In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> you wrote:
> Ralf S. Engelschall wrote:
>>
>> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> you wrote:
>> > Ralf S. Engelschall wrote:
>> >> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> you wrote:
>> >> > Ralf S. Engelschall wrote:
>> >> >> In short, this (the s_server approach) works:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> ctx = SSL_CTX_new();
>> >> >> SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, ...);
>> >> >> SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, ...);
>> >> >> ssl = SSL_new();
>> >> >> /* now ssl->cert contains the callbacks for the RSA temp key */
>> >> >>
>> >> >> while this (the mod_ssl approach) fails:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> ctx = SSL_CTX_new();
>> >> >> SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, ...);
>> >> >> ssl = SSL_new();
>> >> >> SSL_use_certificate(ctx, ...);
>> >[...]
> Isn't this pointless? Unless you have a cert, any key you set on this
> (empty) cert will get blown away when you do set a cert. Presumably
> setting a temp key should be an error if you have no cert set.
What makes you thinking that the settings are blown away by
SSL_use_certificate and friends? These functions already have checks like ``if
((ssl->cert == NULL) || (ssl->cert == ssl->ctx->default_cert))'' which
prevents them from blowing away the settings, Ben.
Ralf S. Engelschall
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
www.engelschall.com
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