The branch OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable has been updated
       via  f1fd279cceb9eb7a0294a1eab8345c3193f40a0a (commit)
      from  a10765c2e0e94d2cd30711339d2ba3f3a244a206 (commit)


- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit f1fd279cceb9eb7a0294a1eab8345c3193f40a0a
Author: Matt Caswell <m...@openssl.org>
Date:   Fri Oct 4 14:01:21 2019 +0100

    Send bad_record_mac instead of decryption_failed
    
    The decryption failed alert was deprecated a long time ago. It can
    provide an attacker too much information to be able to distinguish between
    MAC failures and decryption failures and can lead to oracle attacks.
    Instead we should always use the bad_record_mac alert for these issues.
    This fixes one instance that still exists. It does not represent a
    security issue in this case because it is only ever sent if the record is
    publicly invalid, i.e. we have detected it is invalid without using any
    secret material.
    
    Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tm...@fedoraproject.org>
    (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10093)
    
    (cherry picked from commit 37133290832ac2d1389926eba7325125fdacbe8d)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 ssl/record/ssl3_record.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
index d116ff0e90..d406adfb93 100644
--- a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
+++ b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
             RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
             return 1;
         }
-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
                  SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
         return -1;
     }

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