This is most probably due to the fact that nearly no implementation
of DES actually checks or cares in other ways about that parity
bits.
OTOH it would be good practice produce strictly, accept lazy)
to generate the correct parity for that key.
Jef Pearlman schrieb:
>
> Hi -- I'm not sure which list to send it to, or if this has
> been addressed, but I searched the openssl-user and openssl-dev
> archives with no luck.
> I just noticed that using des_random_key does not usually
> produce a valid key, since after the final
>
> des_cbc_cksum(key,&data,sizeof(key),ks,&key);
>
> it does not fix the parity on the new data (which is then copied into
> the return value). Is this the desired behavior? Of, course, adding
>
> des_set_odd_parity(&data);
>
> after the above line fixes the problem. Thanks for the help.
>
> -Jef
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