Thanks for the notification and patch. It's now applied and
committed, and this ticket is now resolved.
[[EMAIL PROTECTED] - Mon Oct 7 13:46:07 2002]:
> openssl will read max 31 bytes of client auth challenge,
> because the following line assumes total message length
> is SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+1, where it's really
> SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2:
>
> in static int client_certificate(SSL *s), s2_clnt.c:772
>
> i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),
> SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+1-s->init_num);
>
> The result is that for 32 byte challenges, only 31 bytes
> will be included in the hash, so the handshake will
> fail.
>
> The patch below fixes this problem.
>
> Thanks
> Zeev
>
> --- openssl-orig/ssl/s2_clnt.c Fri Oct 4 15:53:53 2002
> +++ openssl-SNAP-20021003/ssl/s2_clnt.c Fri Oct 4 15:54:11
2002
> @@ -770,8 +770,8 @@
> if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_A)
> {
> i=ssl2_read(s,(char *)&(buf[s->init_num]),
> -
SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+1-s->init_num);
> - if (i<(SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+1-s->init_num))
> +
SSL2_MAX_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2-s->init_num);
> + if (i<(SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH+2-s->init_num))
>
return(ssl2_part_read(s,SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,i));
> s->init_num += i;
> if (s->msg_callback)
>
>
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--
Richard Levitte
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