Haz? Is that some kind of devops-speak I am not (yet) aware of?
Ted (a grand-father) On 3 October 2017 at 18:36, Salz, Rich via openssl-dev < openssl-dev@openssl.org> wrote: > Some people have asked why TLS 1.3 isn’t available yet. This might help; > it’s a draft of a posting for my company’s blog. > > > > > > Can I Haz TLS 1.3 ? > > > > Everybody wants to be able to use TLS 1.3. Among the reasons are: > > It’s faster – being able to reconnect to a server you’ve > previously used, and saving a full round-trip latency is impressive. > > It’s more reliable – the protocol has been cleaned up and > simplified. For example, the related concepts of sessions, tickets, and > pre-shared keys are merged and treated consistently. To a protocol > designer, it is much more elegant, and therefore much easier to implement > > It’s more secure – Many world-class cryptographers have > been involved in the protocol design, analyzed it, and tried to break it. > > > > TLS has been in the “last call” for several weeks now. What does that > mean, and what’s holding it up? > > > > The IETF is the organization that defines most of the standards that > define how the Internet works. They cover everything from naming (DNS) to > routing around firewalls, up to and including HTTP. The documents, known as > RFCs, are created by working groups, passed to a steering committee for > review, and then published as “Internet Standards.” > > > > Participation in a working group (WG) is, by design, very easy and not a > lot of overhead. You just have to join a mailing list. Every WG has a > mailing list and there are currently more than 110 working groups hosted at > the IETF. Each one has a status page, that shows their charter (what they > are working on), the current sent of documents, and pointers to the mailing > lists. For the TLS working group, that page is at > https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/tls/documents/. > > > > Future RFC’s start as Internet-Drafts. Each draft usually goes through > multiple revisions, as the working group members comment on it, other > feedback is addressed, and so on. At some point, the authors or editors > will post a new draft. By convention, every working group draft is named > “draft-ietf-{WGNAME}-{subject}-{nn}” where {WGNAME} is the name of the > working group, {subject} is the name of the document, and {nn} is the > revision number. For example, “draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21” is the 21st > draft of the TLS 1.3 specification from the TLS working group. > > > > When the working group thinks a document is done, it enters WGLC, working > group last call. This period, usually lasting a couple of weeks, is the > last chance to make editorial or serious factual fixes. Since most people > are deadline-driven, this is usually when many on the WG wake up and read > the drafts. After WGLC, it goes to the IESG (technical leadership > basically) for review. As I said, TLS 1.3 has been in WGLC for weeks. So > why can’t we use it yet? > > > > First, the different drafts don’t interoperate. Each represents a > different milestone on the way to the full specification, and a flag in the > header identifies which draft is being used. OpenSSL, used by most of the > servers on the Internet, is currently at draft-21. Chrome and Firefox, two > of the most popular browsers on the Internet, are staying at draft-18; they > don’t want to upgrade until we have the final version. (I think that’s > silly, but I don’t work for either browser.) > > > > Tests run by various companies, including Google, Mozilla, and Facebook, > indicate that the “failure rate” of TLS 1.3 is disturbingly high. It > appears that network hardware such as routers, gateways, load balancers and > the like, are blocking TLS 1.3 packets because they don’t recognize the > protocol. They are doing “fail closed” and block the connections because > they don’t understand it, rather than assuming it’s safe to forward. The > IETF often uses the term “middlebox” to describe such hardware that > operates between endpoints, and this type of behavior that blocks new > protocols as “ossificiation.” The various companies, and no doubt others, > are trying experiments to tweak the protocol to lower the failure rate. For > example, in some circumstances it might be acceptable to make a TLS 1.3 > message look like a TLS 1.2 message (after you’ve already committed to > doing TLS 1.3). > > > > So far nobody has released any details. When it happens, it will be on the > TLS-WG mailing list, which you can find at the page I referenced above. > Until then, because of the draft differences, it’s impractical to run even > limited deployment tests unless you’re willing to work with bleeding edge > releases and undocumented flags. That’s unfortunate, and we all hope that > the situation will be improved by the next IETF meeting in November. Until > then, we just have to sit tight and wait. > > > > -- > openssl-dev mailing list > To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-dev > >
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