID.  The purpose of

Well, I think you're splitting hairs.  SIDs are definitely part of
OpenSolaris, in ZFS, cred_t, the SMB stack, and the NFSv4 stack even, as
well as libsec consumers like chmod(1) and ls(1).

True, SIDs are represented as UIDs and GIDs -- ephemeral ones when no
mapping to a real Unix user/group can be found -- in all places where
there's no choice but to use UIDs/GIDs (or where there are standard
interfaces that use UIDs/GIDs).  But that's not the same thing as "SIDs
are not ... part of OpenSolaris".

>       the user object token is to represent a user as the object
>       of some action, not as the subject of an action.  In particular,
>       as noted in the case "passwd -f" auditing would be served well
>       by being able to express the user as an object in a searchable
>       way.  Thus, the motivation for this new token.

Indeed, this case is not about the subject of an audit record, but about
an object that a an audit record is about.  In this case there's no need
for SIDs because the relevant admin interfaces currently can't be used
to admin non-Unix Windows users/groups.

Nico
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