On Sun Jun 29 10:51:32 2014, [email protected] wrote: > > Well, I believe that security implications due to key/IV reuse happen > with all ciphers not just AES in gcm mode, right? There must have > been some very good reasons to introduce EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy in the > first place. >
The implications vary from one cipher mode to another. AES GCM uses counter mode and repeated IVs have rather severe consquences. See for example SP800-38D Appendix A. > Concerning my own use case, I was using EVP_CIPHER_CTX handle as a > "cipher template" - i.e. select a cipher and set a key; foreach > data block clone the context, set IV and decrypt. > Ah now that is a legitimate use case as long as you make sure the IVs are unique. I'll apply your fix. Steve. -- Dr Stephen N. Henson. OpenSSL project core developer. Commercial tech support now available see: http://www.openssl.org ______________________________________________________________________ OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org Development Mailing List [email protected] Automated List Manager [email protected]
